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―The classification of the constituents of a chaos, 
nothing less here is essayed.‖ 
Moby Dick, Herman Melville, 1851.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Herman Melville, "Moby Dick," ([Google Books], 1851), 131. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an interrogation into the epistemological structures which underpin 
modernity, the project and claim which has come to significantly shape the 
contemporary world. Following a line of inquiry which analyses the intersections 
between knowledge, power, and history, this paper examines how signifiers such as 
religion and culture have come to designate ‗otherness‘ in the context of modernity. 
The assignment of such terms to beliefs, values, worldviews, and ideologies that are 
not readily assimilated by the epistemological framework of modernity is 
problematised as a central obstacle to mediating social and political difficulties in 
modern contexts.  
The argument is that the issue of ‗what counts for knowledge‘ has been progressively 
‗closed‘ through particular historical processes in which the shift from a societal 
model based upon Judeo-Christian tenets, to secular modernity, has been rendered 
invisible. The ‗other‘ has, through these processes, become twice-removed from 
epistemological validity: in the first instance, as the ‗pagan‘ other in early Christian 
contexts; in the second instance, as the ‗religious‘ or ‗cultural‘ other within a secular 
that is falsely claimed to have been liberated from its theological roots. These 
epistemological marginalisations impact significantly on social life, especially in the 
areas of education and medicine. The invisibility of the shift from Christianity to 
secular modernity is also perpetuated by the separation of social life and knowledge 
production into distinct ‗spheres‘, as mirrored by the arrangement of disciplinary 
spheres established within the modern universities. The conclusion is that a 
transdisciplinary space is therefore required to engage philosophically and critically 
with the now internalised Christian bias of modernity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
―It is always a thankless and awkward task to introduce ideas 
using notions from which one intends to be set free.‖ 
Media Manifestos, Régis Debray, 1996.2 
 
Modernity is a story about how things should be – a utopian negotiation between 
order and chaos presented variously as an ideal, a claim, a project, an ideology, an 
age; a regulative politics that could, from the perspective of seventeenth century 
Europeans, be widely, if violently, distributed to all for the betterment of 
humankind. This has proved to be a compelling narrative; one fraught with hopes 
and dangers (or their alter egos – science, techné, ethnicity, and religion), and with a 
happy ending in which the heroes of progress, democracy, and reason will save the 
day. However, it‘s a hungry story too: obeisance to this story is epidemic, viral; even 
chemotherapeutic. The project of modernity involves replacement, and demands 
compliance. What once was imposed through colonialism and disseminated with the 
promises of better, richer, softer, warmer, ‗Western dreams‘3 now enjoys streamlined 
delivery via the speed and flourish of globalisation. Increased modernisation4 – the 
inevitable outcome of the implementation of such an ideology – is a total package, 
internal to which is an epistemological structure with central tenets that are, 
historically speaking, at least four hundred years old. To briefly signal the argument 
herein, it is precisely the invisibility of this episteme that appears to be at the centre of 
                                                 
2 Régis Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms (London; 
New York, 1996), 7. 
3 As to the origin of the idea of the „West‟, Le Goff writes: “...the notion of Europe was set in opposition 
to that of Asia and, more generally, the East. The „„West‟‟ may thus sometimes designate a territory 
that essentially constitutes that of Europe. The West was... strengthened by Christendom being split 
between the Byzantine Empire and Latin Christendom, the two corresponding, respectively, to an 
Eastern empire and a Western one. This was the major division bequeathed by the Middle Ages. Since 
the demise of the Roman Empire, it had been magnified by the split, at once linguistic, religious, and 
political, between an eastern and a western Europe. The 'western' nature of Latin Christian Europe, 
which lies at the origin of present-day Europe, was further accentuated by a theory that certain 
Christian intellectuals developed in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries... that power and 
civilization had shifted from the east to the west... [The] westward march of civilization certainly 
encouraged a belief in the superiority of western European culture among many Europeans in 
subsequent centuries." Jacques Le Goff, The Birth of Europe, The Making of Europe (Malden, MA, 
2005), 4-5. 
4 As sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt has pointed out, classical theories of modernisation as promoted 
by Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and the like, “...assumed, even if only implicitly, that the cultural program 
as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would 
ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansion of modernity, they 
would prevail throughout the world.” He notes that a multiplicity of „unique expressions of modernity‟ 
(which he calls „multiple modernities‟), have been observed instead. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, 'Multiple 
Modernities,' Daedalus, vol. 129: 1 (2000), 2. 
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many of the difficulties associated with ‗the modern world‘. Yet modernity itself is 
not a common term, and the entanglement of history and power relations 
manifested through claims made in its name so often remain hidden: the ‗citizens of 
modernity‘ are perhaps dissatisfied, but unaware. This is an issue of power and 
knowledge: where the former emits from, how it is maintained, and what counts for 
the latter.  
In the words of Dean MacCannell, there is a restless and persistent ―...belief that 
somewhere, only not right here, not right now, perhaps just over there someplace, in 
another country, in another life-style, in another social class, perhaps, there is a 
genuine society.‖5 The dream is that somewhere, all objections to the black-skinned, 
white-skinned, cultured, gendered, gay, politically radical, mentally ‗ill‘, spiritually 
‗different‘, and religious bodies have been suspended in a utopian hope of radical 
(yet still financially ‗convenient‘ – nobody likes to suffer) equality – the best of 
everything and everyone; the ultimate ‗overcoming‘ of violence and oppression as 
the world becomes egalitarian and harmonious… rather similar to the fantasy of 
multiculturalism pictured in Jehovah‘s Witnesses literature.6 The desire for a lost 
‗golden age‘ appears to possess remarkable cross-cultural consistency, but this is 
illusory: it reliant upon a dislocation that is both spatial and temporal, which makes it 
Judeo-Christian – or more accurately, based upon a set of older cultural ideas which 
eventually codified into what is now collectively known as Judeo-Christian7 – the 
                                                 
5 Dean MacCannell, The Tourist : A New Theory of the Leisure Class, new ed. (USA, 1999), 155. 
6 For example, consider the following anecdote: “A few weeks ago I was shovelling out my driveway 
when a young African American man approached me. I instantly recognized him as an evangelist 
coming to save me. He first handed me a pamphlet with a painting of a beautiful paradisiacal 
landscape, and everyone in the picture was smiling and having a wonderful and wholesome time. 
There are what looks to be an Asian mother and daughter petting a bear near a berry bush, a Latino 
family petting an African lion, an African man and woman, as well as a white boy carrying food. This is 
all set in an idyllic landscape with farmlands and mountains in the background. And, of course it is a 
splendid fall day. Everyone is smiling. I have seen pictures like this one, and they give me a feeling of 
intense uneasiness simply because, in my experience, people should stay away from African lions and 
bears (especially around berry bushes), and people who are delirious happy for no apparent reason 
make me nervous. But what really made me mad was the title of the painting, „Life in a Peaceful NEW 
WORLD.‟ The image that the young man gave me I will label a fantasy of multiculturalism. The reason 
it made me mad was that it was an image in which the challenge of diversity which has constituted 
the New World is stripped out of life. It is a very polite, cleaned-up fiction which we in the history of 
religions might jokingly refer to as the „take a Buddhist to lunch‟ notion of religious plurality.” Philip P. 
Arnold, 'Sacred Landscapes and Global Religion: Reflections on the Significance of Indigenous 
Religions for University Culture,' in Religion and Global Culture : New Terrain in the Study of Religion 
and the Work of Charles H. Long, ed. Jennifer I. M. Reid (New York; Oxford, 2003), 43. 
7 It is worth noting that the concept of Christianity itself is not singular, nor did not arise in a vacuum: 
if an archaeological excavation of Christian symbols were possible, theologians could neither locate 
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same ideas which have structured the epistemological orientations of modernity.8 
Romantic and utopian notions of a return to the pre-modern, the ‗traditional‘, or a 
‗community‘ are also strategic oppositions to where the problem is thought to be 
located: here and now, in the immediacy of ‗modern life‘. 
In MacCannell‘s words, the dream denies any unpleasant reckoning with the guilty 
nature of the modern conscience, based ―...in modern society‘s decadent assaults on 
savagery, peasantry, and on nature itself.‖9 The excuses and justifications are 
ongoing:  
―The primitives had to be converted because they were different: namely, not 
Christian, white, or clothed. They had to be removed because they were in 
the way; there simply was not enough room on this planet for both primitive 
and industrial life. They were occupying valuable real estate. Or perhaps the 
savages had to be destroyed because they were evil.‖10  
 
An even more ingenious dodge is deciding that the category of primitive is ‗just a 
scholarly invention‘; a noted claim of the famous Writing Culture anthropological 
school of thought headed by James Clifford and George Marcus.11 And yet, the 
racialised notions of the savage, traditional, religious (formerly, pagan), barbaric, 
irrational, and so forth, still exist in an uncomfortable tension with the privileges of 
‗whiteness‘ as specifically associated with the ‗progressive‘, ‗modern‘, and ‗civilised‘ 
concepts of light, truth, beauty, logic, and rationality. To this, one could add the 
                                                                                                                                                
any single site of origin characterised by the artifacts of their faith, nor identify any single faith 
community existent today (or at any time) which can reasonably be representative of the entire 
„Christian tradition‟. It is also very difficult, even today, to take a historical look at Christianity without 
becoming entangled in the debate over the invisibility of Christian origins, and even more difficult to 
perform any exegesis on Christian belief and praxis without encountering difficulties in 
contextualisation.  To imagine studying a modern Christian church service, looking for the history of 
symbolism and ritual practice, interpreting the meanings, assessing the social dynamics and the 
impact on the wider community,  and so forth, from the perspective of a non-Western, non-Christian 
anthropologist, might momentarily allow some sense of what this might entail. 
8 So to speak of the „Judeo-Christian‟ –a term that arose as a Protestant response to Catholic anti-
semitism –  is actually the process of employing hindsight logic in order to approximate what traces of 
Biblical or prophetic instruction appear to have been influential on the later development of 
modernity. „Judeo-Christian‟ does not make sense as a Jewish term. As argued by Ruprecht: “The 
hyphen that attempted to link these terms eventually drove a wedge between them…  Ours is a 
culture deeply informed by, and still under the influence of, a Christian culture – specifically, the 
Protestant culture of northern Europe. That culture may have been deliberately Hebraizing itself, but 
there is little directly Jewish about it.” Louis A. Ruprecht, Was Greek Thought Religious? On the Use 
and Abuse of Hellenism, from Rome to Romanticism (New York, 2002), 40. 
9 Dean MacCannell, Empty Meeting Grounds : The Tourist Papers (London; New York, 1992), 20. 
10 Ibid., 20. 
11 James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., Writing Culture (USA; UK, 1986). Noted in MacCannell, 
Empty Meeting Grounds : The Tourist Papers, 22. 
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claim that ‗religion‘ and ‗culture‘ are also categories invented by scholars, as 
Jonathan Z. Smith notes.  
―‗Religion‘ is not a native term; it is a term created by scholars for their 
intellectual purposes and therefore is theirs to define. It is a second-order, 
generic concept that plays the same role in establishing a disciplinary horizon 
that a concept such as ‗language‘ plays in linguistics or ‗culture‘ plays in 
anthropology.‖12  
 
But it has become a native term – if even by sleight-of-hand or unconscious 
appropriation – and to brush it aside with scholarly flair is perhaps to offend a 
considerable number of the world‘s population who now claim the word ‗religion‘ 
for themselves. Further to this, as Tomoko Masuzawa writes:  
―...the categories religion and culture… are both historically specific, fairly 
recent formations, and our daily employment of these terms, however natural 
and uncontroversial it may seem, is in fact mobilizing and energizing a 
powerful ideology of modernity, both feeding on and feeding into a certain 
logic that is central to our notion of who we are and what we are… the term 
‗culture‘ is dangerously capacious, semantically vague and confused, and 
finally, taken as a whole, inconsistent.‖13   
 
‗Culture‘ and ‗religion‘ as wielded by the scholar is especially so: reductions 
conveniently ascribed to elements of the worldview of ‗the other‘ supposedly to 
prevent the loss of efficacy and context, but yet, this is so often its consequence. The 
difficulty is that these collective terms encompass both more, and less, than is 
intended by their use, and their meaning changes radically with context. The post-
modern ‗push‘ for cultural relativism appears to mandate for the equality of values, 
but in practice, does little to actually mitigate inequality. As Alex Callinicos notes, 
                                                 
12 Jonathan Z. Smith, 'Religion, Religions, Religious,' in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark 
C. Taylor (USA, 1998), 281-282. Religion is also often „colonised‟ into the thinking of non-Western 
scholars who are trained in the West and export the term to apply it in „non-Western‟ contexts in 
„Western‟ ways. Masuzawa writes: “In the social sciences and humanities alike, „religion‟ as a 
category has been left largely unhistoricized, essentialized, and tacitly presumed immune or 
inherently resistant to critical analysis… [Religions] are often arranged by means of one or the other of 
various systems of classification… [and] what these systems do… is to distinguish the West from the 
rest… [a] demarcation… which is in all known cases historically aligned or conflated, though not 
without some ambiguity, within Christendom.” Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, 
or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (USA, 2005), 1-3. For the 
relationship between „the West‟ and „religion‟, also see Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction 
of Religion : Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology (USA, 2003), 1-6. 
13 Tomoko Masuzawa, 'Culture,' in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (USA, 
1998), 71. 
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the main difficulty with post-modernist philosophers is ―...their denial of any 
objectivity to discourse, their inability to ground the resistance to power which they 
claim to articulate, and their denial of any coherence or initiative to the human 
subject.‖14 Despite the claim that cultural relativism empowers all perspectives, the 
failure to relativise the ‗modern‘ – which derives from the failure to recognise the 
modern as ‗cultural‘ – actually results in the disempowerment of other cultural 
positions. The post- of post-modernity does not transcend the modern:15 it remains 
complicit and thus facilitates the continuation of the project, whilst a pluralism of 
values as experienced in the cities, suburbs, villages, slums, ghettos, institutions and 
the various ‗marginalised‘ sectors of society (to use an ‗outsider term‘) carry on 
jostling for position, often antagonistically.  
Culture has also been improperly attached to nationalistic, ethnic, and racial 
identities in a manner which may render other (often more immediately 
discriminatory) social demarcations invisible.16 This may force the inclination to 
make a ‗cultural‘ justification for rights or resources in which culture (equally ‗race‘ 
or ‗ethnicity‘) may actually play a minor role. Culture can be an instrument of power 
where the mismatch between the values or epistemological orientations of the 
claimant vis-a-vis the modern state is either concealed or inaccessible. Further, whilst 
the most visible outcome of epistemological difference is manifested socio-
economically, education and medicine also present as common sites of resistance in 
the bid for an increased equality of values; both areas in which ‗experts‘ transmit 
knowledge derived from universalistic values which are at odds with ‗cultural‘ or 
‗religious‘ variations. 
Culture as a term employed outside academia can be a reference to something 
important that is claimed, recalled, remembered, reinvented, or retrieved. The 
questions of authenticity commonly raised in existentialist and post-modernist 
salons have no traction among those scrabbling for rights or resources once the 
                                                 
14 Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism : A Marxist Critique (Cambridge, 1989), 6. 
15 Consider McLennan: “…definitive of postmodernism is its rejection of the primacy of 
epistemological discourse itself.  In particular postmodernism refuses to depict the „object‟ of 
knowledge as some independent, real order of being.” Gregor McLennan, 'Feminism, Epistemology 
and Postmodernism: Reflections on Current Ambivalence,' Sociology, vol. 29: 2 (1995), 394. 
16 Perhaps, because all are modern taxonomies: personal communication with thesis supervisor Dr 
Michael Grimshaw 2011. 
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juggernaut of modernity has arrived. The academic suggestion that there is no 
primordial or essential state of being to be recovered is reasonable, but the bid – 
which is often politically motivated – to ‗revive culture‘ or ‗reclaim religion‘ 
proceeds nonetheless. So what is particular about humankind that provokes this 
desire to retrieve something ‗lost‘ (if often inaccurately articulated or identified) from 
a presumably ‗remembered past‘? This is not only a post-colonial inclination, but a 
utopian aspiration seemingly common to many, if not all: this sense of loss is now 
shared by people the world over. Whether it is a yearning for culture, identity, 
tradition, values, community, family, happiness, wellbeing, security, inclusion, or 
satisfaction, the basis for utopian thinking seems universally oriented backwards 
(perhaps marked as the time before an event, such as colonialism, but often not), and 
oriented also towards ‗elsewhere‘ – not here, not yet. As William Rasch notes, 
referencing a distinctly Christian narrative: ―It is as if the City of Man, in which we 
are of necessity condemned to live, perpetually suffers from the knowledge that it is 
not, thought it somehow should be, the City of God. The resultant fever is 
messianic…‖17 
There is a distinction between those who can identify something tangible which 
modernity has failed to replace (such as culture, religion, or tradition), versus those 
who are dissatisfied and/or displaced: it is socially unacceptable to be dissatisfied 
within modernity without a ‗legitimate‘ claim to speak of. What is deemed 
legitimate is determined by a kind of legal logic which places the onus on the 
complainant to ‗make the case‘ for their dissatisfaction. It is little wonder the former 
‗primitives‘, now modernised, relocated, ‗developed‘ or assimilated into large urban 
centres, not only share in the anomie of the modern age but perhaps its apathy and 
nihilism too. This ‗loss‘, as now experienced by all, is not the perpetual ‗state of 
humanity‘ to which a philosopher or psychologist may refer, but an inherited 
dislocation which has been distributed via the replacement and compliance ethos of 
                                                 
17 William Rasch, Niklas Luhmann's Modernity: The Paradoxes of Differentiation, ed. Hent De Vries 
and Mieke Bal, Cultural Memory in the Present (USA, 2000), 5. Consider Benjamin also: “There is a 
secret agreement between past generations and the present one. Our coming was expected on earth. 
Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a 
power to which the past has a claim. That claim cannot be settled cheaply. Historical materialists are 
aware of that.” Illuminations (1968) cited in Avery Gordon, Ghostly Matters : Haunting and the 
Sociological Imagination (USA, 1997), 164. 
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modernity. This is recognised as such within both post-colonialism and indigenous 
scholarship, though perhaps without explicit linkage to Judeo-Christian values.  
Whilst no-one is disagreeing with the notion that something unpleasant 
accompanied the fruits of modernity, framing it generally as a ‗loss of culture‘, a 
concern specific to indigenous groups, or a racialised concern which is somehow 
separated from the ‗privileges of whiteness‘, is a gross under-analysis. The difference 
between the newly modernised/post-colonised and ‗the civilisers‘ (of whatever 
geographical persuasion), is simply a ‗depth-of-time‘ issue, that is: requiring the 
consideration of the speed with which the formerly Judeo-Christian ‗modern‘ 
episteme becomes ‗culture‘ in modernised groups, within which it eventually 
appears indigenous. As no one group can claim Judeo-Christian roots embedded in a 
particular territory, all must be thought of as ‗colonised‘ through these ideas – even if 
they were later delivered in an embellished form by the proponents of modernity.18 
The ascription of ‗the West‘ to an imaginary territory – that is referred to, yet cannot 
be physically located – illustrates this well: to be ‗Western‘ is ideally to be an 
indigene of the imagined terrain peculiar to modernity.19 That it is a morally and 
structurally Christianised West without a single individual (or founding ancestor) 
who is to be responsible for its perceived benefits, nor ‗evils‘, seems too easily 
forgotten when the dialectic of alterity is invoked in either direction. 
Theodore Zeldin writes: ―The history of Paradise begins on the day its gates were 
shut for the last time. Until then, Paradise had no history. Nothing ever happened; 
                                                 
18 As Slavoj Zizek claims, Christianity is the first modernity. Slavoj Zizek, The Puppet and the Dwarf : 
The Perverse Core of Christianity, Short Circuits (Cambridge, USA, 2003). 
19 Though the use of the term „Western‟ is incredibly problematic, cultural theorist Raymond Williams 
supplies a useful definition that summarises how its use is to be interpreted here: “...a whole body of 
practices and expectations over the whole of living: our sense and assignments of energy, our shaping 
perceptions of ourselves and our world. It is a lived system of meanings and values – constitutive and 
constituting – which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming.” 
Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (UK, 1977), 110. He calls this a „selective tradition‟ 
because it incorporates the entire social process. It is not just an „ideology‟, but an entire way of 
thinking and being that transcends the purely mental: a collection of subjects, objects, and ideas 
which together form some sort of cohesive whole. Robert C. Ulin, Understanding Cultures : 
Perspectives in Anthropology and Social Theory, 2nd ed. (USA, 2001), 174. It is this whole which is 
governed by an epistemology that is fundamentally inhospitable to any forms of religiosity that escape 
their imaginary, yet designated, „sphere‟. 
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everybody was happy: there was no more to be said.‖20 MacCannell‘s view coincides 
with this. He writes:  
―I suspect that the capital offense committed by the savages and the other 
non-European peoples was not that they were living a life entirely different 
from the Europeans who discovered them. It was that they were living a life 
entirely different, and evidently enjoying it. Human beings accept difference 
much more easily if those who are different from themselves also appear to 
be unhappy.‖21  
 
MacCannell gives several examples to back up his observation, noting that it is 
generally completely overlooked by the social sciences, and ―...strange that no one 
seems to have noticed this hatred of the pleasure of others, absolute to the point of 
being expressed casually, without any felt need for justification.‖22  
This hostility to the contentment of ‗the other‘ has since evolved into an ongoing 
attempt to overcome the dislocation particular to the Judeo-Christian myth of 
origins which continues to relocate the potential for happiness and enjoyment with 
the secular modern world to the past or future. The inclination to ‗romance the 
primitive‘ is just a singular example of this attempt. At the heart of this argument, 
therefore, is the notion that with the loss of location, the ‗civilised‘ (now ‗modern‘) 
person also experiences a loss of identity – the ‗modern‘ person in the ‗modern‘ 
world is, by default, anonymously Judeo-Christian23 – thus, further propelling the 
scramble for happiness, security, cultural and religious identity, embeddedness in a 
distinct location or community, personal fulfilment, and so forth. This sense of 
absence, which underpins the conceptual structure of modernity, is the inheritance 
from Judaism: a cultural-religious matrix which rejected the concept of a local god 
                                                 
20 Theodore Zeldin, Happiness: An Exploration of the Art of Sleeping, Eating, Complaining, Postponing, 
Sympathising, and, above All, Being Free (London, 1990), 7. 
21 MacCannell, Empty Meeting Grounds : The Tourist Papers, 22. 
22 Ibid., 22-23. Implicit to MacCannell‟s argument is the assumption that the contentment observed in 
the so-called primitive lifestyle was not just an invention transmitted through textual accounts over 
time, and it is noted that some scholars may take the position that this cannot be extrapolated from 
historical accounts with any certainty. However, there is some agreement amongst those groups who 
might have been identified as tribal or primitive by early anthropologists that there was a sense of 
contentment and balance enjoyed by their ancestors which they claim was disrupted by colonial or 
modern forces, etc. What is often argued for within post-colonial and indigenous scholarship is a 
return to „relationality‟ between the inhabitants of an environment, their worldview, and the external 
world itself, a strategy that is essentially aimed towards closing the (invented, modern) gap between 
self and nature – in a bid to restore the sense of contentment or connection that is identified as „lost‟. 
23 Concept of „anonymous Christianity‟ as applicable to modernity emerged from personal 
communication with thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw 2011. 
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tied to a special location and devised a unique temporal-spatial context within which 
‗community‘ was reconfigured as nomadic.24 Melanie Phillips writes that ―Judaism, 
which underpinned Western rationalism though its assertion of an orderly universe, 
can lay reasonable claim to being the most rational of all religions. Unlike 
Christianity, Judaism is all about this world, not the next, and is firmly grounded in 
man‘s deeds, in historical memory and in the here and now.‖25 Christianity adopted 
the emphasis on history, but abandoned the here and now, except in its relation with 
salvation. The failure of Christianity to incorporate the cultural adhesion of the 
Judaic community – one that binds despite this dislocation – culminates in the 
philosophical rationale underlying scientific progress.  
Scientific inquiry has pursued the exploration, explanation, and the eventual 
conquering of every kind of space – internal and external – so as to ground humans 
conclusively in the corporeal natural world; leaving nothing to chance or fate by 
attempting to bring not only the world, but even the past and future under human 
control. Science, and as Paul Heelas argues, modernity itself, is ―...characterized by 
the attempt to ‗pin down‘: to establish the determinate; to find order by way of 
classification; to explain how things work by distinguishing between essences and 
finding relevant mechanisms of operation.‖26 Scientific knowledge – derived from 
experience, experiments, and equations – is the outcome; a response to a theological 
problem inherited along with other aspects of Judeo-Christian epistemology that 
were integral to the ‗lived experience‘ of the pioneers of the Enlightenment. Biblical 
morality, monotheism, universalism, soteriology, teleology, eschatology, 
providence, authoritarianism, transcendental sovereignty, divine election, etc., are so 
                                                 
24 The use of the term „Judeo-Christian‟ as a combination of Judaic structures of belief and practice, 
re-interpreted and reconfigured by Christianity (as against anti-semitism), is evident here.  
25 Melanie Phillips, The World Turned Upside Down : The Global Battle over God, Truth, and Power 
(New York, 2010), 330. Consider Benjamin: “We know that the Jews were prohibited from 
investigating the future. The Torah and the prayers instruct them in remembrance, however. This 
stripped the future of its magic, to which all those succumb who turn to the soothsayers for 
enlightenment. This does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future turned into homogeneous, 
empty time. For every second of time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter.” 
Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, Harry Zohn trans. (New York, [1937]1968), 264. 
26 Paul Heelas, 'Introduction: On Differentiation and Dedifferentiation,' in Religion, Modernity, and 
Postmodernity, ed. Paul Morris, Paul Heelas, and David Martin (Oxford, UK; Malden, USA, 1998), 2. 
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deeply embedded in modernity, so interiorised, as to appear legitimately secular, 
thus concealing their indelibly Judeo-Christian origins.27 
This epistemological context has determined the values which possess salience in the 
modern world: whose have merit, what values are to be upheld? What voices have 
power, what ideas, what theories and practices?  What is possible in light of this 
configuration of values and voices, and what is not? Understanding the 
epistemological context illuminates the logic behind the rejection of alternative 
visions; so often seen as a (faint) possibility or (merely) a personal/group preference 
instead of a force that compels action and requires legal and social accommodation. 
Any hierarchy of values (which translates to persons and institutions) requires the 
exclusion and subordination of particular kinds of knowledge in order to prop up the 
mechanisms of social control over any large body of people. Even the earliest 
examples of political organisation in cosmopolitan centres have conformed to this 
strategy.28 Increased violence results, however, when the majority of the population 
are dissatisfied with the dominant hierarchy of values; forcing the governing 
                                                 
27 There have been several debates, especially among German scholars, about how these transfers 
actually occurred. Whereas Karl Löwith, Jacob Taubes, and others, consider progress to be clearly the 
result of secularised Judeo-Christian eschatology – in Carl Schmitt‟s case, the political and legal are 
natural extensions of the theological. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology : Four Chapters on the Concept 
of Sovereignty, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, USA, [1921]1985). Karl 
Löwith, Meaning in History (USA, 1949), ibid. Jacob Taubes, Occidental Eschatology,, ed. Hent de 
Vries and Mieke Bal, Cultural Memory in the Present (USA, [1947] 2009). Hans Blumenberg, arguing 
against Löwith and others, writes that modernity is not, as they claim, the transposition of the 
theological into „secularized alienation‟ from their original context, but the “...reoccupation of answer 
positions that had become vacant and whose corresponding questions could not be eliminated.” In 
short, the modern concepts we consider to have theological origins are modern responses to pre-
modern questions. Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, Studies in Contemporary 
German Social Thought (Cambridge, USA, 1983), 65. For the connections between Taubes, Schmitt, 
and Blumenberg, insightful also for presenting Taubes‟ respect for Schmitt‟s ideas, despite his Nazi 
associations, see „Appendix A: The Jacob Taubes-Carl Schmitt story‟ in Jacob Taubes, The Political 
Theology of Paul, ed. Aleida Assman, Dana Hollander trans., Cultural Memory in the Present (USA, 
2004), 97-106. An alternative view is found in Hubert Cancik (1979) “...who has shown that many of 
the traits associated with modernity, namely, the belief in progress and in a rational approach to 
nature that is to be the object of one‟s imperium and entrepreneurship, can be found in Rome.” As 
Rome was notable for its Jewish, and later, Christian, populous however, it seems difficult to separate 
Roman „culture‟ from whatever influence both Judaism and Christianity may have had in the absolute 
sense alluded to here. Cited in Gustavo Benavides, 'Modernity,' in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, 
ed. Mark C. Taylor (USA, 1998), 192. 
28 See Justin Jennings, Globalizations and the Ancient World (Cambridge, UK; New York, 2011). 
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institutions and governed populations to work to maintain, or resist, ongoing social 
controls.29 
The Enlightenment claim that modernity would equal the end of violence has 
proven to be magnificently unsuccessful.  Wars are now called ‗conflicts‘, 
‗insurgencies‘, ‗occupations‘, or ‗operations‘ – for example, the ongoing war in Iraq 
is also called Operation Iraqi Freedom – but the promises that continue to be made 
in the name of modernity (or ‗Westernisation‘, or globalisation) remain unfulfilled. 
In a present day context, increased modernisation does not amount to freedom, 
security, food, or housing, for a considerable majority of the world‘s population. 
Modernity was fashioned through an ideological violence that systematically 
exorcised alternatives as it became increasingly purified and narrowed. In addition, 
the action of a secularised millenarianism paradoxically pushes forwards towards a 
utopia framed as the outcome of progress, whilst simultaneously generating 
momentum towards what is most accurately seen as an epistemological dead end.30 
As Michel Serres notes:  
―Mastery and possession: these are the master words launched by Descartes 
at the dawn of the scientific and technological age, when our Western reason 
went off to conquer the universe. We dominate and appropriate it: such is the 
shared philosophy underlying industrial enterprise as well as so-called 
disinterested science, which are indistinguishable in this respect. Cartesian 
mastery brings science‘s objective violence into line, making it a well-
controlled strategy. Our fundamental relationship with objects comes down 
to war and property.‖31  
 
Security in the face of such violence is difficult to come by. Harvey Cox points to 
similar dangers when he asks: ―A question might legitimately arise… about those 
myriad modern men who feel the full weight of relativism but have no faith. Must it 
                                                 
29 For the argument that rising violence is essential to the maintenance of both social control and 
economic growth, see Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine : The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, 1st ed. 
(New York, 2007). 
30 Take, for example, the difficulty of incorporating Heisenberg‟s matrix theory of quantum mechanics 
into scientific experiments. As this represents an „epistemological limit‟, beyond which science (as 
presently defined) has no validity, scientists have to reject the implications of this theory in order to 
continue the progression of „science‟. 
31 Michel Serres, The Natural Contract (USA, 1995), 32. 
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not be conceded that, for them, Ivan Karamazov is right when he says that, if God is 
dead, then anything is possible?‖32,33 
Within modernity, the relations between knowledge and power which perpetuate, 
and are perpetuated by, the epistemological apparti in an ouroboric cycle of 
repetition:34 one that appears to be maintained primarily in the service of capitalism. 
Philip Goodchild writes: ―To ask who will suffer for us so that we do not have to is 
the implicit theology of the pursuit of money.‖35 Slavery, colonialism, and the 
expansion of empire (from Rome, to the Commonwealth, to globalised Euro-
American culture) always was, and always will be, about resources – regardless of 
whether the articles of trade are defined geographically or in terms of human capital. 
In the spirit of cultural Marxism via Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, 
therefore, this impetus that is unabashedly maintaining the totalitarian tendencies of 
modernity invites a challenge that does not resort to a model based on war, violence, 
or suspicion – all of which are internal to and thus, constrained by, the logics of 
                                                 
32 Harvey  Cox, The Secular City : Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective (London, 
1965), 44-48. Here, Cox is presuming faith to have a limited context – that of religion – though an 
alternative might be a faith in the modern, in techne, in one‟s self or in a particular moral code. Cox‟s 
argument is that modernity, or more pointedly, secularisation, forces us to become „citizens of the 
land of broken symbols‟; self-reflexive enough to apprehend the full horror of an irreversible and 
absolute relativisation (in both ethics and belief) that no previous generation has had to comprehend. 
This multiplicity and indeterminacy which historical consciousness and psychology appear to have 
together contributed to, makes plausible the notion that all things, religious and otherwise, are the 
products of humankind which, all persons being equal, results in all things being relative; thus, 
everything, and nothing, is important. Importantly, the truth of this is also relative. He takes the notion 
of „broken symbols‟ from theologian Paul Tillich, but what is either unstated or unrealised in the way 
he uses this idea is that there has never been any „authentic‟ or holistic symbolic order which might 
„break‟ – the notion of a progression from chaos, to cohesion, to chaos, is in itself a scholarly and 
social myth. 
33 Tracking a citation is sometimes labyrinthine: citations act as what Giorgio Agamben calls the „go-
betweens‟ in a „secret meeting‟ which takes place between past generations and ours; and even 
within this citation, Agamben is drawing upon Walter Benjamin. Giorgio Agamben, The Time That 
Remains : A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans (California, USA, 2005), 139. Take this 
example: Cox is drawing upon a well known phrase attributed to Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers 
Karamazov (London, 1920). Dostoyevsky, in turn, is drawing upon Nietzsche, as Michael Gillespie 
points out: “Nietzsche believed that while the death of God and the consequent collapse of European 
values would throw humanity into an abyss of war and destruction, this event would also open up the 
world in a way unknown since the tragic age of the Greeks. While he recognizes that God‟s death 
would produce a „monstrous logic of terror,‟ he also believed that „at long last, the horizon appears 
free to us again.‟ If God is dead and nothing is true, then, he concluded, „everything is permitted.‟” 
Citations in text from original by Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Giorgio 
Colli and Mazzino Montinari, vol. 2 (Berlin, [1864]1967). Cited by Michael Allen Gillespie, The 
Theological Origins of Modernity (USA, 2008), 13. 
34 From „Uroboros‟, depicted as a snake or dragon eating its own tail. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
English Dictionary Online (2011); available from http://www.oed.com. Retrieved 20 April 2011. 
35 Philip Goodchild, Theology of Money (Durham, USA, 2009), 238. 
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modernity.36 The equality championed by societies which are themselves a product 
of Enlightenment values must overturn this totalitarianism in the service of a self-
reflexivity often cited as necessary and internal to the project of modernity; though 
this is rarely demanded, nor achieved.37 Such self-reflexivity must accommodate the 
question of whether the project of modernity has never been ‗modern‘ enough – that 
is, true to the ideology or claim – to ‗progress‘ beyond this totalitarianism; or 
whether project, claim, and ideology are faulty at base.38 In addition, all 
fundamentalisms essentially amount to rejections of modernity, as implied by John 
Gray:  
―The Enlightenment is a part of the way we live and think. The point is not 
to accept or reject it but to understand it. This requires that we view it not as 
partisans or enemies but from a distance, as if we were excavating a lost 
religion… Just as religious fundamentalists present a severely simplified 
version of the faith to which they want to return, Enlightenment 
fundamentalists present a sanitized copy of the tradition they wish to revive. 
In so doing, they block understanding of the Enlightenment‘s role in our 
present difficulties.‖39  
 
                                                 
36The notion of Enlightenment as totalitarian derives directly from the Frankfurt School. As de Wilde 
writes: “…the early Frankfurt School [was] a philosophical movement that attempted to save the 
critical impetus of Enlightenment thought. In the eyes of the Frankfurt School, the First World War had 
discredited the Enlightenment‟s dominant cultural and philosophical expression in Germany, that is, 
idealism… The crisis of idealism thus caused the members of the Frankfurt School to search for a 
radical alternative, which they eventually found in an unorthodox Marxist approach.” Marc de Wilde, 
'Violence in the State of Exception : Reflections on Theologico-Political Motifs in Benjamin and 
Schmitt,' in Political Theologies : Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, ed. Hent de Vries and 
Lawrence Eugene Sullivan (New York, 2006), 189. With regard to the critique of modernity, Gillespie 
writes: “…questions about the modern project [have] been raised before. Indeed, while modernity had 
increasingly engaged the imagination of European intellectuals since the latter half of the 
seventeenth century, there had always been those who had doubts that it was an unqualified good. In 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the broadest claims of the modern project had 
been called into question in the famous Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns, but this for the 
most part was merely a rear-guard effort by humanists defending the authority of classical thought 
against Cartesian modernists. Rousseau launched a similar but broader attack in his Discourse on 
the Arts and Sciences…  And finally, Hume mounted a skeptical attack that called into question the 
idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect that was essential to the idea of an 
apodictic science. [But] the critique of modernity often fell on deaf ears.” Gillespie, The Theological 
Origins of Modernity, 256. 
37 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London, 1973), 6. 
38 The idea that we have never been modern is the subject of Latour‟s noted book. Bruno Latour, We 
Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, USA, 1993). The notion that modernity is plagued by the 
improper use of Reason, which is therefore linked to the notion of the „irrational modern‟ of whom 
Latour writes, is the claim of Immanuel Kant. 
39 John Gray, Enlightenment's Wake : Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age (New York, 
2007), xvi. Consider also, “The kingdom of God was a feast promised for those without wealth.” 
Goodchild, Theology of Money, 2. 
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The Enlightenment project of emancipation from the ‗tyranny of tradition‘, to 
borrow from Alasdair MacIntyre, was a genuine attempt to ‗found a social order in 
which the appeal to universal, tradition-independent norms‘ would result in a liberal, 
individualist, and eminently rational society.40 As Condorcet‘s famous essay on 
progress (1793) argued: ―Once people in the West threw off the yoke of tradition and 
recognized at last that knowledge arises only through careful generalizations from 
the givens of sense experience, scientific growth and moral improvement were 
bound to accelerate as they had since the seventeenth century.‖41 The project of 
modernity promised a great deal based on initial indications that perfection was 
possible: ‗Reason‘ would bring about perfection on earth and progress was the 
means by which utopia would be realised.42 It is on this basis that many continue to 
philosophically uphold secular modernity as viable; despite the evidence that Reason 
has not brought an end to the collective suffering and violence experienced in the 
world. In fact, human life may arguably have become more savage and irrational as 
science has accelerated.43 Alexander Boot supplies a particularly rich metaphor: 
―Without the warmth of a metaphysical soul, reason is a cold-spermed warlock, 
capable of destruction but unable to procreate.‖44 According to ‗the vision‘, secular 
modernity is pursued by the individual seeking increased security and wellbeing 
(often via capitalistic gain), or moral freedoms; and on the societal level, motivated 
by the ideal of reduced violence between countries or various factions, or material 
security without ideological or economic opposition, especially in societal contexts 
where this is achievable.45 This is messianic, which is both its appeal, and its failing: 
as it remains – via Walter Benjamin – the ‗angel of history‘ for most.46 
                                                 
40 Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (USA, 1988), 335. 
41 Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progres de l'esprit humain (1793), cited in Charles 
Larmore, 'History and Truth,' Daedalus, vol. 133: 3 (2004), 47. 
42 Phillips, The World Turned Upside Down : The Global Battle over God, Truth, and Power, 245. “The 
term „enlighten‟ was actually first used in print in English in 1667 by Milton, whose God in Paradise 
Lost commands the archangel Michael to „reveal to Adam what shall come... As I shall thee 
enlighten.” Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity, 257. 
43 John Gray, Heresies (London, 2004), 4. 
44 Alexander Boot, How the West Was Lost (London, 2006), 11, ibid. 
45 Foucault offers an historical parallel which may be useful for understanding the „promise‟ of secular 
modernity and the means of sustaining belief in this promise: “At the end of the eighteenth century, 
people dreamed of a society without crime. And then the dream evaporated. Crime was too useful for 
them to dream of anything as crazy – or ultimately as dangerous – as a society without crime. No 
crime means no police. What makes the presence and control of the police tolerable for the 
population, if not fear of the criminal? This institution of the police, which is so recent and so 
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This entanglement of reduced violence and moral freedoms ties directly into the 
context in which secularity arose and became plausible; as a response to the wars 
over religion, sovereignty, and territory that proceeded from the Crusades onwards. 
Cox writes: ―Christian and Arab scholars seemed able to get along surprisingly well 
when they stopped discussing the Holy Trinity versus the one God Allah and began 
dissecting animals, enumerating things, or peering through telescopes.‖47 The failure 
of this project to translate into universal social improvement still appears mysterious 
to those who continue to advocate for the tenets of Enlightenment ‗faith‘: such as 
‗development‘, democracy, and increased industrialisation. These same advocates 
continue to have the upper hand, and, in the face of any and all opposition, the 
juggernaut pushes onward: the question is, how? To take the lead from Karl Marx, 
the issue of how an idea becomes a material force is central: in this case, to inquire 
into the means by which the idea of modernity has become incorporated and 
embodied in a manner that has literally transformed the world. 
The project of modernity maintains both transcendental power and an 
epistemological supremacy which has engulfed the world; primarily, by establishing 
‗ideal‘ types of governance, education, medicine, etc., and the reinforcement of 
‗Western values‘ through the media and popular culture.48 The transmission of this 
                                                                                                                                                
oppressive, is only justified by that fear. If we accept the presence in our midst of these uniformed 
men, who have the exclusive right to carry arms, who demand our papers, who come and prowl on our 
doorsteps, how would any of this be possible if there were no criminals? And if there weren‟t articles 
every day in the newspaper telling us how numerous and dangerous our criminals are?” Michel 
Foucault and Colin Gordon, Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 
(UK, 1980), 47. 
46 This line must be attributed to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw 2011. Benjamin‟s most cited 
work on the angel of history (the first of three separate and distinct works which allude to the angel) is 
translated as follows. “A Klee painting named ‟Angelus Novus‟ shows an angel looking as though it is 
about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is 
open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turning toward 
the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling 
wreckage upon wreckage and hurts it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the 
dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got 
caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly 
propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows 
skyward. This storm is what we call progress.” Benjamin, Illuminations, 257-258. 
47 Cox, The Secular City : Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective, 228. Note that 
Islamic expansion and self-definition, which began in the seventh and eighth centuries CE, is often 
reduced to “Arab‟ in a way which decontextualises the actual nature of trans-Muslim identities – 
salient then, as now. See Ruprecht, Was Greek Thought Religious? On the Use and Abuse of 
Hellenism, from Rome to Romanticism, 79. 
48 For a plausible view with regard to the role played by power in European modernity, consider 
Benavides citing Mark Elvin‟s work (1986) as follows: “Elvin singled out the following characteristics: 
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epistemology is particularly reliant upon its maintenance within all secular 
institutions;49 however, the keystone of these is education. The latter maintains the 
epistemological rigour of the whole social system; thus, the epistemological 
boundaries are maintained via knowledge dissemination, creating a ‗closed system‘: 
from the top down, and the bottom up. The institutions and the ways in which they 
reproduce and disseminate knowledge function as a vehicle for the specifically 
Judeo-Christian values and mechanisms which underpin the foundation of the 
institutions themselves, and upon which the ideologies of secular modernity rely: 
hence, establishing the ouroboric loop. 
Universities legitimise ‗experts‘ in all fields who are then deployed to the other 
institutions to act out the role of replicating knowledge en masse.50 These same 
universities train experts who establish school curriculums, and, at a lower level, 
primary and secondary school teachers, who establish norms based upon the 
Western intellectual and philosophical traditions. Values and behaviours that are 
generated by said traditions are mandated via the curriculum – culminating in the 
social articulation of the epistemology. The education of each subsequent generation 
builds on the education of the earlier generations in a manner which extends the 
epistemological reach of ‗modernity‘ until the corresponding values become 
embedded in the smallest social unit (the family) and ideally, begin to self-reproduce, 
                                                                                                                                                
power over other human beings, practical power over nature in terms of the capacity for economic 
production, and intellectual power over nature in the form of capacity for prediction. We should in fact 
consider that it is the interaction between the exercise of reflexivity and the capacity to exercise power 
– in other words between modernity and modernization – that has led to the emergence of the 
peculiar configuration known as Western modernity.” Benavides, 'Modernity,' 188. 
49 It is important to consider whether or not there are truly any „neutral‟ institutions. Anything 
„institutionalised‟ (in either the anthropological sense or the bureaucratic sense) has already shifted 
the locus of power into a context that is structurally modern in terms of organisation, including the 
„religious‟ institutions – Weber‟s iron cage (more accurately, and in recent translations - shell as hard 
as steel). Original quotation in found in Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
Talcott Parsons trans. (London, 1930), 181. 
50 “The medieval term universitas, originally applied to any legally defined guild or corporation, came 
to be applied from the fifteenth century exclusively to the academic corporations.  The usual medieval 
term denoting a university up until then was studium generale or stadium… the essential identity of 
the university was that of a community of masters or scholars, associating in the pursuit of higher 
education – teaching, learning, and exploring the frontiers of knowledge and understanding. Many of 
the earlier institutions of higher education – in Greece, in the Roman Empire, and in the Arab world – 
were undoubtedly universities in this sense.  Aristotle‟s Lyceum, for example, taught a wide range of 
subjects in the sciences and humanities, carried out research type activities, and was reputed to have 
had 2,000 pupils by the time of Aristotle‟s successor.” Glenys Patterson, The University : From Ancient 
Greece to the 20th Century (Palmerston North, N.Z., 1997), 9. 
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as in autopoiesis.51 This is what post-colonial scholars seek to dismantle when they 
talk of ‗decolonising education‘. Thus, with the attainment of sufficient historical 
depth, the process results in the now indigenous ‗citizen of the world‘: the Western 
individual.  
The process of enculturation – it is suggested that the epistemology acts as culture – is 
supported by these institutional means in a manner that is epistemologically resilient 
enough to consistently marginalise ways of thinking and being that might destabilise 
its authority. Consider, for example, the area of ‗religion‘, for which the necessary 
praxis (in order to be ‗modern‘) is the orientation of spiritual matters ‗inward‘, whilst 
outwardly expressing agreement with the distinction between ‗truth‘ and ‗error‘ that 
is characteristic of a ‗modern society‘. Modernity does not ‗allow‘ religion to be 
visible: the stamping of universality upon diversity ultimately requires religious 
expressions that refuse to be neatly contained within their designated sphere to be 
formally classified as liminal: confined structurally to the margins of public life, 
whilst simultaneously, remaining central to private life.52 As the ‗social‘ is not an 
entity with its own agency, individuals who comprise the social – each with their 
own set of rationalisations, beliefs, faith claims, and degrees of enchantment – are 
forced into an uncertain position with respect to how they conceptualise and practice 
religiously within a similarly ambiguous modern world. Though there may be an 
innovative and creative human spirit buried within the superficial sterility of 
                                                 
51 Autopoiesis is loosely defined as self-creation within a closed system, as generally used to describe 
the relations between structure and function in living systems, as formulated by biologists Maturana 
and Varela. “The autopoietic system is defined as a unity by its autopoietic organization... Accordingly, 
an autopoietic organization constitutes a closed domain of relations... and thus, it defines a „space‟ in 
which it can be realized as a concrete system... the space defined by an autopoietic system is self-
contained and cannot be described by using dimensions that define another space. When we refer to 
our interactions with a concrete autopoietic system, however, we project this system on the space of 
our manipulations and make a description of this projection.” Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. 
Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition : The Realization of the Living (USA, 1980), 88-89. 
52 The historical precedent for this is the Treaty (or Peace) of Westphalia, in which Protestants and 
Catholics became equal before the law in Europe, and religious observance became a matter of 
private conscience. As Bhambra writes: “The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 led to the inception of a 
new multi-state system which was characterized by the simultaneous centralization and 
impersonalization of political power, that is, states were now more likely to act independently of papal 
authority and the Church‟s role as the arbiter of international affairs was greatly reduced (citing 
Pagden 2002). This separation between religion and state, as well as the emergence of theories of 
sovereignty, has been seen as uniquely European and as constituting a key aspect of European 
identity.” Gurminder K. Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity : Postcolonialism and the Sociological 
Imagination (UK; USA, 2007), 91. 
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modernity, the ability of an individual to command agency in service to such a spirit 
is, alas, too often consumed by forces of history that appear overwhelming.53 
‗Acceptable‘ negotiation with spiritual matters occurs in private; phrased by William 
James as the ―...feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so 
far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider 
the divine.‖54 In short, the liberty an individual possesses with regard to spiritual 
matters contains a caveat, that it is acceptable provided it remain private, which 
generates institution vs. institution debates within the public arena, whilst also 
justifying the individual‘s pursuit of personal meaning, interpreted and practiced in 
accordance with their desires.55 The visual politic attached to this propriety, that 
certain things are ‗permitted‘ to be seen and others, such as spiritual matters, are 
supposed to remain invisible, is disrupted when the boundary between the public 
and the private is perpetually displaced, as noted by Jeffrey Weeks: ―The boundaries 
between the political, social and intimate spheres of contemporary life are constantly 
shifting, or being shifted. The borderlines are extremely difficult to detect, let alone 
police.‖56  
‗Cultural matters‘ attract similar difficulties as religion: culture and religion, which 
were once attributes proudly claimed by the first colonisers of ‗the West‘, have, in a 
                                                 
53 As science writer Jeremy Burgess asks, pointedly: “Is it just me, or does everyone else feel guilty for 
being alive too?” Theodore Roszak, The Voice of the Earth (New York, 1992), 37. 
54 Cited in Paul Heelas, Spiritualities of Life : New Age Romanticism and Consumptive Capitalism 
(USA; UK, 2008), 36.  
55 That these conflicts appear to arise predominantly between the modern nation states, and multiple 
variations of Christianity and Islam, suggests that these religions possess such an unsettling similarity 
to the theistic Christianity that historically structured the secular that they represent a „replacement‟ 
threat. This is especially evident when liberal humanistic morality comes into conflict with a more 
specialised religious morality deriving from a group which is perceived as possessing communitarian 
strengths: conversely, they also possess an ideology which might compromise human rights for 
particular groups (such as women, children, or homosexuals). It is also instructive to consider that as 
this struggle is over values, rights, resources, and power, often explicitly linked to modern nation 
states, war, crime, punishment, and economic status, it is non-responsive to post-modern, 
humanistic, or „soft‟ scientific solutions. Concepts like pluralism, religious tolerance, equality, and so 
forth, often fail to gain traction among participants engaged in such power struggles.  
56 Jeffrey Weeks, Invented Moralities : Sexual Values in an Age of Uncertainty (Cambridge, 1995), 
125. For the original scholarship regarding the division of social life into separate „spheres‟, see Max 
Weber, 'Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions,' in From Max Weber : Essays in 
Sociology, ed. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London, 1991). Consider also: “One can, of course, 
attempt to defend and reconstitute a purified public sphere, liberated from the interests of particular 
groups and perspectives. Once doubt is cast upon the integrity of such a project, however, one may 
either perform the self-contradictory and self-defeating task of dogmatically defending the public 
sphere, or one may return to the question of philosophy.” Philip Goodchild, Capitalism and Religion : 
The Price of Piety (New York, 2002), 14,fn.19. 
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spectacular reversal, become equal parts of the ‗Black Man‘s Burden‘; these may be 
expressed publicly (and in a limited fashion), only upon the condition that it is a 
temporary state of being on the way to being ‗fully modern‘. In Cox‘s words, the 
demand is ―...that all men be drawn into the secularization process so that no one 
clings to the dangerous pre-critical illusion that his values are ultimate.‖57 When 
Nietzsche called for a ‗polytheism of values‘, as Gianni Vattimo notes: ―The call is 
thus not for a society with no values, but for a society without supreme and exclusive 
values.‖58 Both of these statements clash with the epistemic structures of modernity, 
within which particular emphasis is put on certain values whilst deference to 
justifications like the foregoing render this insistence invisible. Any conversation 
between modernity, ethics, values, and beliefs, however secular this may appear, is 
therefore perpetually referring to ‗Christian ideas dressed in secular garb‘.59 
Modernity, however, has also been the incubator for alternatives (or challenges) 
which have been incompletely exorcised throughout its gestation period: alternatives 
which possess an uncertain relation with the on-going project of modernity. Drawing 
upon Michel Foucault, Michel de Certeau argues that the applications of power 
exerted upon everyday life have never been wholly deterministic, which is a critical 
point. He writes that: ―Beneath what one might call the ‗monotheistic‘ privilege that 
panoptic apparatuses have won for themselves, the ‗polytheism‘ of scattered 
practices survives, dominated but not erased by the triumphal success of one of their 
number.‖60 The on-going existence of these beliefs and practices preserve the 
possibility for empowerment of alternative epistemological positions, though the use 
of the term ‗survivals‘ must be taken into account. An evolutionary ordering system 
is still an implicit component of the dominant episteme, and the question of whose 
beliefs and values can be visible, where, and under what circumstances, is very much 
governed by invisible social codes: permitted, enabled, tolerated, and allowed are 
qualitatively different concepts to supported, endorsed, and empowered.  
                                                 
57 Cox, The Secular City : Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective, 48. 
58 Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala, '"Weak Thought" and the Reduction of Violence,' Common 
Knowledge, vol. 8: 3 (2002), 454. 
59 Gray, Heresies, 31. 
60 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (USA, 1984), 48. 
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As modernity appears insufficiently powerful to actually eliminate these challenges to 
its authority (despite countless affronts to ‗the other‘, of all persuasions, undertaken 
in its name) it ought to be theoretically possible to expose and dismantle the logical 
foundations upon which the privilege, or hegemony, of the episteme is based. In 
methodological terms, by focusing on its historical and epistemological foundations 
to reveal the tenuous nature of Judeo-Christian content at its core and thus, create a 
space of possibility in which competing epistemologies (those which are neither 
Christian, nor scientific, and are thus twice-removed) might be realistically 
entertained. As Stephen Diamond writes:  
―…it is we who are responsible for much of the evil in the world; and we are 
each morally required to accept rather than project that ponderous 
responsibility – lest we prefer instead to wallow in a perennial state of 
powerless, frustrated, furious, victimhood. For what one possesses the power 
to bring about, one has also the power to limit, mitigate, counteract, or 
transmute."61  
 
And, to balance this assertion with the necessary humility, a cite from Desiderius 
Erasmus – Renaissance humanist – may also be appropriate: ―Although I am aware 
that this custom is too long accepted for one to hope to be able to uproot it, yet I 
thought it best to give my advice in case things should turn out beyond my hope.‖62 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 Stephen A. Diamond, Anger, Madness, and the Daimonic : The Psychological Genesis of Violence, 
Evil, and Creativity (USA, 1996), 85. 
62 Desiderius Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince (1516) cited in Ernest Becker, The 
Structure of Evil : An Essay on the Unification of the Science of Man (New York, 1968), 374.  
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Part I: Methodology  
A single belief can be the foundation upon which an entire epistemology is inferentially built, 
beginning with cohesion between the parts, and finally, establishing consensus – that is, 
expanding the number of individuals who „agree‟ with the components sufficiently enough that 
the episteme comes to resemble „truth‟. Since David Hume established the limits of consensus 
during the Age of Enlightenment, knowledge is „attested to‟ only within the limits of rationality 
– there is no testimony, or consensus, which is sufficient to establish a miracle.63 Truth then, 
appears as History, which is the backwards glance of the Triumph of Reason over Superstition. 
The subsequent consensual agreement among the eminently „Reasonable‟ is, therefore, founded 
upon the „fact‟ that the miracle and its relations are „prima facie‟ false, or delusional.64 The 
sciences, including the social sciences, proceed from this point. This primary reduction is the 
foundation for a secondary reduction which is often performed upon constructivist positions: 
deemed false by the logic that social, cultural, or linguistic constructions are not „as real‟ as the 
objects of „true‟ scientific inquiry.  
Epistemological constructivism cannot combat realism; just as relativism cannot topple 
rationality. Proponents of the ideology of modernity do not have to make a case for legitimacy 
(or what is „real‟ and „true‟). Though consensus may not be „informed‟, it is nonetheless 
assumed. Constructivism gives only the illusion of power and resistance to those who seek to 
counter a realist and rationalist epistemology. As Charles Larmore writes, “...reason is not a 
view from nowhere...  Consequently, the judgments we... make about moral and scientific 
progress will not simply express our own habits of mind.”65 No method can escape this 
absolutely; even the reflexivity which is demanded by a methodology is only reflexive to the 
degree already established as an acceptable response, or „zone of resistance‟, towards the 
modern.66  
                                                 
63 See David Hume and Charles William Hendel, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding; with a 
Supplement : An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature (New York, 1957). 
64 Douglas Ezzy, 'Religious Ethnography : Practicing the Witch's Craft,' in Researching Paganisms, ed. 
Jenny Blain, Douglas Ezzy, and Graham Harvey (UK, 2004), 116. Ezzy calls this methodological 
atheism, not agnosticism, as is claimed by the „impartial‟ scholar and challenges on the basis it is 
simply „not good science‟, proceeding from neither careful observation, nor reasoned argument. 
65 Larmore, 'History and Truth,' 47. 
66 Just as the critique of religion is enabled by the existence of, and requirement for, a critical 
theology, even the outright rejection of modernity would be limited in the same manner by a space 
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METHODOLOGY 1: MEDIOLOGY 
 ―In this field of research, the theory of knowledge, the 
history of praxes, the only thing ever considered is the set of 
relations of the subject, be it personal or collective, with the 
object, be it local or global.‖ 
The Parasite, Michel Serres, 2007.67 
 
―Interdisciplinary work, so much discussed these days, is not 
about confronting already constituted disciplines (none of 
which, in fact, is willing to let itself go). To do something 
interdisciplinary it‘s not enough to choose a ‗subject‘ (a 
theme) and gather around it two or three sciences. 
Interdisciplinarity consists in creating a new object that 
belongs to no-one.‖ 
Jeunes Chercheurs, Roland Barthes, 1972.68 
 
The work that follows (despite having an ‗official‘ location within the quickly 
disappearing discipline of Religious Studies) has considerable theoretical elements in 
common with Mediology, as innovated by French intellectual and philosopher Régis 
Debray. Mediology (an emergent discipline) is an area of study which is concerned 
with the intersections between intellectual, material, and social life: the ‗excluded 
third‘ category which connects the ‗software‘ with the ‗hardware‘; or the processes of 
transmission that transform ideologies into socially lived realities.69 Mediology is, by 
design, multi-, inter- or trans-disciplinary, and shares philosophical commonalities 
with the work of Bruno Latour, Michel Serres, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Gauttari, 
whereby it investigates connections, hybrids, ‗rhizomatic‘ networks, intersections, 
and go-betweens, though Debray‘s point of difference is that he offers a fully 
developed methodology that suits an historical inquiry such as undertaken herein, 
thus inviting replication. Mediology, as employed herein, also capitalises upon the 
work undertaken by Foucault in his genealogies and archaeologies of history, in which 
                                                                                                                                                
which has been made available to accommodate the most radical of critiques. Attributed to thesis 
supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011. 
67 Michel Serres and Lawrence R. Schehr, The Parasite (USA, 2007), 65. 
68 Cited in Clifford and Marcus, eds., Writing Culture. 1. Alhough this thesis is specifically and strongly 
launched in pursuit of the trans signifier in order to „go beyond‟ the limits of current scholarship and 
definition, as scholars, the inter, the para, the post, the neo, and so forth, remain the conventional 
ways of mediating the tension between the fluidity of context and the fixity of meaning; the arbitrary 
borders we attempt to draw and re-draw around the nebulous „objects‟ we seek to capture. It is 
difficult to abandon these completely, especially as it is the language in which much of the 
scholarship that has gone before is already written, so they may, at times, occur in the text as a 
means of illustrating some point or another.   
69 Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 18-19. 
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he highlights the breaks and discontinuities found within the historical record.70 His 
‗insurrection of subjugated knowledges‘71 is designed to excavate those aspects of history 
which have been disqualified, ignored, buried, or disguised; elements which are of 
great interest to the mediological undertaking.72 This method and its goals implicitly 
(though it is not always explicitly stated) underpins the historical excavations, 
connections, and assertions found within this work. 
Mediology‘s central concept, mediation, is a ―...dynamic combination of 
intermediary procedures and bodies that interpose themselves between a producing 
of signs and a producing of events.‖73 By focusing on the intermediary, Debray 
‗changes elements‘, shifting from ‗communication‘, which he sees as fluid, to 
mediation, which he describes as infinitely more weighty: ―...the intermediary makes 
the law. Mediation determines the nature of the message, relation has primacy over 
being… People are not influenced by words alone. Messages transmit themselves as 
well by gestures, by figures and pictures, the whole panoply of the signs ‗archives‘.‖74 
In mediology, the medium (which is a device or system of representation, in a 
material sense), is integrated with the actual use, or disposal, of resources – that is, 
                                                 
70 In The Order of Things, Foucault was concerned, as with the argument ordered herein, with 
reconstructing the episteme that underpinned the possibilities of knowing for an epoch or milieu. 
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things : An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London, 1970). For 
other archaeological inquiries, see also Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic : An Archaeology of 
Medical Perception, Social Sciences Paperback (London, 1973), Michel Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish : The Birth of the Prison, 1st American ed. (New York, 1977), Michel Foucault, The History of 
Sexuality, Volume 1 : An Introduction, 1st American ed. (London, 1979), Michel Foucault, Madness 
and Civilization : A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (London, 1967). 
71 Foucault and Gordon, Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, 81. 
72
 Mediology hinges on the notion of „transmission‟: “Transmission… imposes itself on us by its 
character as process or mediation, something that dispels all illusion of immediacy.  Mediology is 
devoted to medium and median bodies, to everything that acts as milieu or middle ground in the 
black box of meaning‟s production, between an input and an output.  A milieu: it is indeed because 
there is refraction and degradation. The transmission coefficient (or ratio between the intensity of 
influential radiance after its passage through a given milieu and its initial intensity) also affects the 
emission of immaterial abstractions.” Régis Debray, Transmitting Culture, European Perspectives 
(New York, 2000), 7-8. 
73 Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 17. 
74 Debray is influenced by Serres here, for whom the concept of the intermediary is a central theme. 
As Serres writes: “...one must describe the spaces situated between things that are already marked 
out – spaces of interference, as I called them in the title of my second book on Hermes. This god or 
these angels pass through folded time, making millions of connections. Between has always struck 
me as a preposition of prime importance.” Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, Conversations on 
Science, Culture, and Time, Studies in Literature and Science (USA, 1995), 64. Debray is also arguing 
against, or more properly, expanding upon Marshall McLuhan‟s notion that the medium is the 
message, see Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media : The Extensions of Man, [1st ed. (New York, 
1964). In Debray‟s words: “The medium in the McLuhanite sense of the word is but the ground floor. 
One cannot thus rest there.” Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of 
Cultural Forms, 11. 
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mediation.75 Take the migration from a concept of the ‗modern‘, to modern art and 
architecture: the material proof of transmission.  The Church that is built on the 
strength of a prophet‘s words, the formation of a Party from a Manifesto, the radio 
broadcast of The War of the Worlds by Orson Welles on October 30th 1938, and the 
mass hysteria which followed.76 In other words, mediology is a theoretical 
framework that inquires into the structures of mediation by which ideologies – what is 
said or thought – become grounded: ―...the fact that a representation of the world shall 
have modified the state of the world, and not just its perception (a fact we hold to be 
something natural), is worth taking the trouble reconfiguring into a real enigma.‖77  
Mediology is primarily concerned with the means by which cultural meaning, or 
ideologies, are transmitted, and for Debray, this is explicitly linked not only to the 
materials of semiologists – ie. languages, signs, images – but the physical materiality 
of the world: technologies of transmission such as guilds, organisations, institutions, 
practices, discourses, selections, political moves; and physical objects, from books to 
buildings.78 Whilst being most closely allied with the history of mentalities (such as in 
the work of Jacques Le Goff),79 mediology purposefully ‗lowers the debate‘ by fusing 
philosophy and history with the social sciences to translate a ‗revision of values‘ by a 
‗displacement of vectors‘; revealing the ―...skeletal structure beneath the flesh, what 
one could call ‗the hard of the soft.‘‖80 It is therefore possible to usefully apply this to 
excavate the theological from within the modern, and the modern ideology from 
within the material world. Debray writes that, in addition to ―...removing the 
partition between vectors and values, we [need] to talk about strengthening 
crosscrossed lacings: an intertwined kind of understanding that would de-ideologize 
                                                 
75 Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 11. 
76 Ibid., 8. 
77 Italics added. Ibid., 10. 
78 Ibid., 19. Semiology, as most simply conceived by Charles Peirce, is concerned with „the sign that 
represents something to someone.‟ 
79 Le Goff, The Birth of Europe, Jacques Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory (USA, 1984), Jacques Le Goff, 
History and Memory, European Perspectives (New York, 1992), Jacques Le Goff, Medieval Civilization 
400-1500 (Oxford, UK ; New York, 1988), Jacques Le Goff, The Medieval Imagination (USA, 1988), 
Jacques Le Goff, The Medieval World, The History of European Society (London, 1990), Jacques Le 
Goff, Time, Work & Culture in the Middle Ages (USA, 1980), Jacques Le Goff and Pierre Nora, 
Constructing the Past : Essays in Historical Methodology (Cambridge; New York; Paris, 1985). 
80 Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 20. 
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‗ideologies,‘ desanctify sanctities, but also mentalize the material bases of systems of 
inscription...‖81  
To paraphrase Debray: the amateur mediologist herein is therefore required to set up 
her footstool between a selection of ‗more dignified armchairs‘, such as those of the 
Philosopher, Historian, Sociologist, Theologian, and Political Scientist.82 Such 
breadth is essential to the focus of this work, as the central query – into how the 
symbols and ideas implicit to firstly, Judaism, and secondly, Christianity, became 
both internal to, and invisible within, secular modernity – is reliant on the 
transmission of ideas through multiple geo-cultural and socio-political networks over 
several thousand years. The result of this process is the now-dominant 
epistemological structure which was foundational to the formation of modern 
institutions and remains integral to modern societies. What counts for knowledge, or 
what is considered ‗normative‘ – that is, scientific and universalistic – is oriented 
around the notion that there is an absolute ‗truth‘ to be uncovered in the world, one 
that is objective and can be separated from power relations.83 However, as Nietzsche 
recognised, there is no truth, only interpretations imposed upon a world by the play of 
forces for domination;84 and it is this play of forces which is of central interest here. 
As this epistemology is the silent referent (or absolute) upon which the legitimacy of 
all knowledge is contingent, and as all disciplines produce knowledge of a kind 
which complies wholly or in part with this maxim, no single disciplinary lens will be 
adequate to this inquiry.85 Debray writes: ―Everything takes place as if one had 
always unconsciously disassociated 1) the technological question – which machine is 
at work here? 2) the semantic question – which discourse are we given to 
                                                 
81 Ibid., 20-21. 
82 In Debray‟s conception he ascribes these armchairs to the historian of technology, the semiologist, 
and the sociologist. He calls this a demand for a „staggered approach‟. Ibid., 18. 
83 The desire for clean and uncorrupted narratives that are representative of „truth‟, whether 
belonging to the self or society, seems to be peculiar to „Western‟ ways of thought.  The insistence on 
the consistency of identity, fixed narrative selves, history, and truth is extremely problematic when 
applied cross-culturally. 
84 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Walter Arnold Kaufmann, and R. J. Hollingdale, The Will to Power 
(London, [1901]1968). Cited in Todd May, Between Genealogy and Epistemology : Psychology, 
Politics, and Knowledge in the Thought of Michel Foucault (USA, 1993), 79. 
85 The term „silent referent‟ is taken from Chakrabarty, though it is used in the original to refer to 
Europe as the referent for „historical knowledge‟. See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe : 
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (USA; 
Oxford, 2000), 28. 
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understand? and 3) the political question – which power is exerted, how and on 
whom?‖86 A history of this nature is therefore not only interested in a corpus of 
doctrines and a totality of discourses, or principles, but in the changes in the systems 
of manufacture, circulation, transmission, and storage of ‗signs‘ which have had a 
transformative effect upon the lived social reality.87 This requires a dual focus: the 
appearance and meaning of words, ideas, signs, and symbols; also, the transmission 
mechanisms by which these become either included in or excluded from the corpus 
of knowledge and normative praxis specific to the ‗West‘. The process of excavation 
must not only investigate the content of normative, alternative, and juxtaposed 
knowledge claims, but also how the gap between different claims is mediated. Debray 
asserts that the mediologist prefers ―...nothing more than immersion in the 
contingency of historical accidents and things, while at the same time mindful to 
posit or set off from the magma of events some structures of necessity of a more 
general character.‖88 
This attempt (remembering that all ‗conclusions‘ are always provisional, partial, 
contingent, and contextual) will, to follow Leibniz, inquire into the question of how 
‗the order of successions can make contradictions appear in the state of things‘ – 
though ‗succession‘ has been reworked by Debray to be thought of ―...more in terms 
of the staggered stages of the ziggurat than the linear suite of doorways or enfilade of 
trees.‖89 The aim of this analysis is to uncover whether there is any possibility for not 
just the expression, but the empowerment of alternative epistemologies despite the on-
going project of modernity, or whether this is a utopian aspiration that is destined to 
remain unfulfilled. This question hinges on another: can modernity, if it is 
recognised as culture, be relativised? 
This is well illustrated by the issue of ‗who can speak‘, also known as the ‗equality of 
voice‘,90 a problem of alterity and power which has been put forward by neo-
                                                 
86 Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 18. 
87 Original quotation, paraphrased here, uses the Enlightenment as its example. Ibid., 19. 
88 Ibid., 20. 
89 Leibniz cited in Serres and Schehr, The Parasite, 220. Debray, Media Manifestos : On the 
Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 35. 
90 This inquiry begins with Spivak‟s paper dealing with her uncertainties on the 
possibility/impossibility of this speech, as focused upon the „itinerary of silencing‟. The conclusion she 
comes to is that there is „no space‟ from which the subalterns can speak and thus make their 
interests and experience known to others on their own terms. Gayatri C. Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern 
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Marxists, social, political, indigenous, cultural, racial, post-colonial, feminist, 
gender, and pedagogical scholars for over twenty years now; generally on behalf of 
either gendered, religious, ethnic or indigenous claims wherein the right to speak, to 
be heard, and invoke action or social change is in conflict with an institutional or 
social norm.91 The grouping together of such a diverse repertory of academic 
positions makes sense only if the structures of marginalisation are shown to be based 
on degrees of ‗deviance‘ from a ‗normative‘ Judeo-Christian ethos. Any move 
against this dominant episteme (often referred to as the ‗hegemony of the system‘) is 
generally met with overwhelming resistance, or accommodated outside the system, 
rather than within it; thus, limiting the degree of power available to augment the 
propulsion of these alternatives. In mediological terms, these ideas (some of which 
may arguably have a significant contribution to make towards increased social 
justice or minimising violence) have not translated into lived social reality, and not 
because they are irrational or anti-modern, but simply because the totalitarian 
enforcement of the episteme through the institutions and social norms prevents it. 
The transmission is ‗blocked‘, which suggests something very hypocritical about the 
                                                                                                                                                
Speak?,' in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (USA, 
1988). Her use of the word „subaltern‟ in a non-militarised sense derives from fellow Marxist Antonio 
Gramsci (noted for his writings on hegemony) and literally refers to a person who has limited or no 
status. Antonio Gramsci, Quintin Hoare, and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (London, 1971). Other scholars working in this area include:  Michael 
W. Apple and Kristen L. Buras, The Subaltern Speak : Curriculum, Power, and Educational Struggles 
(New York, 2006), George J. Sefa Dei, Leeno Luke Karumanchery, and Nisha Karumanchery-Luik, 
Playing the Race Card : Exposing White Power and Privilege (New York, 2004), George Jerry Sefa Dei, 
Budd L. Hall, and Dorothy Goldin Rosenberg, eds., Indigenous Knowledges in Global Contexts : 
Multiple Readings of Our World (Canada, 2000), Henry A. Giroux, Border Crossings : Cultural Workers 
and the Politics of Education (New York; London, 1992), Henry A. Giroux and Peter McLaren, Between 
Borders : Pedagogy and the Politics of Cultural Studies (New York ; London, 1994), Rauna Johanna 
Kuokkanen, Reshaping the University : Responsibility, Indigenous Epistemes, and the Logic of the Gift 
(Vancouver, 2007), Donald E. Morton and Mas'ud Zavarzadeh, Theory/Pedagogy/Politics : Texts for 
Change (USA, 1991).  
91 Consider Bhabha: “The silent Other of gesture and failed speech becomes what Freud calls that 
„haphazard member of the herd‟, the Stranger, whose languageless presence evokes an archaic 
anxiety and aggressivity by impeding the search for narcissistic love-objects in which the subject can 
rediscover himself, and upon which the group‟s amore propre is based.” Homi K. Bhabha, The 
Location of Culture (London; New York, 1994), 166. This link to „language‟ is also signaled by Bankim 
Chandra Chatterjee: “You can translate a word by a word, but behind the word is an idea, the thing 
which the word denotes, and this idea you cannot translate, if it does not exist among the people in 
whose language you are translating.” Cited in Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial 
World : A Derivative Discourse?, Third World Books (UK; USA, 1986), 61. His observations are 
interesting because he was writing in the 19th century, and as Partha Chatterjee points out, his 
“methods, concepts and modes of reasoning are completely contained within the forms of post-
Enlightenment scientific thought.” Ibid., 58.  
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claims made in the name of modernity.92 What is required, therefore, is a more 
nuanced history of modernity that illuminates the double-standard, such as the idea 
that scientific and technical progress can equal social progress; that social progress 
culminates in the end of violence or equality; or that there exist such things as 
secular humanitarian values or institutions. Secularity itself needs to be seriously 
questioned.93 
This exercise in historical exegesis will attempt to identify the moments at which the 
battle for the supremacy of certain ideas appeared to extinguish others, but instead, 
left a memory, or trace, that is carried over to the present: a series of events that has 
been selected to emphasise the ‗exorcisms‘ specific to the process of epistemological 
purification. To frame this as a series of exorcisms is to incorporate a particularly 
Christian motif for understanding a complex issue of competing epistemologies and 
the history of their elimination; appropriate because it arises out of an issue of 
alterity forged in the fires of Christian cosmology. What is sought is the means by 
which various ideas have been either excluded, or incorporated into what we call 
modernity: the structuring, strengthening, and purifying of the episteme. 
Incorporation, as specifically meaning ‗to put something into the body or substance of 
something else‘, or ‗unite into one body‘:94 a concept as applicable to the episteme as 
it is to an institution. As the writing of history tends to favour some narratives over 
others on the basis of significance, this process of incorporation can be difficult to 
extract from the annals of ‗received wisdom‘ which sometimes stand in for historical 
                                                 
92 Consider Derrida: “The crossing of borders always announces itself according to the movement of a 
certain step [pas] – and of the step that crosses a line. An indivisible line. And one always assumes 
the institution of such an indivisibility. Customs, police, visa or passport, passenger identification – all 
of that is established upon this institution of the indivisible, the institution therefore of the step that is 
related to it, whether the step crosses it or not.” Jacques Derrida, Aporias : Dying - Awaiting (One 
Another at) the "Limits of Truth" (USA, 1993), 11, ibid. 
93 As Gray writes: “When thinking about the idea that we live in a secular era, it is worth remembering 
that… the Biblical root of the secular state is the passage in the New Testament where Jesus tells his 
disciples to give to God what is God‟s and to Caesar what belongs to Caesar. Refined by Augustine 
and given a modern formulation with the Reformation, this early Christian commandment is the 
ultimate origin of the liberal attempt to separate religion from politics. In this, as in many other 
respects, liberalism is a neo-Christian cult.” Gray, Heresies, 41-42. 
94 „Incorporated‟, Oxford English Dictionary Online, retrieved 20 April 2011. Consider Debray also: “To 
put it in other terms, it is bodies that think and not minds. The constraint of incorporation produces 
the corporations – those intermediate bodies and institutions of knowledge, normatized and 
normative, which we call schools, churches, parties, associations, societies of thinker, etc. ”Debray, 
Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 5-7. 
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accounts.95 These are attempted exorcisms, precisely because they fail: if they had 
not, it would not be possible to locate both the symbolic and literal traces of similarly 
structured competing epistemologies (often directly descended from earlier matrices) 
in the present day context.96 They would be unrecognisable, if indeed they were 
noted, within the historical accounts. Yet the claim that these exorcisms were 
successful is important because the dominance of the episteme (and the justifications 
for ‗scientific and technical progress‘ hinges entirely upon this notion; which is 
especially interesting in light of the fact that these victories are constructed and 
illusory. The exorcisms were partial, at best. In the words of Gregory Bateson,  
―...every important scientific advance provides tools which look to be just 
what [was] hoped for, and usually the gentry jump in without more ado... 
Behind every scientific advance there is always a matrix, a mother lode of 
unknowns out of which the new partial answers have been chiselled. But the 
hungry, overpopulated, sick, ambitious, and competitive world will not wait, 
we are told, until more is known, but must rush in where angels fear to 
tread.‖97 
                                                 
95 The problem of equality of voice is as much a difficulty for scholars reliant on published histories as 
it is for champions of the oppressed. Whose history? Whose version of history? Aso to be considered 
are the alternative histories: such as what is not being said, or what is not allowed to be said. All 
„versions‟ must be considered, however, returning to Nietzsche, the claim to truth must be viewed as 
most suspicious in work of those who make the strongest bid for it. History privileges a certain type of 
narrative which translates into a lay explanation of how the „modern‟ came to be – an initial meeting 
of Athens and Jerusalem which eventually culminates sometime around the 18th century – at which 
point modernity was supposedly fully „in play‟. Whatever else historians have to offer remains 
accessible to only a small number of readers, whilst the simplified version is transmitted through the 
course of a primary and secondary education. At the university level, conservative accounts tend to 
dominate the curriculum until graduate level, at which point a certain percentage of the group leave 
the discipline and become „experts‟ in other areas – knowledgeable „enough‟ about history to discuss 
and disseminate concepts, whilst still remaining under-educated with regards the critical positions 
that may be taken with respect to this knowledge. Callinicos usefully cites Kuhn on this issue: “Kuhn 
notes the distorted image of the history of the sciences derived from „the study of finished scientific 
achievements as these are recorded in the classics, and more recently, in the textbooks from which 
each new scientific generation learns to practice its trade‟. He argues that „a concept of science 
drawn from them is no more likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than an image of a 
national culture drawn from a tourist brochure or a language text.‟” Alex Callinicos, 'Review : 
Postmodernism as Normal Science,' The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 46: 4 (1995), 735. 
96 A contemporary example would be the attempted elimination of „traditional‟ or „pagan‟ local 
religious expressions in the Americas or Africa during the colonial period. The traditions which 
Christian missionaries attempted to overthrow and obliterate have rarely suffered from an absolute 
loss of context for their original beliefs and practices. Although substantial losses must be registered, 
and whilst an evolution into syncretic forms may have occurred, these could also be considered 
partial „exorcisms‟ in the sense meant herein. 
97 Rest of quotation reads: “I have very little sympathy for these arguments from the world‟s „need.‟ I 
notice that those who pander to its needs are often well paid. I distrust the applied scientists‟ claim 
that what they do is useful and necessary. I suspect that their impatient enthusiasm for action, their 
rarin‟ to go, is not just a symptom of impatience, nor is it pure buccaneering ambition. I suspect that it 
covers deep epistemological panic.” Gregory Bateson and Mary Catherine Bateson, Angels Fear : An 
Investigation into the Nature and Meaning of the Sacred (New Jersey, USA, [1988]2005), 14-15. 
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Such affirmations of success, necessity, and perhaps, righteousness, also act to 
conceal the degree of violence required to maintain dominance in the modern world, 
especially where capitalistic gain – convenience, supply and demand, and so on – 
requires double-standards, particularly in the area of morality. ‗Religious‘ or 
‗cultural‘ conflicts attract the publicity, and the juggernaut is quietly propelled 
forward, whilst its endemically violent nature remains obscured. As Rollo May 
writes: ―Our age is one of transition, in which the normal channels for utilizing the 
daimonic are denied; and such ages tend to be times when the daimonic is expressed 
in its most destructive form.‖98 
  
                                                 
98 Rollo May, Love and Will (New York, 1969), 130. 
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METHODOLOGY 2: EPISTEMOLOGY 
―Truth is a thing of this world... Each society has its regime 
of truth, its ‗general politics‘ of truth: that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish 
true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctified; the techniques and procedures accorded value in 
the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged 
with saying what counts as true.‖ 
Power/Knowledge, Michel Foucault, 1980.99 
 
―Without some degree of epistemic grounding, without some 
coherent notion of the knowing, acting, subject, distinctive 
political projects and articulations of any kind cannot be 
sustained.‖ 
Feminism, Epistemology and Postmodernism, 
Gregor McLennan, 1995.100 
 
The episteme internal to the modern defines and redefines the limits of ‗truth‘ by 
determining what does, and does not, count for knowledge. To offer a definition, 
epistemology is literally ‗The Word on Knowledge‘ or a way of knowing in which 
observation, experience, truth, belief, and reason, are bound into a cohesive 
framework.101 An episteme is generally thought of as a discursive practice, a theory on 
knowledge, a theory of the world, or a worldview.102 Both terms, to paraphrase 
Sandra Harding, are used ―...to describe theories of knowledge adopted by individuals 
and created in collective contexts… theories of knowledge that make basic claims about 
the nature of knowledge: who can know, how we know, and what counts as 
evidence for our claims.‖103  This emphasis on social construction is critical: 
epistemologies do not exist outside of the individuals who create, use, and reify 
them.104 In the case of ‗the episteme‘ – the significant episteme, according to Foucault 
                                                 
99 Foucault and Gordon, Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, 
131. 
100 McLennan, 'Feminism, Epistemology and Postmodernism: Reflections on Current Ambivalence,' 
393.  
101 From the Greek episteme (knowledge or science) and logos (word or speech), or “...to know how to 
do, or understand”, literally to „over stand‟ or stand over.  „Epistemology‟, Douglas Harper, Online 
Etymology Dictionary (2001-2010); available from http://www.etymonline.com. Retrieved 27 June 
2010. 
102 From the Germanic woruld (literally human existence or affairs, or humankind, or the age of man). 
„World‟, Online Etymology Dictionary, retrieved 27 June 2010. 
103 Italics added. Feminist Sandra Harding, paraphrased in Margaret Hunter, 'Rethinking 
Epistemology, Methodology, and Racism: Or, Is White Sociology Really Dead?,' Race and Society, vol. 
5:  (2002), 120. 
104 Ibid., 120. 
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– it is a ―...slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on 
each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain 
structure of thought... a great body of legislation written once a for all by some 
anonymous hand... the totality of relations...‖105 
Traditionally, epistemology has two key elements: ―...the defining features of 
knowledge and justification, and their limits.‖106 As Hannah Arendt writes: 
―Legitimacy, when challenged, bases itself on an appeal to the past, while 
justification relates to an end that lies in the future,‖107 an insight internal to the 
structure of the ‗Western‘ model which exposes the teleological thrust of the 
episteme itself.  The justification itself is messianic, in that it is a correction yet ‗to 
come‘.108 Legitimation is central: specifically, what gives meaning to social and 
cultural practices, and how this validity within the process of signification is 
established; returning always to the construction of networks of power.109 
Foucault, for whom power is central, conceptualises the episteme as apparatus, and 
his definition recognises its regulative effect upon knowledge (permitting or 
forbidding inclusions of particular kinds). For Foucault, the rationality associated 
with the episteme is what gives it cohesion, in that there is some observable co-
ordination between its elements.110 His concept is not limited to science (though the 
following quote deliberately addresses that subject), but can be extended to an entire 
epoch, era, or any sort of collective – it is primarily a discursive apparatus. In attempt 
to refine what was originally presented in his works The Order of Things and The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, he makes the following clarification:  
―I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which 
permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible 
those that will be acceptable within... a field of scientificity, and which it is 
possible to say are true or false. The episteme is the ‗apparatus‘ which makes 
                                                 
105 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London, 1972), 191. 
106 Don Ihde and Evan Selinger, 'Merleau-Ponty and Epistemology Engines,' Human Studies, vol. 27:  
(2004), 363. 
107 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (London, 1970), 52. 
108 This observation is attributed to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw 2011. 
109 See Vrasidas Karalis, 'Reflections on the Project of a Renewed Polis: After Athens and Jerusalem,' 
Thesis Eleven, vol. 102: 1 (2010), 18. 
110 Foucault and Gordon, Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, 
197. 
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possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from 
what may not be characterised as scientific.‖111 
 
Foucault‘s use of field here, in combination with the notion of discursive practice, 
emphasises the embodied nature of the episteme. A field is a human creation, a 
method of classification, indicating a habit of mind to group disparate (or chaotic) 
events or objects and create within them some cohesion or unity.112 Joseph Chilton 
Pearce phrases this poetically:  
―There is a medical field, legal field, a field of education, a field of 
knowledge, the orbital or wave field of a particle, a field of potential energy, 
neural fields of [the] brain, fields of stars...  Field as artefacts of memory or 
repositories of experience... No field could be bound into a finite system, yet 
our intellect, once it creates a field, continually tries to create finite 
boundaries for it.‖113  
 
The epistemology sets the rules of inclusion or exclusion for the field, whether the 
latter is that of a wave, or of modernity itself.  Moreover, a field is posited as not just 
an observable, but a controllable entity. 
Foucault also nominates the term threshold to signal the point at which the discursive 
practice acquires ‗speed‘, power, and validity (eventually, formalisation). The 
complexity of his thought on this topic requires lengthy quotation:  
―The moment at which a discursive practice achieves individuality and 
autonomy... might be called the threshold of positivity. When in the operation 
of a discursive formation, a group of statements is articulated, claims to 
validate (even unsuccessfully) norms of verification and coherence, and when 
it exercises a dominant function (as a model, a critique, or a verification) over 
knowledge, we will say that the discursive formation crosses threshold of 
epistemologization. When the epistemological figure... obeys a number of 
formal criteria... its statements comply not only with archaeological rules of 
formation, but also with certain laws for the construction of propositions... it 
has crossed a threshold of scientificity. And when this scientific discourse is 
able... to define the axioms necessary to it, the elements that it uses, the 
propositional structures that are legitimate to it, and the transformations that 
                                                 
111 Ibid., 197. 
112 Joseph Chilton Pearce, The Biology of Transcendence : A Blueprint of the Human Spirit (Vermont, 
2002), 76. 
113 Ibid., 76. 
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it accepts, when it is thus able, taking itself as its starting-point, to deploy the 
formal edifice it constitutes... it has crossed the threshold of formalization.‖114  
 
By the end of this process it would appear that discourse has acquired a degree of 
power, privilege, material-semiotic reality, and, apparently, agents who can formally 
‗deploy‘ its content; agents who, through the use of the discursive apparatus 
(episteme), initially set, then sometimes reproduce, or perhaps, recreate, the rules or 
limits for a particular field. This suggests these limits are not ‗fixed‘, at least not 
within Foucault‘s type of philosophical inquiry. Judith Butler sums up his position 
as follows:  
―One asks about the limits of ways of knowing because one has already run 
up against a crisis within the epistemological field in which one lives. The 
categories by which social life are ordered produce a certain incoherence or 
entire realms of unspeakability. And it is from this... tear in the fabric of our 
epistemological web, that the practice of critique emerges, with the awareness 
that no discourse is adequate here or that our reigning discourses have 
produced an impasse… this exposure of the limit of the epistemological field 
is linked with the practice of virtue...  as if virtue itself is to be found in the 
risking of established order.‖115  
 
Foucault‘s virtue, when conceived in this manner, is reminiscent of Adorno‘s notion 
of critique, which warns against ―...the danger… of judging intellectual phenomena 
in a subsumptive, uninformed and administrative manner and assimilating them into 
the prevailing constellations of power which the intellect ought to expose.‖116 In her 
analysis, Butler notes that exposing these constellations is impeded by judgment, 
which is a move that, for Adorno, ―...serves to separate the critic from the social 
world... For critique to operate as part of a praxis... is for it to apprehend the ways in 
which categories are themselves instituted, how the field of knowledge is ordered, 
and how what it suppresses returns... as its own constitutive occlusion.‖117 
The type of analysis undertaken herein takes the threshold of epistemologization as the 
‗point of attack‘: in Foucault‘s terms, scientificity does not serve as the norm, nor 
will positivity suffice. He writes, ―...what one is trying to uncover are discursive 
                                                 
114 Foucault warns against reifying the precise order of these stages. Foucault, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, 186-187. 
115 Judith Butler, 'What Is Critique? An Essay on Foucault's Virtue,' in The Political : Readings in 
Continental Philosophy, ed. David Ingram (London, 2002), 215.  
116 Adorno cited in ibid., 213. 
117 Adorno paraphrased in ibid., 213. 
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practices in so far as they give rise to a corpus of knowledge...‖118; the manner in 
which they acquire status as ‗fact‘, ‗truth‘, ‗right‘, ‗good‘, and so forth. What 
occurred to push certain ways of thinking to the point of formalisation?  To the point 
where a particular set of relations have become systematised and institutionalised 
with excessive formality – demonstrating coherence, without necessarily signifying 
consensus – and disproportionate enough in terms of power relations to be 
considered not only dominant, but totalitarian. Juxtaposed with these questions is 
Debray‘s concern (in which he draws upon Foucault) with ―...locating certain 
thresholds of discontinuity within what would appear as a continuum...‖.119 In 
particular, the contradictions between what is claimed, and what is observed. 
Another way of ‗thinking the episteme‘ (which is related to Debray‘s technologies of 
transmission) conceives it in ‗mechanised‘ or ‗material-semiotic‘ terms, as developed 
by Don Ihde and Evan Selinger.  
―An epistemology engine is a technology or set of technologies that through use 
frequently become explicit models for describing how knowledge is produced. 
The most dramatic examples of ‗epistemology engines‘ influence our notions 
of subjectivity, directly affecting how we understand what it means to be 
human and perceive things from a human perspective… An epistemology 
engine is thus a special case of a more general phenomenological notion that 
entails the ways in which life-world practices form the basis for what often 
become scientific theories.‖120  
 
Ihde and Selinger relate their concept to particular technological apparati: the 
technology, art, and science of warfare and the intersections between these and the 
philosophical-historical conjecture upon relations between humans and machines; 
and in more contemporary times, the idea of returning to the ‗book of life‘ through 
the codes of genetic mapping or the digital computer, which replaces the intuitive 
basis of expertise.121 To further illustrate their argument, they offer Lawrence 
Henderson‘s well-known quote: ―Science owes more to the steam engine than the 
steam engine owes to science.‖122  
                                                 
118 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 190. 
119 Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 134. 
120 Ihde and Selinger, 'Merleau-Ponty and Epistemology Engines,' 362. 
121 Ibid., 362.  
122 Lawrence Joseph Henderson (1917). Cited in ibid., 363. 
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Ihde and Selinger suggest that particular technological shifts (praxis) can start the 
‗engine of theory‘ towards social and epistemological changes, which amounts to 
―...a radical inversion between the traditional priority of theory over practice.‖123 This 
suggests some compatibility might be found between the theories of Ihde, Selinger, 
and Foucault: whether the discursive construction of the epistemology is generated 
from the material to the semiotic, or the reverse, theory occurs through observation 
of praxis. Consider how certain periods of time come to be identified with particular 
technological shifts and are named in a manner which stands in symbolically for the 
milieu, such as the ‗Gutenberg‘ Era, or the ‗Information Age‘. These are 
retrospective: at the inception of one is the book, at the other, the digital computer, 
though formalisation of the limits of the field specific to each occurred prior to the 
identification and naming of the milieu. The modification of each field followed 
thereafter. The ‗linguistic turn‘ for example, was generated at the inception of the 
Information Age, though its point of impact was, retrospectively speaking, the 
Gutenberg Era, and its culmination point (the end of ‗the book‘) has not yet 
occurred.124 Rather than viewing history as one of mentalities, or the ‗intellectual 
history of ideas‘, the notion of an epistemology engine therefore ―...places 
philosophical thought on a continuum with lifeworld activity, provocatively 
suggesting that philosophical ideas can be generated from technologically mediated 
lifeworld praxes.‖125 
The third theorist who has usefully configured the concept of episteme is Mark A. 
Schneider, clearly drawing upon Foucault. In his work the distinction between 
‗fictional‘, ‗factual‘, ‗imaginative‘ and ‗instrumental‘ is highlighted; he calls this the 
epistemic register.126 Schneider‘s formulation is useful for identifying the mental and 
                                                 
123 Ibid., 363. What connection can be made between the „engine of theory‟ and the „angel of 
history‟? Is the engine what the angel became? Modernity? Personal communication with thesis 
supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw 2011. 
124 For essays interrogating this process see Geoffrey Nunberg, ed., The Future of the Book (USA, 
1996). The hypertextual world of the internet is as dependent on the „death of the Author‟ (a 
movement pre-empting the linguistic turn, as stimulated by an essay written by Roland Barthes 1967) 
as the digital domain is dependent on the expansion of human inquiry beyond the physical world into 
space. There is perhaps some connection also between the „death of God‟ movement (reinvigorated 
in 1961), and the moon landing (1969). Time, space, and transcendence, all of which are theological 
in origin, have been shifted into cyberspace through various transfers of authority, of which the textual 
shift is but one aspect. 
125 Ihde and Selinger, 'Merleau-Ponty and Epistemology Engines,' 375, fn. 7. 
126 Mark A. Schneider, Culture and Enchantment (USA, 1993), 10-11. 
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cultural structures that are welcome ‗in principle‘ within the ‗Western epistemic 
register‘, or conversely, unable to be assimilated, bringing the division between 
‗truth‘ and ‗falsity‘ (that Foucault abandons) to the forefront of his analysis. 
Schneider‘s concept can be understood contractually. General legitimacy is founded 
on a register that is historically compiled and provides a comparative index for 
assimilation or rejection of all subsequent claims. Though it may appear otherwise, 
there is no ambiguity as to the content of the register in any particular field: it is 
simply a matter of ‗narrowing‘ the field until a particular niche is located and the 
necessary ‗warrants‘ (or proofs) for legitimacy can be obtained.  
Following this line of thought, it is possible to recognise the ‗warrants‘ facilitated by 
concepts such as post-modernity, for instance, or internal to this school of thought, 
cultural relativism, and how the validity of the niche maintains cohesion. These 
examples also demonstrate, however, that the existence of a warrant does not 
necessarily translate to any power being acquired through occupation of that niche. 
Furthermore, there are scholarly niches such as phenomenology, for example, or 
some divisions of cultural studies, that via their own arguments and claims to 
exceptionality, inadvertently disrupt their own access and right to power: self-
situating so far beyond the conventional structures of scholarship that they are not 
only niche, but easily ghettoised. Therefore, the notion of an epistemic register can 
be applicable on multiple levels, acquire consensus as a ‗truth claim‘, and thus, 
retain coherence, but this is always dependent upon relationships between different 
orders of being. In thinking about the epistemic register indigenous to modernity, it 
is the normalised claims for justification and legitimacy (such as those asserted on 
behalf of ‗scientific progress‘ or ‗democracy‘, for example) which need interrogation. 
Particularly applicable is the observation by Gregor McLennan, that, 
―...epistemology has more often been about contriving strategies of justification for 
treating belief as knowledge.‖127 
To combine Foucault‘s apparatus (discursive), Ihde and Selinger‘s engine 
(mechanical), and Schneider‘s register (contractual/legal), is still to think about 
epistemology as a limit. All of these observations on ‗how‘ an episteme works deal 
                                                 
127 McLennan, 'Feminism, Epistemology and Postmodernism: Reflections on Current Ambivalence,' 
401. 
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only with what is permissible within the limits, there is no real discussion on what is 
beyond the limits other than an acknowledgment that there are persons, places, 
ideas, etc. inhabiting that position. Attempts to transverse the limit are antithetical to 
the episteme of modernity; the limit is rarely shifted.128 All three theorists recognise 
the limit and posit a way around it: Foucault‘s ‗relations‘ within the field are 
bounded by the limit, though the limit is not necessarily ‗fixed‘ or stable; Ihde and 
Selinger attempt to reconfigure Cartesian dualism (via Merleau-Ponty) and, despite 
their material-semiotic argument, put forward an embodied mind inhabiting a world 
– absolute subjectivity – as the way out of the argument. Schneider argues for a 
‗third space‘ where the introduction of a moral, aesthetic, or naturalistic criterion 
might break the limits of the register in ways which make the limit inapplicable.  
It is Jacques Derrida who really attempts to deal with the problem of the ‗limit as 
limit‘. Derrida‘s notion of aporia marks the place of ‗cutting‘ – in this case, 
epistemicide – which, like all notions of –cide, ‗murder‘ or ‗remove‘ what is either 
extraneous or beyond the limit. The aporia is a blind-spot and a threshold – evoking 
the possibility of hospitality in both directions across the ‗border‘ – or a place where 
the way is philosophically or literally ‗blocked‘: Derrida‘s ‗limits of truth‘. 129 Derrida 
demonstrates what Paulo Freire calls an ‗epistemological curiosity‘, which is 1.) a 
willingness to go beyond the limits, to be reflexive about how the knowledge 
contained by the limit came to be considered important, or limited in this particular 
way, and 2.) to discern whose interests are served by both the knowing, and the 
limits imposed upon it.130 Derrida‘s method – deconstruction, as described by 
Christopher Norris – deliberately seeks out the ―...‗aporias‘, blindspots or moments 
of self-contradiction… to operate a kind of strategic reversal, seizing on precisely 
those unguarded details… which are always, and necessarily, passed over by 
                                                 
128 Idea credited to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw 2011. 
129 Derrida‟s philosophy is sometimes called into question, primarily for „rejection of truth‟ (it is all 
differance and representation) and his claim that „there is nothing beyond the text‟ – a limited view of 
his philosophy centred on an impoverished reading of deconstruction, and one which fails to 
recognise that his philosophy has always circled back to real world issues, most notably the political 
interface with theology. For example: “In a series of lectures and seminars on the death penalty, for 
example, Derrida wished to expose the theological vestiges of a notion of sovereignty that asserts its 
powers, cruelty, and exceptionality most visibly in putting citizens to death, or, in the case of war, 
sending them off to face death.” Michael Naas, 'Derrida's Laïcité ' CR: The New Centennial Review, 
vol. 7: 2 (2007), 26. 
130 Paulo Freire and Donaldo Macedo, 'A Dialogue: Culture, Language, and Race,' Harvard Educational 
Review, vol. 65: 3 (1995). 
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interpreters of a more orthodox persuasion.‖131 Deconstruction is also an act of 
defiance; undertaken in the name of something that is generally considered to be un-
deconstructable, and generally linked to justice.132 These are aporia‟s of justice because 
justice is only possible if the way is blocked. Otherwise, as fellow philosopher John 
D. Caputo notes: ―...we are just sailing along on automatic, with cruise control and 
with our hands barely on the wheel, staying inside the lines, applying the law, 
remaining securely within the horizon of the possible…‖133 For Derrida, 
deconstruction, his method and project, is justice, and responsibility demands that a 
different understanding of justice which reaches beyond the political emerge, one 
that emphasises and is hospitable to the right of the human other to exist, appear, or 
reappear legitimately in ‗public‘ space, or as Emmanuel Levinas would say, ‗to make 
welcome‘. There is an assumption here that the dominant epistemological terrain is 
exclusive, and in a sense, this is correct, but only with respect to what is permitted 
within public space. To follow Derrida, if justice depends on deconstructing the un-
deconstructable, and the opportunity for justice presents at the aporia (where the 
way is philosophically blocked), then it is the aporia presented by the limits of what is 
permissible (and, internal to this, what counts for knowledge), within public space (including 
the institutions) that is of central concern.  
This circles back to the political issues of who can speak, and who can be heard; the 
right to which is foundational for the establishment of legitimate claims. Vattimo 
                                                 
131 Christopher Norris, Derrida (London, 1987), 19. 
132 Jacques Derrida and John D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell : A Conversation with Jacques 
Derrida, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, (New York, 1997), 128. It is the French philosophers, 
such as Emmanuel Levinas, Gabriel Marcel, along with Derrida, working out of a post-Shoah context 
for understanding humanity, who place the emphasis on justice as fundamental for an understanding 
of otherness, and in doing so, promote an engagement with „the other‟ which hinges on responsibility. 
In Derrida‟s terms, this is achieved by learning to speak with and to the „ghosts‟, which he uses 
metaphorically to suggest those persons or ideas (using the example of Marxism) who are excluded 
and/or expired. “To exorcise not in order to chase [them] away, but this time to grant them the right, if 
it means making them come back alive, as revenants who would no longer be revenants, but as other 
arrivants to whom a hospitable memory or promise must offer welcome… out of a concern for justice.” 
Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx : The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 
International (New York, 1994), 176. “The key to understanding what Derrida is about here is to 
understand that by „justice‟ he does not mean a Platonic eidos, or a Kantian regulative Idea, a 
determinable ideal or universal model, an identifiable paradigm to be applied as the universal is 
applied to the particular. What he means by Justice and its impossibility, in the typically unorthodox, 
exorbitant style of deconstruction, is the „singular,‟ the Abrahamic exception to the law, the „remnant‟ 
and the „fragment‟ that drops through the cracks of the law, not as a merely factual omission or 
defect of existing laws, but structurally, necessarily.” Derrida and Caputo, Deconstruction in a 
Nutshell : A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, 135. 
133 Derrida and Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell : A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, 135. 
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links this to violence: ―Philosophically, violence can only be defined as the silencing 
of questions... Burning heretics was a form of violence defended, in metaphysical 
terms, by a religion that professed an ultimate truth.‖134 What is heretical within the 
epistemological framework of modernity if not the voices which challenge the claims 
to authoritative knowledge made in its name?  The charge of heresy is levelled in 
cases of presumed or proclaimed epistemological and ontological error, and thus, has 
always been linked to violence of a kind. As Bateson writes: ―Is there... such a 
subject of inquiry as Epistemology, with a capital E?  ...Is it possible to be 
Epistemologically wrong? Wrong at the very root of thought? Christians, Moslems, 
Marxists (and many biologists) say yes – they call such error ‗heresy‘ and equate it 
with spiritual death.‖135 In turn, the expressions of religion and culture that refuse to 
be tamed by relativisation or refuse exorcism via the authorities of secular modernity 
are the heresies of modernity.  
Such violence relies on implements, in this case Foucault‘s formalisation of the 
episteme as ‗apparatus‘, but it also requires a degree of complicity to maintain 
power: it capitalises upon the residual fear of breaking with the group within 
society.136 In the words of Adorno and Horkheimer, the Enlightenment was ‗mythic 
fear turned radical‘137 and it would seem that collectively, because we are still living 
out the precepts of the Enlightenment, we default, perhaps unconsciously, to a 
                                                 
134 Vattimo and Zabala, '"Weak Thought" and the Reduction of Violence,' 455. 
135 „Moslem‟ [sic] Bateson and Bateson, Angels Fear : An Investigation into the Nature and Meaning 
of the Sacred, 23. „Heresy‟. “Etymology:  Old French eresie, heresie (12th cent.), modern French 
hérésie, < Latin type *heresia (whence also Italian eresia, Portuguese heresia), for Latin hæresis 
school of thought, philosophical sect, in eccl. writers, theological heresy, < Greek, taking, choosing, 
choice, course taken, course of action or thought, „school‟ of thought, philosophic principle or set of 
principles, philosophical or religious sect; to take, middle voice, to take for oneself, choose... [defn] 2. 
By extension, Opinion or doctrine in philosophy, politics, science, art, etc., at variance with those 
generally accepted as authoritative.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, retrieved 31 January 2011. 
Also consider Asad: “The Church always exercised the authority to read Christian practice for its 
Religious Truth. In this context it is interesting that the word „heresy‟ at first designated all kinds of 
errors, including errors „unconsciously‟ involved in some activity… and it acquired its specific modern 
meaning (the verbal formulation of denial or doubt of any defined doctrine of the Catholic Church) 
only in the course of the methodological controversies of the sixteenth century.” Talal Asad, 
'Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz,' Man, vol. 18: 2 (1983), 254, fn.20. 
136 Arendt draws upon Hobbes on this issue: “Hobbes is the only political philosopher in whose work 
death, in the form of fear of violent death, plays a crucial role. But it is not equality before death that 
is decisive for Hobbes; it is the equality of fear resulting from the equal ability to kill possessed by 
everyone that persuades men in their state of nature to bind themselves into a commonwealth.” 
Arendt, On Violence, 68. 
137 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, 'Dialectic of the Enlightenment,' in Knowledge and 
Postmodernism in Historical Perspective, ed. Joyce Oldham Appleby (New York, [1944] 1996), 336. 
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residual tribalism that subscribes to a ‗rule‘ of conduct that demands faith in the 
authority of institutions and is complicit with social norms. ―Transmission,‖ 
following Debray, ―is a violent collective process... it puts into play all at once 
systems of authority and relations of domination. Every transmission is a 
combat...‖138 Yet the obedience demanded by the social contract goes almost 
unnoticed, is barely articulated. Debray has a particular turn of phrase that is 
pertinent here, with an applicability that might be extended also to the replacement 
ethos of post-Christian modernity. ―The doctrine‘s influence and success wipe clean 
the memory of indoctrinations painful gestation; opus eclipses operation. Optimal 
transmission is transmission forgotten.‖139 
Vandana Shiva, who links violence explicitly to the destruction of epistemological 
validity in her discussion of reductionist science, renders this violence as a fourfold 
assault in the service of maintaining a monopoly on knowledge:  
―...violence is inflicted on the subject socially through the sharp divide 
between the expert and the non-expert – a divide which converts the vast 
majority of non-expects into non-knower even in those areas of life in which 
the responsibility of practice and action rests with them. But even the expert 
is not spare: fragmentation of knowledge converts the expert into a non-
knower in fields of knowledge other than his or her specialization.‖140  
 
Such fragmentation can also be a silencing. It is the overlapping terrain of 
imperialistic and epistemic violence, wrought through the nexus of Judeo-Christian 
theological concepts with historical sovereign powers, in which the subaltern voices 
locate the moment of attempted extinction; although the subsequent attempts to 
reverse this seem to frequently become stranded in the chaos of post-modernity. As 
Ward writes: ―Attempts to delineate the cultural Zeitgeist, even provide a typology 
for it, inevitably involves simplifying; and sometimes the reduction involved leaves 
                                                 
138 “Christian theology was not unaware of this. The study of angels, angelology, was in mythic form 
our first science of transmissions, is at bottom a polemology. „Angel‟ means messenger (angelos), and 
the angels of the Old Testament (the ‟Good News‟ postal workers) are not isolated gyro-waves twirling 
at will. They are, like the clerics of yore, „incardinated.‟ They are ranked in politico-military formations... 
under the dual sign of antagonism (combat against demons and the other army, Satan‟s) and of 
hierarchy...  These celestial pyramids served as models for the courtly protocol and caesaro-papist 
ceremonial in Byzantium, which in turn served as the matrix for our monarchical (and in its wake, 
Republican) protocol.” Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural 
Forms, 45. 
139 Debray, Transmitting Culture, 14-15. 
140 Vandana Shiva, "Reductionist Science as Epistemological Violence," in Science, Hegemony and 
Violence : a requiem for modernity, ed. Ashis Nandy (Tokyo; Delhi University; Oxford, 1988), 86-87. 
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the dominant category-term itself (postmodern, late-capitalism etc.) suffocating in its 
own vacuity.‖141 This insight verifies the earlier warning that the ‗warrants‘ extracted 
through the contractual nature of a particular epistemic register may not succeed in 
generating power.  
In Serres‘ prose then, ―...the former imaginary subject of knowledge, taking refuge in 
his stove-heated room to conjure up the Devil and the Good Lord, or bent under his 
transcendental conditions, gives way to a group, united or dispersed in space and 
time, dominated and ruled by agreement.‖142 This ‗social contract‘ is loaded in two 
directions: obedience protects the privileges (usually called ‗freedom‘) of living in a 
modern society, but this obedience is frustrated by the inability to profess or remedy 
any cause for objection or obstacle to freedom due to the absence of any singular 
authority that might take responsibility. Responsibility, knowledge, and authority 
are divided. The issue of ‗who can speak‘ therefore shifts to become the problem of 
who to speak to. How do you argue with a dominant paradigm? And how to access 
the networks of power in order to try and change it? Such difficulties not only frustrate 
the efforts of those championing alternative epistemological positions, but even the 
most general attempts to negotiate the modern bureaucratic terrain. Arendt makes 
this point clearly:  
―...the latest and perhaps most formidable form of… domination [is] 
bureaucracy or the rule of an intricate system of bureaus in which no [one]... 
can be held responsible, and which could properly be called rule by Nobody. 
(If, in accord with traditional political thought, we identify tyranny as 
government that is not held to give account of itself, rule by Nobody is clearly 
the most tyrannical of all, since there is no one left who could even be asked 
to answer for what is being done. It is this state of affairs, making it 
impossible to localize responsibility and to identify the enemy...)‖143  
 
Within the epistemological limits of modernity, what is legitimate within shared 
public space typically conforms to a binarised, or dialectical form: only binaries are 
permitted, however illusory these may be.144 The only way to ‗cross the border‘ is to 
                                                 
141 Graham Ward, Cities of God (USA, 2000), 4. 
142 Serres, The Natural Contract, 21. 
143 Arendt, On Violence, 38-39. 
144 Consider C.P. Snow: “Attempts to divide anything into two ought to be regarded with much 
suspicion.” The Two Cultures (1959) cited in Patricia Fara, Science : A Four Thousand Year History, 
1st ed. (Oxford; New York, 2009), 154. 
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philosophically commit to the process of binarisation, which ultimately may be 
epistemologically fatal. The dialectical form is a part of the modern episteme itself, 
and possesses both a theological origin and a twist, as Arendt recognises:  
―Hegel‘s and Marx‘s great trust in the dialectical ‗power of negation,‘ by 
virtue of which opposites do not destroy but smoothly develop into each 
other because contradictions promote and do not paralyse development, rests 
on a much older philosophical prejudice: that evil is no more than a primitive 
modus of the good, that good can come out of evil; that, in short, evil is but a 
temporary manifestation of a still-hidden good.‖145  
 
To enter into the dialectic is therefore to risk epistemological compromise, 
extinguishment, or attempted exorcism/exclusion.146 The alternative is to submit to 
the normative processes of relativisation and privatisation, in short, agreeing to 
private and limited freedoms. This insight can be identified in the work of Carl 
Schmitt: ―Schmitt views the history of modernity as driven by a continuing quest for 
a neutral and safe haven on earth in denial of the necessity to take a side between good and 
evil…‖147 As any neutral position is the outcome of full relativisation then all 
knowledge claims, in the context of a liberal society, are also fully relativised: thus 
(in the thinking of Schmitt‘s contemporary, Leo Strauss), denying any possibility of 
any definitive account. 148 The exception is: 
―...the step undertaken by the seventeenth century from traditional Christian 
theology to the system of a ‗natural‘ science. Until this day this has 
determined the direction that all ensuing development had to take… 
Therewith the direction to neutralization and minimalization was taken and 
the law accepted, according to which European humanity has acted and that 
has shaped its concept of truth.‖149  
 
                                                 
145 Arendt, On Violence, 56. Further: “Marx‟s idea, borrowed from Hegel, that every old society harbors 
the seeds of its successors in the same way every living organism harbors the seeds of its offspring is 
indeed not only the most ingenious but also the only possible conceptual guarantee for the 
sempiternal continuity of progress in history; and since the motion of this progress is supposed to 
come about through the clashes of antagonistic forces, it is possible to interpret every „regress‟ as a 
necessary but temporary setback.” Ibid., 26. 
146 As this dialectic, that of negation and overcoming, is thus theological and therefore still internal to 
modernity, the preference here is to follow Goodchild who frames criticism in terms of „turning our 
attention toward that which matters‟ – to consider a third way which is outside of the dialectic. 
Goodchild, Capitalism and Religion : The Price of Piety, 252. 
147 Anna Schmidt, 'The Problem of Carl Schmitt's Political Theology,' Interpretations, vol. 36: 3 (2009), 
221. 
148 „Introduction‟ in Leo Strauss et al., On Tyranny : Including the Strauss-Kojeve Correspondence, 
Rev. and enl. ed. (USA, [1963] 2000), xvii. 
149 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1932), 94 in Schmidt, 'The 
Problem of Carl Schmitt's Political Theology,' 220. 
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As Foucault and Shiva have recognised however, the ‗definitive‘ episteme, the 
exception, remains unrelativised. Foucault (though he eventually settles on the 
negative), even questions whether all such interrogations of epistemology necessitate 
the analysis of scientific discourse.150 
The limits of the episteme do, however, overlap with other epistemological terrain 
which co-exists in the same spaces as modernity; hence, Foucault‘s recognition that 
the limits are not ‗fixed‘. The limits present as aporias or opportunities for hospitality 
and justice, but only if a ‗third position‘ with respect to these limits is taken. This 
third position (as sought by not only Derrida, but Serres, Debray, and others) is not 
possible either inside or outside the binarised area, but may only be philosophically 
possible beyond them, which is more to do with the difference between ‗truth‘ 
positions than the attempt to reconcile truth positions, either via universiality or 
relativism. The structure of this dominant modern episteme and the power relations 
specific to it have to be sought in the interface between ‗relations of forces which are 
supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge,‘151 and the material-semiotic 
apparati (such as Schneider‘s register, or Idhe and Selinger‘s engines) which are 
deployed by human agents who are creating, negotiating, and modifying the 
epistemological field. This field is isomorphic with the ‗terrain‘ indigenous to the 
ideology of modernity: the ‗modern West‘, which, true to its conception within 
popular culture – as if it were a ‗frontier‘ – has expanded at the borders and 
epistemologically engulfed the world. Vincent Crapanzano puts this particularly 
well: ―Unlike borders, which can be crossed (unless they are closed) and boundaries, 
which can be transgressed, frontiers... cannot be crossed. They mark a change in 
ontological register.‖152 Impressions of the world are altered: history, globalisation, 
tourism, migration, and trade, bring with them new kinds of evaluating the quality 
of ‗here to there‘, ‗mine to yours‘, and the present in relation to the past.153  
                                                 
150 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 194-195. 
151 Ibid., 196. 
152 Vincent Crapanzano, Imaginative Horizons : An Essay in Literary-Philosophical Anthropology (USA, 
2004), 14. 
153 In Zygmunt Bauman‟s terms, power has become extraterritorial, no longer slowed down by the 
resistance of space: “Time acquires history once the speed of movement through space... becomes a 
matter of human ingenuity, imagination and resourcefulness.” Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity 
(Cambridge, USA, 2000), 9, 11. 
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Immersion in the epistemology of the ‗West‘ also, ironically, forces confrontation 
with the guiding beliefs and practices employed to secure meaning in a local and 
personal sense. Ultimate questions of purpose, fate, the control of illness, birth, 
death, and the anxiety of an unknown future must still be mediated. The scientific 
and technological advances of a secular modernity supply tools for only a partial 
mediation, one that is explanatory, yet often, unsatisfying. The question arises (to 
borrow from Rasch): ―If this is modernity, do we really want to be here?‖ 154 Thus, 
the attempt must be made to begin the process of relativising the ‗culture‘ and 
epistemology of modernity through the interrogation of its origins, structure, and 
outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
154 Rasch, Niklas Luhmann's Modernity: The Paradoxes of Differentiation, 2. 
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Part II: Definitions 
Jacques Le Goff, in his histories, notes that historians do not pay enough attention to the way 
in which words mark, with their appearance, a significant moment in time, and alter in 
meaning through the course of their use.155 Words – indeed, language(s) – are vehicles of 
transmission;156 for Roland Barthes, the „object in which power in inscribed‟;157 for Umberto 
Eco, the means by which it becomes established.158 Words are not just communicative, but are 
creative: in the theological sense of the Word (in the Hebrew, a verb);159 in the educational, 
discursive, and rhetorical senses; and in the direct sense of supplying the connection between 
related meanings, based upon cultural conventions, and mental, semantic, and other 
associations.160 Their inception occurs within a particular historical milieu, in which their 
appearance is a part of a method of organising information within a particular horizon of 
meanings. Words are neither singular, nor static, but are situated somewhere between message 
and medium. Eco writes, against Marshall McLuhan: “The medium is not the message; the 
message becomes what the receiver makes of it, applying to it his own codes of reception, which 
are neither those of the sender nor those of the scholar of communication.”161 Words are go-
betweens, because one word may possess multiple meanings or ways of reading, yet one way of 
reading or a single meaning can be derived from a selection of quite different words. In 
Debray‟s terms, the „weighty plots‟ of any milieu are often underestimated: “...usage is more 
archaic than the tool... if the medium is „new‟, the milieu is „old,‟ by definition. It is a 
stratification of memories and narrative associations... [a] repertory [of] representational 
structures and symbols from all preceding ages.”162  
                                                 
155 Le Goff, The Birth of Europe, 3. 
156 “Christianity helps along the victory of the codex (our own form of book) over the volumen (or 
scroll), unfit for liturgical reading because so little able to be easily handled, and the victory of the 
codex helps along that of Christianity over pagan practices.” Debray, Media Manifestos : On the 
Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 15. 
157 Cited in Umberto Eco, Travels in Hyperreality : Essays, Picador ed., Picador (London, 1987), 240.  
158 Ibid., 244-245. 
159 Consider Tracy on this also: “The recent theoretical work on Western „logocentrism‟… needs to be 
explicitly related to a study of Christian self-understanding within… theology, the discipline that asks 
„Greek‟ (logocentric) questions of Jewish and Hellenistic Jewish scriptural texts…  This… alliance [has] 
helped to occasion… categories as spirit over letter, ideality over materiality, reason over feeling, 
content in written sign over form, signified over signifier, identity over difference, and self-presence in 
self-understanding over all „derivative,‟ distancing forms of writing.” David Tracy, 'Writing,' in Critical 
Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (USA, 1998), 385. 
160 Last fragment paraphrased from Eco, Travels in Hyperreality : Essays, 298. 
161 Ibid., 235. 
162 Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 16-17. 
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DEFINITIONS 1: MODERNITY 
―…a condition of modernity presupposes an act of self-
conscious distancing from a past or a situation regarded as 
naïve.‖ 
Modernity, Gustavo Benavides, 1998.163 
 
―Naïve: 1. Originally: natural and unaffected; artless; 
innocent. Later also: showing a lack of experience, 
judgement, or wisdom; credulous, gullible. 2a. Of art… 
produced by a person without formal training. b. Of an artist: 
not trained in a formal manner; eschewing sophisticated 
techniques. 3. Science. Of a person or animal: not having 
previously had a particular experience or been the subject of 
a particular experiment; lacking knowledge of the purpose of 
an experiment; unconditioned.‖  
Oxford English Dictionary, 2010.164 
 
―It is never a waste of time to study the history of a word.‖ 
Civilisation, Lucien Febvre, 1930.165 
The concept of utopia is conceived via the connections between the spatial and the 
temporal… from urbanus… to urban – the implicit promise of the city; from 
saeculum… to secular – the aeon or world; from modus… and modernus… to modern… 
to modernity. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who first used the term moderniste in the sense 
that we have come to use it today, took as his symbol for modernity ‗the agitated 
street life of Paris – le tourbillion social, the social whirlwind‘, an image which 
entwines speed and the city in the image of the ‗new‘.166 Deriving from modo, or 
‗now‘, modernity sets temporal and structural boundaries, a definition condensing 
both time and space: pushing forwards towards utopia without cognisance of the 
irony that utopia is ‗no place‘ at all, and thus, the future is both open and devoid of 
any intrinsic meaning; whether this evokes Sartrean nausea or inspires the 
                                                 
163 Benavides, 'Modernity,' 187. 
164 „Naïve‟. “Etymology: Middle French, French naïf natural, unspoilt (late 12th cent. in Old French; 
attested earlier in Anglo-Norman with sense „native‟ (c1150)), foolish (13th cent.), imitating nature, 
without artifice (mid 16th cent.), unsophisticated, credulous (1642) < classical Latin nātīvus.” Oxford 
English Dictionary Online, retrieved 26 January 2011. 
165 Cited in Brett Bowden, The Empire of Civilization : The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (Chicago, 
2009), 23. 
166 Cited in Harvey Cox, Religion in the Secular City : Toward a Postmodern Theology (New York, 
1984), 181. Speed and the city are also entwined in the manifestos of Marinetti‟s Futurism, which 
glorified youth, technology, war, and progress. “An art-movement, originating in Italy, characterized by 
violent departure from traditional forms, the avowed aim being to express movement and growth in 
objects, not their appearance at some particular moment. Also applied to similar tendencies in 
literature and music.” „Futurism‟, Oxford English Dictionary Online, retrieved 26 January 2011. 
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contemplation of infinite possibilities. Meaning is always in potential; thus, intrinsic 
to the promise is that it can be a catalyst for the creation of meaning, but it possesses 
none of its own. In fact, it could be argued that modernity has failed to provide 
meaning. As Rasch writes, albeit employing a deliberately theatrical tone:  
―Rationalization and pluralisation, we have heard, are really reification and 
alienation, really social and psychic fragmentation. Rationalization has 
epistemologically separated us (subjects) from our natural surroundings 
(objects), whilst pluralisation has voided us of our moral centre. With no 
vision of the whole and our place in it, we have no sure knowledge how to 
live.‖ 167  
 
The question must be asked as to whether nihilism and relativism are the 
unavoidable outcomes of such a ‗meaningless modernity‘?168 
Our current concepts derive from a strange fusion of classical and religious thought: 
the age old debate between ‗Athens and Jerusalem‘ (as originally posed by 
Tertullian).169 To the Greeks, utopia was an ideal place that could be realised in the 
polis; to the Jews and Christians, utopia was an ideal time, structured through the 
expectation of the messiah; and thus, the culmination of history in the 
millennium.170 The term is ‗evocative‘ and, in the thought of Vattimo (extending 
Mannheim, the Hegelians, the Frankfurt School), it is an ideal that is potentially 
                                                 
167 Further: “Rationalization and pluralisation have therefore been emphatically rejected, have been 
sublimated in a variety of historical and political theodicies: and even when grudgingly acknowledged 
as irreducible and necessary, they have nevertheless been quarantined, kept at a distance from that 
lifeboat named the Lifeworld, the last remnant of authenticity and free intersubjectivity equipped with 
a rudder. And yet now – after the postmodern critique has once again questioned the wisdom of a too 
narrowly defined Enlightenment project, and as we enter another millennium without the benefit of 
Messianic guidance – it seems that neither our quasi-theological rejections of the world nor our 
political theodicies and ethical lifeworlds have been able to move us beyond the barren landscape of 
rationalization and pluralisation.” Rasch, Niklas Luhmann's Modernity: The Paradoxes of 
Differentiation, 2-3. 
168 Ibid., 3. 
169 Tertullian (155-230) was a native of Carthage in Roman Africa who was well educated in 
philosophy, medicine, and law. Tertullian was convinced that philosophy led to heresy, and it was 
particularly Gnostic heresy to which he was opposed, though he was not (as is often presumed), 
opposed to philosophical reason generally and defended the possibility of rational knowledge of 
divine things: as is evidenced by his other writings. The original quote reads: “What indeed has Athens 
to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? What between 
heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from „the porch of Solomon,‟ who had himself taught 
that „the Lord should be sought in simplicity of heart.‟ Away with all attempts to produce a mottled 
Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition! We want no curious disputation after 
possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the gospel! With our faith, we desire no further 
belief. For once we believe this, there is nothing else that we ought to believe.” Cited in David C. 
Lindberg, 'Science and the Early Christian Church,' Isis, vol. 74: 4 (1983), 515-516. 
170 Krishan Kumar, 'Aspects of the Western Utopian Tradition,' History of the Human Sciences, vol. 16: 
1 (2003), 63. 
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made real through action. An ideal fundamentally oriented toward the relations of 
dominance, albeit Biblically derived, between humankind and nature; that of man 
over nature, and nature over man.171 The modern desire to harness the resources of 
the planet and effectively control outcomes in terms of human fate is the extension 
of an urge to mitigate uncertainty by deliberate management and control of the 
‗unknown‘. In any tradition or cultural milieu, persistent ambiguities – such as 
knowing what the future holds, or the direction of personal and collective fate – are 
managed via proven strategies (ritual, belief, or science) from which a sense of 
purpose, solace, or an explanation can be obtained. The drive behind the Age of 
Enlightenment and the recourse to Reason was no different. Reconstruction of the 
world left little to fate; specifically, death, suffering, and cosmological insecurity. 
Religious practices such as prayer, sacrifice, ritual, and magic, and their role in 
placating invisible forces, could be gradually abandoned in light of the fact that 
human destiny could be more reliably controlled with science and technology.172 The 
dominance and authority of a single, all-powerful deity thereafter became replaced 
with the authority of the human who ‗dwells godlike at the centre of the world he 
constructs for himself‘, a world constructed through logic and science.173  
To use a theological term, it is the kenosis, or self-emptying of the transcendental 
deity into the now mechanically administered offices of the state from which this 
authority descends: according to Foucault (recalling Eric Voegelin): ―...we still have 
not cut off the head of the king.‖174 Kenosis is also a critical part of Vattimo‘s 
philosophy on ‗weakening‘, in that it is the ―...weakening of the transcendental 
potency of the divine and its metaphysical essence… has produced the progressive 
                                                 
171 Gianni Vattimo, 'Utopia Dispersed,' Diogenes 209, vol. 53:  (2006), 20-21. 
172 Georges Helal, 'Conditions for Religious Progress in the Contemporary Developed World,' in 
Perspectives on the Unity and Integration of Knowledge, ed. Garth Benson, Ronald Glasberg, and 
Bryant Griffith (New York, 1998), 136.  
173 Sean Kane, Wisdom of the Mythtellers, 2nd ed. (Canada; New York, 1998), 34. 
174 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 : An Introduction, 88-89. Berger links this symbolically 
to the institutions of social control: “…the institution of divine kingship, and the several roles 
representing it, is apprehended as a decisive link between the world of men and the world of the 
gods. The religious legitimation of power involved in this institution does not appear as an ex post 
facto justification of a few theoreticians, it is objectively present as the institution is encountered by 
the man in the street in the course of his everyday life. Insofar as the man in the street is adequately 
socialized into the reality of his society, he cannot conceive of the king except as the bearer of a role 
that represents the fundamental order of the universe – and indeed, the same assumption may be 
made for the king himself. In this manner, the cosmic status of the institution is „experienced‟ 
whenever men come into contact with it in the ordinary course of events.” Peter L. Berger, The Sacred 
Canopy : Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion, [1st ed. (New York, 1967), 36. 
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destructuring and draining away of all the ontological truths that have characterized 
mankind‘s history and thought.‖175 It is unsurprising, therefore, that political 
philosophy tends to lead back to Nietzsche and the ‗disquieting nihilism‘ that 
characterises the modern age. In Vattimo‘s terms, kenosis results in the progressive 
reduction of the violence of the sacred,176 thus it is ‗emptied‘ into the secular, where 
it appears to have neither limits, nor accountability; as evidenced by the 
mechanisation of war, death and the atrocities of torture which accompany the 
modern age. Violence as the outcome of secularity is atheist in the sense meant by 
Jean-Luc Nancy when he names it as ―...the element with which the West invented 
itself,‖177 in that it requires the ultimate denial of any authority beyond the state. As 
Voegelin writes: ―It does not suffice, therefore, to replace the old world of God with 
a new world of man: the world of God itself must have been a world of man, and 
God a work of man that can therefore be destroyed if it prevents man from reigning 
over the order of being. The murder of God must be made retroactive 
speculatively.‖178 
Modernus, as contrasted with antiqui, or the traditional, is to be ‗unprecedented‘, 
novel, autonomous, to understand one‘s self and world as ‗free and creative in a 
radical sense‘, governed neither by fate nor providence, to demonstrate both 
superiority and originality in contrast to what has gone before.179 Such a claim must 
be queried when modernity is also saturated thoroughly with a theistic, yet largely 
invisible, Judeo-Christian ethos, which structures morality, perpetuates fantasies of 
aseity, and interiorises the eschatological impulse towards progress. Modernity (and 
its predominant vehicle, Enlightenment science) was to provide the answers to the 
questions typically forwarded by religion; however, it also prompted a type of 
cultural vertigo as ‗modern‘ quickly became the designator for a ‗contemporary‘ 
artistic style, and then ultimately a creative and liberating manner of being which 
                                                 
175 „Introduction‟ in Pierpaolo Antonello, Rene Girard, and Gianni Vattimo, Christianity, Truth, and 
Weakening Faith : A Dialogue, William McCuaig trans. (New York, 2010), 6. 
176 Ibid., 87. 
177 Jean-Luc Nancy, 'Atheism and Monotheism,' in Weakening Philosophy : Essays in Honour of Gianni 
Vattimo, ed. Santiago Zabala (Montreal; London, 2007), 387. 
178 Eric Voegelin and Manfred Henningsen, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin: Modernity without 
Restraint (USA, 2000), 279. 
179 Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity, 2, 6. 
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celebrated progress and freedom, along with a messianic enthusiasm for being on 
perpetually on the cusp of the new.180  
Graham Ward notes that, for the Judeo-Christian traditions, the key questions of the 
relation between God and the world are essentially temporal: all notions of 
salvation, history, election, ecclesiology, the coming of the Kingdom, the work of 
creation, revelation, etc., are oriented towards the central inquiry – ‗what time is 
it?‘181 The modern concept of ‗progress‘ derives from the same question: a moment 
suspended between a genesis and eschatological moment. According to Michael 
Gillespie: ―…to think of oneself of modern is to define one‘s being in terms of time. 
This is remarkable. In previous ages and other places, people have defined 
themselves in terms of their land... place... race... ethnic groups... traditions... gods, 
but not explicitly in terms of time…‖182 Further: ―To be modern consequently means 
not merely to define one‘s being in terms of time but also to define time in terms of 
one‘s being, to understand time as the product of human freedom in interaction with 
the natural world. Being modern at its core is thus something titanic, something 
Promethean.‖183 Baudelaire, in The Painter of Modern Life (1863), described modernity 
as ―that which is ephemeral, fugitive, contingent upon the occasion.‖184 
Despite the emergence of the ‗modern‘ in medieval times, and the link to a medieval 
Christian notion of the world as ‗the unfolding of God‘s plan‘, there was no sense of 
‗progress‘ as it is understood today.185 The view of the universe during the 
‗European‘ Middle Ages was limited by Biblical teachings on history and, despite 
some influence from Greek theories of time, the earth was regarded as a ‗steady-state 
system‘ as opposed to an evolving one: people simply awaited the end-of-days.186 It 
took some time for humankind to be self-actualising and motivated towards the goal 
outside of, or perhaps in reaction to, the closed system of theological absolutism, or 
predestination. Max Weber‘s theory on this was that, in the age of the Reformation, 
                                                 
180 Ibid., 4-5. 
181 Ward, Cities of God, 2-3. 
182 Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity, 2. 
183 Ibid., 2.  
184 Cited in Callinicos, Against Postmodernism : A Marxist Critique, 29. 
185 Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity, 3-4.  
186 J.L. Russell, 'Time in Christian Thought,' in The Voices of Time : A Cooperative Survey of Man's 
Views of Time as Expressed by the Sciences and by the Humanities, ed. J. T. Fraser (UK, 1968), 70. 
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‗salvation‘ was central, but the Calvinist doctrine of predestination eliminated any 
and all means of attaining the grace of God. Human efforts were therefore redirected 
towards work, thereafter providing the motivation for the growth of capitalism and 
the industrial revolution.187 Following this logic, the ‗steady-state‘ conceptualisation 
was slowly transformed and ‗change‘ became linked to ‗progression‘. As Gillespie 
writes: progress was a continuous and natural ―...process that free human beings 
could master and control through the application of the proper scientific method. In 
this way they could become masters and possessors of nature and thereby produce a 
more hospitable world for themselves.‖188  
This shift in the meaning of ‗progress‘ is vaguely linked to the scientific revolution or 
thereabouts, because, as the opening quotes suggest, the designation of all that has 
gone prior as ‗naïve‘ was designed to deliver a death-blow to religion.189 
Enlightenment thinkers shaped the notion of progress from a Christian narrative of 
sin and redemption that was fused to the Greek philosophy of liberation through 
knowledge.190 Despite the fact there was no ‗sudden break‘ from the past to speak of, 
these thinkers also reconfigured the historical narrative so as to nominate the 
‗Enlightened Renaissance‘ as the fracture point with the ‗dark‘ Middle Ages, as if the 
shift was immediate, final, and could be applied across continents.191 The 
distribution of these ideas was via the universities, which operated like guilds, 
organising learning into strict hierarchies which prized both theology and Greek 
philosophy at the highest levels.192 As Patricia Fara writes, ―...in Victorian England, 
                                                 
187 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 104-105. 
188 Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity, 5. 
189 As Arendt notes, the notion of progress shifted in meaning between the 17th century, in which 
progress was thought „in terms of an accumulation of knowledge through the centuries‟, and the 18th 
century, when the word came to imply an „education of mankind whose end would coincide with 
man‟s coming of age.‟ To quote her directly: “Progress was not unlimited, and Marx‟s classless society 
seen as the realm of freedom that could be the end of history – often interpreted as the 
secularization – of Christian eschatology or Jewish messianism – actually still bears the hallmark of 
the Age of Enlightenment. Beginning with the nineteenth century, however, all such limitations 
disappeared… “ Arendt, On Violence, 25-26. 
190 Gray, Heresies, 13-14. 
191 In Bhambra‟s words: “John Hale‟s definition of the Renaissance, as the recovery of „the sounds of 
classical antiquity after the long medieval winter that closed in with the loss of Rome to the 
barbarians‟ (1994: 189), elegantly, if ultimately misleadingly, encapsulates the dominant themes of 
the Renaissance as modern and as European…” Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity : Postcolonialism 
and the Sociological Imagination, 84. 
192 With respect to the establishment of the universities: “By 1200, Europe boasted three – first in 
Bologna, then Paris, and Oxford – and during the next three centuries, around seventy more were 
founded in cities seeking to advertise their importance. Universities became powerful institutions that 
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engineers were... seen as socially inferior to scientists, and hard labour was rated 
lower than intellectual speculation...‖193 The error was, as Gray points out, was 
linking scientific progress to ‗social progress‘ and expecting the two would go hand 
in hand. He writes: ―In science, progress is a fact, in ethics and politics it is a 
superstition.‖194  
Conceptually, the project of ‗the modern‘ is structurally perfect, in that it is always 
‗about to be‘ achieved and (like classic utopias), it has retained a degree of privilege 
by remaining eternally ‗just‘ ahead, on the other side of the now. Though it may 
appear so, ‗modernity‘ itself has no real world presence: in ‗the lived-in reality of 
actual people‘, modernity is something in the name of which a promise is issued, 
and those promises are either delivered on or they are not. In Gray‘s view, we are 
living in the latest succession in a line of  
―Enlightenment faiths, in which the Christian promise of universal salvation 
reappears as a political project of universal emancipation... Secular societies 
are ruled by repressed religion. Screened off from conscious awareness, the 
religious impulse has mutated... most cling to the hope that science can 
succeed where politics has failed... not from real conviction but from fear of 
the void that looms if the hope of a better future is given up. Belief in progress 
is the Prozac of the thinking classes... The illusion is in the belief that it can 
effect any fundamental alteration in the human condition.‖195 
 
Modernity is an ideology in the name of which a power is appropriated. Modernity 
itself does not exist: it possesses no agency, has no territory, nor even (despite being 
a temporal designator) any bounded time period. Modernity itself, to borrow from 
Baudrillard, is a hyperreality.196 Modernity perpetuates as a type of ‗monotheism by 
other means‘, the secularisation of an ideal attached to the monotheistic 
                                                                                                                                                
could negotiate with the State as well as with the Church. Like guilds, they governed themselves, but 
they were also awarded exceptional privileges for their scholars, who were highly regarded as elite 
guardians of esoteric knowledge. This protection meant that in addition to their main role of teaching, 
mediaeval scholars were relatively free to discuss controversial ideas.” Fara, Science : A Four 
Thousand Year History, 72-73. 
193 Ibid., 74. 
194 Gray, Heresies, 3. 
195 Ibid., 2-3. 
196 See Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, Foreign Agents Series (New York, 1983). As Bauman writes in a 
critical review of Baudrillard: “Baudrillard‟s simulation… effaces the very difference between the 
categories true and false, real and imaginary. We no longer have any means of testing pretence 
against reality, or know which is which. Nor is there any exit from this quandary…  In fact we do not 
know the difference between map and territory, and would not know it even if we had our noses 
pressed up against the thing itself.” Zygmunt Bauman, 'Disappearing into the Desert,' Times Literary 
Supplement,, Issue (Date December 16-22,1988). 
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transcendental Judeo-Christian God; a juggernaut driven by capital, fuelled by its 
own logic, and consuming ‗all cultural and social formations which obstruct its 
progress‘.197 Utopian, but in the words of Bauman: now, ―...within the logic of the 
globalized world, a contradiction in terms… The „u‟ of „utopia‟ bereaved by the topos, is 
left homeless and floating, no longer hoping to strike roots, to „re-embed‟.‖198 In addition, the 
present ‗modern moment‘ is suspended between two fictions – an idealised past and 
an idealised future – and it has been thus since sometime between the Renaissance 
and the Enlightenment. The ‗Western‘ moment and imagined terrain which is 
generated by these fictions continues to dictate present understandings of what 
counts for knowledge, especially in the context of religious and cultural exchange, as 
defined by the specific trajectory modernity ‗should‘ take. This absolute futuristic 
orientation of modernity, coupled with the inherited Judeo-Christian insistence on 
historicism, displaces it in a manner which makes it impossible to definitively ‗nail 
any objections to the door‘. Modernity is elusive. It is therefore best to deal with the 
effects of the idea, rather than the idea itself, and perhaps map the ways in which the 
idea is used to generate power.199  
Gray writes that the political thought of modernity is, ―...in all its varieties, liberal 
and otherwise… an application of the Enlightenment project... of giving human 
institutions a claim on reason that has universal authority.‖200 Modernity (via 
secularity) assured a new revelation (via revolution):201 an end to religious conflict 
through the reinvention of the world, and ‗freedom from the cycle of anarchy and 
                                                 
197 „Monotheism by other means‟ attributed to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw 2011. Phrasing 
of last fragment borrowed from R. Danielle Egan and Stephen D. Papson, '"You Either Get It or You 
Don't:" Conversion Experiences and the Dr Phil Show,' Journal of Religion and Popular Culture, vol. 10: 
2 (2005), 38. 
198 Zygmunt Bauman, 'Utopia with No Topos,' History of the Human Sciences, vol. 16: 1 (2003), 22. 
199 This is an issue which Rorty calls the „epistemological problem‟ – recommending that we simply 
„drop it‟ and shift our focus to politics (and what he calls a „poeticized culture‟). However, it is difficult 
to see how this is achievable in the context of on-going subscription to the theological and 
epistemological tenets that continue to shape the political orders – the fact of which blocks Rorty‟s 
possibility absolutely. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge, UK; New York, 
1989), 67-69. A rejoinder by Carl Schmitt and John Gray is useful here, in that they both constantly 
argue for epistemological inseparability between the theological, legal, and thus, the political. 
200 Gray, Enlightenment's Wake : Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, 97. 
201 „Revolution‟. “Late 14c., originally of celestial bodies, from O.Fr. revolution, from L.L. revolutionem 
(nom. revolutio) „a revolving,‟ from L. revolutus, pp. of revolvere „turn, roll back‟ (see revolve). General 
sense of „instance of great change in affairs‟ is recorded from mid-15c. Political meaning first 
recorded c.1600, derived from French, and was especially applied to the expulsion of the Stuart 
dynasty under James II in 1688 and transfer of sovereignty to William and Mary.” „Revolution‟, Online 
Etymology Dictionary, retrieved 4 January 2011. 
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tyranny‘ via the growth of knowledge.202 Secularity, though once thought of as 
somewhat less blessed than a life in the cloisters of contemplation, acquired its status 
from the same ‗this-worldly‘ hue which had formerly set it apart as vaguely 
inferior.203 In the words of filmmaker Ben Stewart: ―Enter the infamous rulers of the 
earth, the patriarchs of civilization, political, social, economic, and spiritual 
dictatorship, psychic tyranny.‖204 With the inception of secular modernity, as 
Voegelin understood, God could be ‗decapitated‘, and the state would take the place 
of the world-transcendent deity as ‗the ultimate condition and the origin of its own 
existence‘.205 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
202 Gray, Heresies, 3. 
203 Of this reversal, consider Geering: “Those who withdrew from the world to live the life of Christian 
devotion in the monastic cloister were the „religious‟, while those who ministered in the everyday 
world were the „secular‟ priests.” Lloyd Geering, God in the New World (London, 1968), 60. 
204 Transcript from film Kymatica (2008). Ben Stewart, "Kymatica " (documentary film transcript is 
available online at  http://truth11.com/2009/07/22/kymatica-transcript/ - USA, 2008). 
205 Voegelin and Henningsen, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin: Modernity without Restraint, 28-
29.  
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DEFINITIONS 2: SECULARITY 
―…we must recognize, on the one hand, the nonfunctional 
status of an increasing number of concepts, and on the other, 
the inadequacy of procedures for thinking about [them].‖ 
The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau, 1984.206 
―Seculere, in Christian Latin‖, to read its definition via William Connolly‘s précis of 
the Oxford English Dictionary, ―...means ‗the world‘ as opposed to the One Church of 
heaven.‖ 207 Saeculum is one of two words denoting ‗world‘ (the other is mundus) and 
is frequently used to translate the Greek aeon, which means ‗age‘, ‗epoch‘, ‗eternity‘ 
or ‗eternal.208 Connolly notes:  
―The early (Christian) Church treated the secular as a necessary but residual 
domain of its way of life.  It was... mostly ‗a negative term,‘ even though a 
restricted secular domain of life was deemed essential... By the modern 
period secularism, as a distinctive political perspective and social movement, 
is represented positively as ‗the doctrine that morality should be based solely 
in regard to the well-being of mankind in the present life to the exclusion of 
all considerations drawn from the belief in God...‘‖209  
 
In contemporary times, secularity is upheld as a solution to the dangers of tribalism, 
ethnic, national, and religious difference which might interfere with the rights of 
individuals to remain (or become) ‗modern‘, whilst specifically aiming to ensure that 
religion never goes ‗public‘ in ways which might jeopardise the transcendental and 
totalitarian powers of the state.210 Connolly writes that secularity is oriented towards 
extracting ―...out of public life as much cultural density and depth as possible so that 
                                                 
206 de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xxiii. 
207 William E. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (USA, 1999), 21.  
208 Cox, The Secular City : Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective, 32-33. Geering, 
God in the New World, 60. “…the word „secularization‟ was first used in 1648, at the end of the Thirty 
Years' War in Europe, to refer to the transfer of church properties to the exclusive control of the 
princes. What was a matter-of-fact statement then became later, after the French Revolution, a value 
statement as well: on November 2, 1789, Talleyrand announced to the French National Assembly that 
all ecclesiastical goods were at the disposal of the nation... Still later, when George Jacob Holyoake 
coined the term „secularism‟ in 1851 and led a rationalist movement of protest in England, 
secularization was built into the ideology of progress. Secularization, though nowhere more than a 
fragmentary and incomplete process, has ever since retained a positive connotation. 
…„Secularization‟ is nowadays generally employed to refer to, in the words of Peter Berger, „the 
process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious 
institutions and symbols.‟” T. N. Madan, 'Secularism in Its Place,' The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 46: 
4 (1987), 748. 
209 Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist, 21.  
210 Brian Goldstone, 'Violence and the Profane: Islamism, Liberal Democracy, and the Limits of 
Secular Discipline,' Anthropological Quarterly, vol. 80: 1 (2007), 208. 
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muddy ‗metaphysical‘ and ‗religious‘ differences don‘t flow into the pure water of 
public reason, procedure, and justice.‖211  
The origins of the secular are not often highlighted in historical exegesis, because the 
assumption that even the most mundane of practical human activities was always 
structured inside of a larger religious or mythic discourse seems a persistent habit 
among scholars.212 Likewise, the parallel tendency of scholars to fixate on the 
etymology of the term itself can obscure the underlying concept, which is ultimately 
much older and broader. For example: ancient India, though its laws were 
structured by religious practice, had a concept of secularity which was attached to 
law-making, custom, and tradition; certain aspects of philosophical inquiry had a 
deliberately secular and empirical focus, and kingship in the Vedic period was a 
purely secular institution – this is also true of early Mesopotamia.213 In China, there 
was a notion similar to secularity which referred to the life of the Buddha or a 
Chinese Buddhist individual before their ‗conversion‘ to Buddhism.  
The difference between these notions of secularity and the modern idea arises when, 
in the early modern period, ‗religion‘ is relegated to a distinct sphere and acquires 
the distinction of being something that can be ‗possessed‘ (such as ‗faith‘). Internal to 
this is the idea of an absent God who requires belief without proof. When compared 
with cross-cultural understandings of deity, ritual, relationship, and belief that 
habitually extend into every area of social life (praxis), this orientation can be 
recognised as uniquely Judeo-Christian.214 This distinction also assumes that the 
Judeo-Christian and later, the modern individual, is somehow set apart from other 
cultures and elevated via this rationalisation and taming of the religious. Such 
arrogance persists despite the fact that there is not now, nor has there ever been, any 
                                                 
211 Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist, 22-23. 
212 This is a distinctly evolutionary mode of thinking which privileges the modern as „advanced‟. 
213 A.S. Altekar, State and Government in Ancient India (India, 2002). Madan notes also that in the 
Brahmanical political period in India the idea of a state religion was never entertained. Madan, 
'Secularism in Its Place,' 752. 
214 The exception here is within Islam, as explained by Muhammed Iqbal: "The ultimate Reality, 
according to the Quran, is spiritual, and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its 
opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. All that is secular is therefore sacred in the 
roots of its being.... There is no such thing as a profane world.... All is holy ground."  Cited in Madan, 
'Secularism in Its Place,' 753, ibid. 
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distinct religious sphere to speak of.215 Despite efforts to create such a sphere (one 
that is distinct from the dominant claim for a public secular space), neither the 
differentiation of ‗spheres‘, nor the ‗dis-embedding‘ of individuals from their 
corporate or tribal groups, has been successful. Even within post-colonial contexts, 
re-embedding, collectivisation and communalism persist in resistance to increased 
homogeneity. These tensions translate to a lived experience of the world (as 
compared with a notion of the world which is purely conceptual), in which neither 
‗religion‘ nor ‗culture‘ will be confined to any ‗sphere‘, private or otherwise.  
A segue to clarify what is meant by ‗religion‘ is required here. Its etymology is 
uncertain, though it appears to stem from the root *leig, meaning ‗to bind‘, 
suggesting a collective of some kind.216 Its historical uses are explicitly Christian in 
orientation, but as Connolly argues, ―...the word ‗religion‘ now becomes treated as a 
universal term, as if ‗it‘ could always be distilled from a variety of cultures in a 
variety of times rather than representing a specific fashioning of spiritual life 
engendered by the secular public space carved out of Christendom.‖217 Religion is 
also an ‗outsider term‘, in that its applicability to a wide range of belief and praxis is, 
at source, a gesture that is consistent with the post-Enlightened classification of the 
world, and one that continues within the culture of scholarship on religion. Religion 
is locked into the same temporal understandings that accompany a Christianised 
modernity, meaning that all religions, once historicised, are thereafter neatly 
                                                 
215 The notion of faith as something that can be possessed (and the presumed existence of a „sphere‟ 
in which this occurs) has confused scholarship on religion with social understandings (or 
misunderstandings) of religion for the last few hundred years, obscured further by the assertion that 
one can now have „faith‟ in progress, or modernity. In practice, the Christian, the modern secular 
individual, the religious self, and the religious „other‟, all navigate the world in pursuit of „proofs‟ which 
validate whatever it is they happen to believe; whether this translates into a verification of faith in an 
invisible transcendent deity, a political ideology, or an exceptional motor vehicle. 
216 Smith, 'Religion, Religions, Religious,' 269. 
217 Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist, 22-23. Consider Serres also: “...religion presses, spins, knots, 
assembles, gathers, binds, connects, lifts up, reads, or sings the elements of time. The term religion 
expresses exactly this trajectory, this review or prolonging whose opposite is called negligence, the 
negligence that incessantly loses the memory of these strange actions and words. The learned say 
that the word religion could have two sources or origins. According to the first, it would come from the 
Latin verb religare, to attach. Does religion bind us together, does it assure the bond of this world to 
another? According to the second origin, which is more probable, though not certain, and related to 
the first one, it would mean to assemble, gather, left up, traverse, or reread.” Serres, The Natural 
Contract, 47. Contra, consider modernity, by also citing Serres: “Modernity neglects, speaking in 
absolute terms. It cannot and will not think or act toward the global, whether temporal or spatial.”  
Ibid., 48. 
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relegated to tradition (explaining why the specific combination of the terms 
‗modernity‘ and ‗religion‘ immediately present in an uncomfortable opposition).  
In the classical world, though secularity was not conceptualised in the absolutist 
sense that it is understood now, the terms by which secularity was understood 
emerge from the basic contrast between the sacred and profane in the Latin sense. 
As Lloyd Geering notes: 
 ―In Christian usage in the course of time we find the word ‗secular‘ being 
used to describe this visible tangible world in contrast with another world, the 
unseen supernatural world, which is the world of eternity.  Any activity 
directed mainly to the natural world is described as secular, while any activity 
directed to the supernatural world is ‗religious‘.‖218  
 
The ‗secular‘ gradually became synonymous with the ‗profane‘, which was then 
juxtaposed with religion, and this secular/profane realm is now that which has 
become allied with modernity. For both the classical and early Christians however, 
the concepts of the sacred and profane remained relative within a religious context 
(the Latin profanum referred to the space in front of a temple) and the removal of this 
sacral reference point would have been seen to be heretical and idolatrous.219 In 
Greece, as Stanley Tambiah suggests, ―...the ‗divinity of nature‘ was taken for 
granted and was not a matter for disputation. They believed that the divine pervaded 
everything… [and] thus it could be said that if the early Greeks distinguished 
between magic and medicine (‗science‘), they did not oppose ‗religion‘ to them as a 
third category.‖220 Such categories have constantly shifted, as evidenced by the 
closure of the split between biology and science within the last century alone, or 
similarly, the gradual incorporation of psychology and medicine. David Lindberg 
writes: ―One need only recall that Plato demanded solitary confinement (and in 
                                                 
218 Geering, God in the New World, 60. 
219 Bronislaw Szerszynski, 'Rethinking the Secular: Science, Technology, and Religion Today,' Zygon, 
vol. 40: 4 (2005), 815. Consider Asad: “…‟sacred‟ in early modern English usage generally referred to 
individuals, things, persons, and occasions that were set apart and entitled to veneration… [Yet] it 
was late nineteenth-century anthropological and theological thought that rendered a variety of 
overlapping social usages rooted in changed and heterogeneous forms of life into a single immutable 
essence, and claimed it to be the object of a universal human experience called „religious‟. The 
supposedly universal opposition between „sacred‟ and „profane‟ finds no place in premodern writing. 
In medieval theology, the overriding antimony was between „the divine‟ and „the satanic‟ (both of 
them transcendent powers) or „the spiritual‟ and „the temporal‟ (both of them worldly institutions), not 
between a supernatural sacred and a natural profane.” Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular : 
Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Cultural Memory in the Present (California, USA, 2003), 31-32. 
220 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality, Lewis Henry 
Morgan Lectures ; 1984 (UK; USA, 1990), 11. 
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extreme cases, execution) for those who denied the existence of the gods and their 
involvement in human affairs.‖221 Science, which was known as ‗the philosophical 
arts‘ in Greece, had sources inherited from South Asia and the Near East, though 
these ancestors tend to disappear in the formal narration of the history of the West. 
The ‗sciences‘ that were expanded upon and developed in ancient Greece, such as 
medicine, metallurgy, geometry, mathematics, and astronomy, all had their origins 
elsewhere and were adopted as a part of the larger philosophical enterprise.222  
It is also important to note that both pre and post-Aristotelian science retained 
mystical dimensions; Pythagorean sects cultivated esoteric doctrines and practices, 
and Ptolemy and other astronomers combined and interest and belief in magic with 
their inquiries into nature.223 Tambiah notes that a similar point can be made about 
intellectual activity in the late medieval/Renaissance period in Europe, and about 
several ‗heroes‘ of the Enlightenment.224 Linearly constructed histories of the 
birthing process of a scientific revolution cast in the mould of a ‗great tradition‘ 
must, therefore, be abandoned, along with abstractions, binaries, or any concept that 
streamlines the disparate religious, nationalistic and factional interests which led up 
to and impacted upon the Age of Enlightenment.225 To suggest that the ‗reality‘ of 
supernatural or preternatural occurrences hinged on either assertion or denial is also 
reductionist, for the discourses or categories by which they were explained, 
authorised, or discounted were (and continue to be) entirely subject to royal, 
ecclesiastical and political interests.226 
Secularity, as it is understood now, was harmonised with the pursuit of truth in ‗the 
world‘ through the investigation of nature; but the truth to be found in nature was 
not claimed to have replaced religious truth until relatively recently. Proof by miracle 
and proof by authority (that is, by validity derived historically and genealogically 
                                                 
221 Lindberg, 'Science and the Early Christian Church,' 512. 
222 Ibid., 511. 
223 Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality, 10-11. 
224 Ibid., 11. 
225 Roy Porter, 'Introduction,' in Science, Culture, and Popular Belief in Renaissance Europe, ed. 
Stephen Pumfrey, Paolo L. Rossi, and Maurice Slawinski (UK; USA, 1991), 4-6. In addition, it should 
be remembered that despite the convenience of this term, there is no accepted „scientific revolution‟ 
to speak of, but a continuity of events which stretch back into prehistory and reach far wider culturally 
than the Eurocentric view of history would indicate. 
226 Ibid., 5. 
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from antiquity) were regularly attributed to the subjects of medieval science, and 
observable natural phenomena (earthquakes, comets, and eclipses) were generally 
interpreted with a religious lens.227 The ancient terms scientia (Latin), and episteme 
(Greek) were applicable to any system of belief characterised by rigour and certainty, 
whether or not it had any relation to nature, and thus, in the Middle Ages it was 
common to refer to theology also as scientia.228 As Lindberg notes:  
―The church fathers used Greek natural science, and in using it they 
transmitted it… Until the twelfth century, [following] a wave of translation... 
patristic writings constituted a major repository of scientific learning... [but] 
what the church transmitted, it also altered – and had its own doctrines 
altered in return. Christian doctrine and Greek natural philosophy must be 
viewed not as independent, unchangeable bodies of thought… but as 
interacting and mutually transforming views of the world… Christians 
learned to read the Bible with Greek, particularly Platonic eyes; and Christian 
theology became thoroughly embued with Greek metaphysics and 
cosmology.‖229  
 
Science quickly became the ‗handmaiden‘ of the church (with theology as the 
‗queen‘ of the sciences), because this was the arena in which the intellectual arts had 
been preserved, so it is inescapable then, that even the conceptualisations of ‗nature‘ 
that science purports to investigate are encumbered with this inheritance. Lynn 
White Jr. maintains: ―From the 13th century onward, up to and including Leibnitz 
and Newton, every major scientist, in effect, explained his motivations in religious 
terms… it was not until the late 18th century that the hypothesis of God became 
unnecessary to many scientists.‖230 Bill McKibben summarises this well:  
                                                 
227 Le Goff, Medieval Civilization 400-1500, 329. 
228 David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science : The European Scientific Tradition in 
Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. To A.D. 1450 (USA, 1992), 4. 
229 „embued‟ [sic] Lindberg, 'Science and the Early Christian Church,' 530.  Consider also: “In Europe it 
was the monasteries which kept alive what learning there was in the Dark Ages, and as the Middle 
Ages emerged, there grew out of these the first of the great European universities. They were founded 
for the study of theology… Theology was seen, as the core of all sound learning…  The very idea of a 
university was that it should bring together all academic pursuits and give a man a completely 
balanced, an all-round, a universal education.  Theology was the queen of the sciences, and these 
latter gradually began to emerge as individual disciplines.  From the Renaissance onwards, the young 
sciences struggled to get to their feet, and later, with the vigour of adolescents, they broke free from 
theological restraint and ecclesiastical control. …By the nineteenth century, universities were being 
founded which had no faculty of theology at all, and some had constitutions which declared that they 
were purely secular institutions in which no religious subjects could be pursued.” Geering, God in the 
New World, 61. 
230 Lynn White, 'The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,' in This Sacred Earth : Religion, Nature, 
Environment, ed. Roger S. Gottlieb (New York, 1996), 191.  White argues that the unique combination 
of domination ethics, a teleological impulse which propels humanity to constantly progress, and the 
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―The hope that science could replace religion as a way for human beings to 
cope with the world… was really a hope that ‗nature‘ could replace ‗God‘ as 
a source of inspiration and understanding.  Harmony, permanence, order, 
and an idea of our place in that order – scientists searched for all that as 
diligently as Job, with the unceasing attention to the ‗web of life‘ and the 
grand cycle of decay and rebirth.‖231  
 
What is commonly referred to as the scientific revolution was quite literally a 
combination of the linear sense of progress derived from the fusion of Genesis and 
Eschaton, and the observable cycles of the ‗secular‘ natural world. The manner in 
which science ‗captures‘ the notion of revolution leads directly into the inability of 
modernity to be hospitable to alternative epistemologies; the demand being that the 
cycles of nature remain wedded to the scientifically administered linear concept of 
progress, whilst also being fused to Biblical instructions wherein the natural world is 
to be approached from a distance. Richard Hull notes:  
―In well-known passages of the creation story, God gives human dominion 
over fish, bird, cattle, and ‗every living thing that moves upon the earth.‘  
Light, night, soil, wind, rain, and fire exist for human use.  Other sections of 
the Bible make it clear that being human means being different than nature 
and that Earth is but a temporary home – the soul is eternal and transcends 
Earth.‖232  
 
To subdue, or dominate nature, or even the softer instruction of stewardship, places 
the human at the centre of the relationship with the surrounding world, as reflected 
by the modern term, environment, which refers to something in which we live (en = 
in), that encircles around, surrounds, or turns (viron), and is perpetually exterior.233 
Relationality, which is a scholarly term employed by both academics and indigenous 
spokespersons to represent the holistic, egalitarian, and inclusive approach to nature 
common in non-Christian contexts, is therefore in direct opposition with the goals of 
any theo-scientific reduction of the environment. Scientific progress requires that the 
                                                                                                                                                
transcendental orientation of Judeo-Christian thought, ultimately resulted in the psychic victory of 
Christianity over paganism, effectively making it possible to exploit nature with a „mood of 
indifference‟. Ibid., 188-189. 
231 Bill McKibben, The End of Nature, 1st . ed. (New York, 1989), 76-77. 
232 R. Bruce Hull, Infinite Nature (UK; USA, 2006), 125. 
233 Usage, which comes into English from a French origin, was originally in a sense of „neighbourhood‟ 
or environner, though „environment‟ is first documented in 1827, passing into common usage in a 
specialized ecological sense in 1956. Online Etymology Dictionary, retrieved 25th June 2010. 
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secular natural world remain distinct and independent from human personhood; yet 
relationality disrupts this. 
In Bauman‘s terms, what followed historically was ‗all strategy‘:  
―If the ‗spirit‘ was modern, it was so indeed in so far as it was determined 
that reality should be emancipated from the ‗dead hand‘ of its own history… 
That intention called in turn for the ‗profaning of the sacred‘: for disavowing 
and dethroning the past, and first and foremost ‗tradition‘ – to wit, the 
sediment and residue of the past in the present...‖ 234  
 
Yet the prediction that Freud made in The Future of an Illusion, that the religious urge 
would inexorably and progressively decline as science took over, did not 
eventuate.235 Despite scholarly acquiescence to the contrary, such as Weber citing 
Friedrich Schiller on the disenchantment of nature (which sent him passionately in 
pursuit of some comprehension of rationalization);236 or Peter Berger‘s secularization 
thesis (well-argued, but recanted);237 the myth of secular modernity remains just that. 
It is worth noting that, in some places, the on-going pursuit of this myth has 
transformed modernity from a promise into a nightmare.  
The models for progress, the bounties of science, the march of capitalism, and 
globalised Euro-American cultural products appear to be taking over the world, and 
in this sense the ideals of modernity appear to have been successfully implemented, 
but not at the expense of religion. The proliferation of spiritual expressions that 
continue despite secular modernity are not defined by locale, cultural persuasions, the 
particularities of religious institutions, nor any other identifiable ‗sphere‘: this is an 
unregulated and unofficial belief and practice which transcends the boundaries set by 
temporal, spatial, and epistemological frames; ‗invisible‘ because they are not 
                                                 
234 Bauman, Liquid Modernity, 3. 
235 Freud (1927) cited in Rachael Kohn, The New Believers : Re-Imagining God (Australia, 2003), 120. 
236 “The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by 
the disenchantment of the world. Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from 
public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and 
personal human relations. It is not accidental that our greatest art is intimate and not monumental.” 
Max Weber (1918) Max Weber, Hans H. Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber : Essays in 
Sociology (London, 1991), 155. 
237 For the thesis itself, see the preface in Berger, The Sacred Canopy : Elements of a Sociological 
Theory of Religion. In 1974 he began to query his thesis, stating: “In the last few years I have come to 
believe that many observers of the religious scene (I among them) have over-estimated both the 
degree and irreversibility of secularization.” Peter L. Berger, Religion in a Revolutionary Society, [1st 
ed. (Washington D.C., USA, 1974). Berger recanted it entirely by 1999. 
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permitted to ‗exist‘, and yet, the spectre is there.238 As Mark C. Taylor argues: ―It 
is… misleading to speak of a ‗return of‘ or ‗return to‘ religion. Religion does not 
return because it never goes away; to the contrary, religion haunts society itself - 
perhaps especially – when it seems to be absent.‖239 Religion does not ‗re-emerge‘, 
because religion has always been at the very core of modernity. Diversification and 
neo-tribalism (even if one‘s ‗community‘ is simply one who ‗share an interest in 
golf‘) have supported the relocation of many of the benefits that were once supplied 
by organised religions to ‗the broader cultural patterns of the modern age‘.240 In 
addition, in Bronislaw Szerszynski‘s terms, religion itself has ‗gone feral‘: escaped 
from its modernist incarcerations in distinct religious zones and institutions.241 
Regardless of efforts to privatise and ultimately eliminate it, ‗religion‘ proliferates in 
the gaps which defy easy categorisation as sacred or profane; in the mundane, the 
‗everyday‘, the space in between the idealised public and private ‗spheres‘.242 In 
short: ―Eliminating God means reproducing divinity everywhere.‖243 
It is the ‗concealed theology‘ within modernity which presents the difficulty and the 
solution for interrogating the episteme for, as Szerszynski points out, modern 
thought is dominated by the idea that the secular is an ‗unmarked‘ term, or one that 
appears to require no explanation; whereas it is the origins and emergence of the 
secular, rather than the religious, from within the context of the modern, that ought to 
be problematised.244 If modernity and its apparatus, secularity, are recognised as a 
                                                 
238 Consider Richard Jenkins, drawing upon Weber: “Enchantment conjures up, and is rooted in, 
understandings and experiences of the world in which there is more to life than the material, the 
visible or the explainable; in which the philosophies and principles of Reason or rationality cannot by 
definition dream of the totality of life; in which the quotidian norms and routines of linear time and 
space are only part of the story; and in which the collective sum of sociability and belonging is 
elusively greater than its individual parts.” Richard Jenkins, 'Disenchantment, Enchantment and Re-
Enchantment : Max Weber at the Millenium,' Max Weber Studies, vol. 1:  (2000), 29. 
239 Mark C. Taylor, After God, Paperback ed., Religion and Postmodernism (USA, 2009), 132. 
240 Eric Repphun, 'Haunted: Religious Modernity and Reenchantment' (Phd thesis, University of Otago, 
NZ, 2009). 1. 
241 Bronislaw Szerszynski, 'The Varieties of Ecological Piety,' Worldviews: Environment, Culture, 
Religion, vol. 1:  (1997), 38. 
242 Concept of religion occurring in the „mundane‟ emerged from personal communication with Dr 
Michael Grimshaw 2010. 
243 Joshua Delpech-Ramey, 'Supernatural Capital : A Note on the Zizek-Millbank Debate,' Political 
Theology, vol. 11:  (2010), 123. 
244 Szerszynski, 'Rethinking the Secular: Science, Technology, and Religion Today,' 814-816. Consider 
also Jeremy Carette: “Religion needs to be rediscovered outside the superstitions, misconception, and 
illusions through which „secular‟ academics have so far dismissed the subject. We need to find 
religion in the very fabric of the „secular‟ – in its absence…” Jeremy R. Carrette, Foucault and Religion 
: Spiritual Corporality and Political Spirituality (London; New York, 2000), 152. 
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continuation of the Judeo-Christian tradition, then a subtle reconfiguration of the 
perceived binary between religion and secular modernity would more accurately 
conceive of it as a particular type of opposition: one between different truth-claims 
or ideals. The post-Christian modern institutions (that deny any Judeo-Christian 
heritage) come into conflict with the religious institutions (that often reject 
modernity), because the conflict underlying this is between a post-Christian episteme 
(responsible for all institutionalised forms of law, politics, ethics, education, 
commerce, the scientific worldview, etc.), and alternative epistemes, which, in the 
case of Christian institutions, for example, retain a context foregone within the so-
called ‗secular‘.  
As Schneider points out, certain ‗enchanted phenomena‘ prove too ‗quirky‘ to be 
readily accepted within a register which prefers scientised, naturalistic types of 
explanation.245 In the cases of non-Christian ways of knowing, the conflicts are more 
obvious. The ‗other‘ is twice-removed from epistemological validity: in the first 
instance as the pagan other to Christianity, in the second instance as the religious 
other to a secular that claims to be intellectually liberated from its theological roots. 
The invisibility of this shift from Christianity to secular modernity is perpetuated by 
the separation of knowledge production into disparate disciplinary spheres 
(organised by the same hybridised theo-scientific logic that designates a specific 
nature-culture division), and the lack of any transdisciplinary space to engage 
philosophically and critically with the now internalised Christian bias. The 
codification of types of ‗otherness‘ and their relation with epistemological framing 
must therefore be interrogated carefully. Critical is the understanding that it is a 
Judeo-Christian perspective that, in all cases, conflicts with alternative ways of 
knowing and types of praxis; in the main, the opposition generally takes a dialectical 
and epistemological form, in that it is the truth of a theory or opinion (as against the 
usefulness or presence of either) that is central to the debate. To borrow from Gray, 
what is, and has always been, central to this problem is the tension between the 
morally neutral ideals of the group (such as state, polis, or tribe), and the requirement 
                                                 
245 Schneider, Culture and Enchantment, 12. 
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that such collectives encompass different ways of living, thinking, and being: ―...the 
problem of what is to count as a bona fide way of life.‖246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
246 Gray, Enlightenment's Wake : Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, 30. 
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Part III: Exorcisms 
Charles Taylor argues that a key fact in understanding our present spiritual predicaments is 
that they are defined by the notion that we have „overcome‟ a previous condition: enchantment, 
magic, myth, fantasy, or being of a „medieval mind‟ (naïveté), is reproached via the disciplines 
of disenchantment to which we ascribe.247 Our sense of where we are is therefore historicised, or 
fundamentally determined by the story of how we got there, and as he notes, “...we are doomed 
to misidentify ourselves, as long as we can‟t do justice to where we come from.”248 „Faith‟ in the 
„tradition‟ of the modern was established, as Callinicos understands it, in precisely the same 
manner as it becomes imbued in a nation state, wherein a historical mythology is constructed, 
portraying its origins in the light of what it regards as its accomplishments.249 This story, 
however, is haunted by remnant spirits that persist, sometimes as a vague memory or bare 
trace, at other times as a raging poltergeist; “...an unwelcome visit from something that will 
not quite die,”250 nor be denied, nor rendered mute. Lingering on are the residual explorative 
philosophies of the medieval alchemists who indulged Gnostic treatises equally as they pursued 
science and reason; by the spirits of what would not be contained by Romanticism, spilling over 
from the arts, culture, and leisure quarters to inundate public space; by the old war between 
science and religion in which the power, visibility, and voice of the latter have persistently 
refused to atrophy. The foreign gods and philosophies; a bounty collected from earlier violent 
acts propelled by missionary zeal, in which the spirits and aesthetics of the „other‟ travelled 
home with the conquerors, quietly incubating and awaiting rebirth in the nascent spiritualities 
of the „modern‟ individual. These are the religious and cultural remnants in which the 
incomplete exorcisms denied by the origin story of modernity are revealed; apparitions that 
have since become residual and spectral. The attempt to exorcise that which cannot be 
assimilated into the paradigm of the times leaves its mark, as a boundary, between that which 
is permitted, and that which is not; the attempt in itself is sufficient to define the limit. In 
Derrida‟s terms, death is a border: the corpse is left at the crossing point.251 
 
                                                 
247 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, USA, 2007), 28-29. 
248 Ibid., 29. 
249 Callinicos, 'Review : Postmodernism as Normal Science,' 735. 
250 Repphun, 'Haunted: Religious Modernity and Reenchantment'. 23. 
251 Derrida, Aporias : Dying - Awaiting (One Another at) the "Limits of Truth", 6. 
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EXORCISM 1: BANISHING SPIRITS, DEPOSING GODS 
―A unique and jealous god, once he becomes the central and 
dominant notion of an intellectual structure erected and 
carried by a given clerisy, constitutes an overwhelmingly 
powerful impulse towards a single strand system. It was 
jealous Jehovah who taught mankind respect for the 
Principle of the Excluded Middle.‖ 
Plough, Sword and Book, Ernest Gellner, 1988.252 
 
―Scratch a Christian and you find the pagan – spoiled.‖ 
Children of the Ghetto, Israel Zangwill, 1914.253 
The enculturation process normative to the imagined ‗Western‘ territories of 
modernity establish certain primary ‗codes‘ which govern its language, its schemas 
of perception, its exchanges, techniques, and values, and the hierarchies of its 
practices, or practical ‗grids‘.254 These, in Foucault‘s terms, ―...establish for every 
man, from the very first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and 
within which he will be at home.‖255 The work from which this citation derives – The 
Order of Things – was concerned with tracing the creation of the positive basis of 
knowledge, indeed, the episteme which underpinned the establishment of the human 
sciences, yet, Foucault‘s genealogical inquiry extended only as far as the sixteenth 
century.256 The project of inquiring into the theological roots of the modern, 
however, necessitates a far longer reach back through time. 
Berger argues that the most effective way of continuing and legitimating a ‗new‘ 
institutional order (in this instance, modernity) is to employ the means necessary to 
situate the tenuous realities of the social world within a sense of a larger cosmic 
                                                 
252 Ernest Gellner, Plough, Sword and Book : The Structure of Human History (London, 1988), 82. 
253 Israel Zangwill, Children of the Ghetto (1914). Project Gutenberg – 
 http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/2/6/8/12680/12680-8.txt 
254 Foucault, The Order of Things : An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, xx. 
255 Italics added. Ibid., xx. 
256 Ibid. Geroulanos, writing on Foucault, notes that “Religion provided him with (often mostly 
Christian) categories and concepts, which fundamentally affected his fascination with the historical 
construction of possibilities and forms of transcendence.” He refers to this as an „awkward shadow‟ 
within Foucault‟s work as Foucault seemed unwilling to explicitly present theology as “prowling in the 
realms of power.” Stefanos Geroulanos, 'Theoscopy : Transparency, Omnipotence, and Modernity,' in 
Political Theologies : Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, ed. Hent de Vries and Lawrence Eugene 
Sullivan (New York, 2006), 636-637. See also the essays in Carrette, Foucault and Religion : Spiritual 
Corporality and Political Spirituality. 
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order; but to hide, as much as possible, its constructed character.257 In hindsight, the 
following advice (as poeticised by Berger) appears to have been followed precisely. 
―Let that which has been stamped out of the ground ex nihilo appear as the 
manifestation of something that has been existent from the beginning of time, 
or at least from the beginning of the group. Let the people forget that this 
order was established by men and continues to be dependent upon the 
consent of men. Let them believe that, in acting out the institutional 
programs that have been imposed upon them, they are but realizing the 
deepest aspirations of their own being and putting themselves in harmony 
with the fundamental order of the universe. In sum: Set up religious 
legitimations.‖258  
 
The historical endeavour must therefore begin with the self-congratulatory story told 
by the essentialist myth of origins specific to modernity. ―The ‗cult of modernity‘‖, 
as Charlene Spretnak notes, ―promised a world of peace, freedom, and fulfilment if 
we would just trust in an instrumental rationality and never look back at our past, so 
embarrassingly superstitious, communal, and constraining to the freewheeling, 
autonomous individual...‖259 The temporal novelty of the ‗modern‘ commands a 
view of history which highlights not only strengths drawn from the past, but suitable 
justifications for overcoming opposition in the quest to establish dominance; a quest 
inherited from the religions that the proponents of modernity were to eventually set 
themselves against. In the words of Vrasidas Karalis: ―We are born (and re-born) in 
Jerusalem through the persistent and inexplicable question about origins; and we 
end up in Athens through grand projects of social instituting and self-invention.‖260 
This geographical juxtaposition, long thought of as the dialectic through which the 
‗West‘ was wrought, sets up a presumed conflict (or negotiation) between 
philosophy, science, and religion, though this is blatantly ignorant of a far more 
complex, and on-going, historical exchange.261 In Foucault‘s prose: ―The silence, or 
rather the prudence, with which... unitary theories avoid the genealogy of 
                                                 
257 Berger, The Sacred Canopy : Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion, 32-33. 
258 Ibid., 33. 
259 Charlene Spretnak, States of Grace : The Recovery of Meaning in the Postmodern Age (USA, 
1991), 11. 
260 Karalis, 'Reflections on the Project of a Renewed Polis: After Athens and Jerusalem,' 18. 
261 “Repeat something often enough, and people will believe it.” Fara, Science : A Four Thousand Year 
History, 43. 
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knowledges might therefore be a good reason to continue to pursue it.‖262 Brian 
Treanor also critiques this impoverished historicism:  
―Theologically and philosophically, the mixing of wisdom traditions and 
religious traditions has created a situation where the question: ‗What has 
Athens to do with Jerusalem?‘ hardly scratches the surface. What has Athens 
to do with Beijing? Jerusalem with Mecca? Washington, Cairo, Paris, or 
Lima with Katmandu, Moscow, London, or Dar es Salaam?‖263  
 
Scholars still gloss over the early contributions to Greek culture from Mesopotamia, 
Egypt, and India, relying also on a ‗cradle of civilisation‘ view of Mesopotamia 
which reconfigures the timeline for both Egypt and India to ‗fit‘ with the received 
wisdom on history, and the cultural and scientific contributions of China, India, and 
the Arabic nations to the ‗New Europe‘ disappear into an historical ‗vacuum‘ 
between the fall of Rome and the Renaissance revival – ―...the so-called ‗Dark Ages‘ 
when… supposedly, nothing much happened.‖264 As Fara argues in her history of 
science:  
―The notion of Europe‘s glorious origins was boasted during the 
Renaissance, when classical revivalists located the cradle of European 
civilization in the Athens of Plato and Aristotle. Imbuing this small and 
remote city-state with the quasi-mythical aura of a bygone golden age, artists, 
scholars, and politicians linked themselves directly to ancient Greece, and 
disassociated themselves from everything in between.‖265  
 
                                                 
262 Foucault and Gordon, Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, 87. 
263 Brian Treanor, Aspects of Alterity : Levinas, Marcel, and the Contemporary Debate, 1st ed., 
Perspectives in Continental Philosophy (New York, 2006), 198. 
264 Fara, Science : A Four Thousand Year History, 44. As Lindberg notes, the use of the expressions 
„dark ages‟, „Middle Ages‟, or the „medieval‟ do not have firm chronological limits but are blurred, 
because whatever we designate as „medieval culture‟ appeared and disappeared in different times 
and regions. He writes: “The idea of the Middle Ages (or medieval period) first arose in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries among Italian humanist scholars, who detected a dark middle period between 
the bright achievements of antiquity and the enlightenment of their own age… If we must have dates, 
then the Middle Ages may be taken to cover the period from the end of Roman civilization in the Latin 
West (500 is a good round number) to 1450, when the artistic and literary revival commonly known 
as the Renaissance was unmistakably underway.” Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science : The 
European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. To A.D. 
1450, 183. 
265 Also: “Metaphorically, the term „Dark Ages‟ was loaded with meanings, suggesting not only that the 
light of intellectual illumination had been dimmed (after all, to see is to know) but also that a gloomy 
cloud of superstition had descended to stifle rationality and originality. While Europe lolled in its Dark 
Ages – or so ran the conventional story – Arabic scholars acted as caretakers of Greek knowledge. 
Muslims were cast as neutral transmitters of European expertise, even though they were 
experimenters and theoreticians in their own right, who actively transformed the skills and beliefs 
they had gathered together from diverse cultures. Similarly, China was viewed as a remote, esoteric 
place, and the impact of its agricultural and industrial success on Europe remained 
unacknowledged.” Fara, Science : A Four Thousand Year History, 44-45. 
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Against the claims of the Churches (as the story goes) science was born in Greece, 
was incubated (unaltered) by Arab scholars for around a thousand years, and was 
transferred directly to Spain in the twelfth century.266  
Despite the unsophisticated conception of this view which marries Athens with 
Jerusalem, it has nonetheless generated the socially distributed ‗catalogue of Ideas‘ 
which have established the epistemological foundations of modernity, globalised 
Euro-American culture, and the universities, institutions, and individuals which 
reproduce these ideas. The myth of origins which harmonises the Greco-Roman 
with the Judeo-Christian has been so systematically privileged that a particular set of 
inclusions and exclusions have emerged from a few critical transfers.267 Among these 
are the shifts from multiple religious and sovereign authorities, to a monotheistic 
transcendental deity, to the transcendental invisible powers of a nation-state that 
continues to demand obedience, and thus, the replacement of religious authority 
with scientific, legal, and technological authorities which now operate as sovereign 
discourses. Historically speaking, what did not serve Christianity as it established 
religious authority does not serve scientific and political rationalism either: the 
power and privilege that is commanded by this worldview is absolute and exclusive, 
and the result is the potent combination of arrogance, power, and technological 
supremacy characteristic of modern societies. As Tambiah argues, the kind of 
ideological dominance the scientific revolution, with its instrumental and secular 
claims, has exerted on the world at large results in a ‗spill-over effect‘ from the hard 
core of science to the surrounding spheres, having the monopolising consequence of 
imperialistically expanding to fill all the moral and social space in which we live.268 
He writes: ―This process of alleged scientific reasoning… is reluctant, even opposed 
to admitting other modes of consciousness or other world orientations into any 
                                                 
266 Ibid., 45. In fact, Islamic physicians, astronomers, and philosophers, added their immense 
repertoire of „scientific‟ knowledge of plants, minerals, animals, physiology, etc., to the updated 
knowledge which they had accumulated during a considerable interactive period with Indian, Persian, 
and other cultures, and appropriated the Greek knowledge inside this context. Note also that the idea 
of „Islamic philosophers‟ (used in an historical context) is not at all reflective of the multiple local 
traditions and knowledges which contributed and continue to contribute to the cultural complex, now 
reduced by the simple designator – „Islamic‟.  
267 Note that the use of the term „Greco-Roman‟, whilst convenient, is a descriptor which determines 
that we read Greek texts through the lens provided by Romanisation. Ruprecht, Was Greek Thought 
Religious? On the Use and Abuse of Hellenism, from Rome to Romanticism, 41. 
268 Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality, 151. 
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space it already occupies...‖269 Scientia (with its internalised theology) and techné (the 
chariot which speeds towards the Eschaton) have become omniscient discourses; a 
revelation via revolution which remains true to the theo-scientific character of 
modernity. 
Gray identifies this unwillingness as a dogmatic ‗article of humanist faith‘ which 
survives in spite of its intrinsic irrationality: ―If the Enlightenment myth of progress 
in ethics and politics continues to have a powerful hold, it is more from fear of the 
consequences of giving it up than from genuine conviction.‖270 Gray is not pushing 
for more rationality however; but an honest appraisal of what drives humankind 
toward particular ends, relinquishing the scholarly ritual of moving around the 
blame like a game of musical chairs. ‗Naïveté‘ is an issue, but not in the social 
institutions, nor the psychological makeup of humankind; this is more literal, in that 
we are largely naïve as to the mechanisms by which social controls have been 
legitimated. In concurrence with Berger, faith in the ideals of modernity and the 
power they acquired did not arise ex nihilo; they were empowered by the collective to 
become a dominant force. Foucault links this, in his discussions of sovereignty, to 
the relations between truth, knowledge and power. Foucault‘s view of power is that 
it comes from everywhere, it is productive, and that it is operative in the relations 
between truth and knowledge as conferred not by the sovereign, per se, but its 
subjects and vehicles.271 Re-reading Foucault through Mark Philp:  
―Domination does not radiate from the peak to the depths... Rather, we need 
to see domination in terms of a ‗microphysics‘ of power: the way in which 
particular mechanisms of power, with particular histories and rationales, are 
colonized, invested, utilized, and so on, by ever more general mechanisms, 
                                                 
269 Ibid., 151. 
270 Gray, Enlightenment's Wake : Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, xiv-xv.  
271 “„Truth‟ is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is 
subject to constant economic and political incitement…; it is the object, under diverse forms, of 
immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information 
whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, not withstanding certain strict limitations); it is 
produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and 
economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, it is the issue of a whole political 
debate and social confrontation („ideological‟ struggles)… „Truth‟ is to be understood as a system of 
ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distributed, circulation and operation of 
statements. „Truth‟ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, 
and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A „regime‟ of truth. This regime is not 
merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of 
capitalism.” Foucault and Gordon, Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-
1977, 131-133. 
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which built up into forms of global domination... Foucault offers us a 
discursive determinism. The power/knowledge nexus of discourse establishes 
regimes of truth, which, with their techniques and practices, discipline the 
social body.‖272 
 
The establishment of monotheism, with its ethical core and universalistic logic, is in 
Jean-Luc Nancy‘s terms, the condition of possibility for the West itself.273 Close 
symbiosis was required between the Greco-Roman consciousness and monotheistic 
disposition to produce the now unrecognizable yet universalised Christianity which 
constitutes the Western ‗in its depths‘.274 Monotheism was also foundational for the 
normative conception of sovereignty, as later dissolved into the offices of the state. 
Sovereignty rests, to borrow from Paul Kahn, on the freedom (or lack, thereof) 
extended to the individual: a prudential response to diversity (deriving from the 
Reformation) which, in turn, rests on a deeper theological principle.275 As Kahn 
notes: ―The truth, and the true virtue of the individual, is located in the interior 
working of the will, in the way in which the subject brings himself into a relationship 
with God. Politically, this point supports a conception of the truth of the nation as a 
manifestation of interior self-realization, rather than outward power.‖276 This has to 
be taken back logically to the concept of firstly, divine kingship, and then, with the 
emergence of the polis, the gradual shift from the deification of the king or emperor, 
to the association of the king or emperor with emerging institutionalised church 
powers. It is possible that, in this instance, the theological (if the meaning of this 
term is tied specifically to Christianity) added another layer to an already existent 
ancient and widespread notion of divine power and authority. 
To ‗amend‘ history: contrary to the view that the transcendent monotheism of the 
modern nation state (or globalised world) is a direct inheritance from Judaism, and 
prior to this, Persian Zoroastrianism, a more nuanced recollection of the history of 
the Israelites would recognise that Judaism was originally polytheistic with a gradual 
move toward becoming institutionally monolatristic; or tolerant and accepting of the 
                                                 
272 Mark Philp, 'Foucault on Power : A Problem in Radical Translation?,' Political Theory, vol. 11: 1 
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273 Jean-Luc Nancy, 'A Deconstruction of Monotheism,' in Religion Beyond a Concept, ed. Hent de 
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274 Ibid., 383-385. 
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existence of other ‗gods‘.277 Due to the historical presence of the early Israelites in 
both Egypt and Babylon, there is no shortage of theories speculating on influences 
from early Egyptian and Mesopotamian monotheisms, although whether there are 
any connections between these monotheisms appears lost to history.278  What can be 
said is that until the Persian rule of the Near East (539BCE-332BCE) the 
‗descendents of Judeans‘ intermarried with Egyptians and worshipped a number of 
deities besides YHVH (Yahweh),279 until they became unified under the Biblical 
narrative which reorganised this history.280 As Naomi Janowitz notes: ―Despite 
modern stereotypes of ancient Israelite monotheism, Biblical texts mention the gods 
of other nations and a repertoire of other supernatural figures.‖281 Although there is 
disagreement as to when exactly this occurred, it would appear that monotheism 
appeared gradually as Jews forewent this ‗theological promiscuity‘ and came to 
believe that YHVH was not just the only god worth worshipping, but the only god 
that existed.282 
The propitiation and cultivation of spirits or gods as entities resident in nature 
(specifically, as agencies capable of supplying assistance in the procurement of 
remedies designed to mediate human health and manage life and death) was also 
                                                 
277 Monolatry is the exclusive worship of one god without excluding the existence of others. The early 
Israelites did not originally deny the existence of other gods, they just condemned the propitiation of 
them, as multiple examples in the Old Testament (such as in Exodus) illustrate. 
278 What this does illustrate is that monotheism does not necessarily emerge purely from a people in 
exile from their local god, as is often argued on behalf of the Jews. Interestingly, YHW (Yahweh), 
denoting a place (which perhaps infers a deity also), and YSRL (Israel), denoting a people, first appear 
separately on Egyptian stele in the second half of the second millennium BCE, which is in accord with 
the timing of both these prior attempts at a universalistic monotheism. Robert Wright, The Evolution 
of God, 1st ed. (New York, 2009), 114. See also, Simo Parpola, 'The Assyrian Tree of Life: Tracing the 
Origins of Jewish Monotheism and Greek Philosophy,' Journal of Near Eastern Studies, vol. 52: 3 
(1993). Karen Armstrong, The Great Transformation : The Beginning of Our Religious Traditions, 1st 
ed. (New York, 2006), 49-49. Jan Assmann, Moses the Egyptian : The Memory of Egypt in Western 
Monotheism (USA, 1997). 
279 W. D. Davies et al., The Cambridge History of Judaism (Cambridge; New York, 1984), 219-278. 
280 Though „Judahite‟ (yehudai) was originally the designation for one of the twelve tribes of Israel, by 
the second century BCE the designation could be held simultaneously with the actual tribal name (for 
example, a Persian Jew may be identified as both a Judahite and a Benjaminite). Judaism (Judah-ism) 
at some point shifted therefore from a tribal to collective identity, and came to be the name of an 
entire religious movement. Ruprecht, Was Greek Thought Religious? On the Use and Abuse of 
Hellenism, from Rome to Romanticism, 78-79. 
281 Naomi Janowitz, Magic in the Roman World : Pagans, Jews, and Christians, Religion in the First 
Christian Centuries (London; New York, 2001), 28. 
282 Wright, The Evolution of God, 166. 
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somewhat normative throughout ‗the ancient‘, as opposed to ‗classical‘ world.283 
This is important because it impacted tremendously on the weight given to 
epistemological challenges to the medicalised (scientific) models employed in 
contemporary times. Both the Egyptians and Jews residing in Egypt had employed 
physician priests or healers, who were equipped with herbs, rituals, amulets, 
incantations and so on, and were primarily responsible for maintaining the health of 
the community by managing the evil spirits or forces that were made accountable for 
illness.284 The general belief in the usefulness of prayers, spells, and related 
phenomena was wedded to a particular cosmological framework which, though 
regionally variable, accommodated multiple gods, spirits and forces which were 
often tied to natural localities, objects, and concepts that may be grouped under the 
later definitions of pagan polytheism and/or animism. In Egypt, for example, 
though plant medicines were in use, their efficacy was tied to the appeasement of 
‗demons‘ through magical rites.285  
With the introduction of codified biblical instruction, a ban was placed on ‗magic‘ 
(defined as a form of causal action to manipulate God), and the interpretation of 
prophecy was redefined as God speaking directly to a prophet.286 The prophet then 
relayed the message to the people: as opposed to the alternative notion of being 
‗possessed‘ by, or a ‗vessel‘ for, a deity or spirit.287 As John Leavitt notes: 
―Throughout much of Western history, we find a division between the Greeks, seen 
as beauty-obsessed masters of craft, and the Hebrews, seen as god-obsessed 
                                                 
283 This distinction between the „ancient‟ and „classical‟ is crucial, given that it was the discovery, 
invention, or rediscovery of the „classical‟ world (as opposed to the „dark‟ ancient world) that is seen 
as contributing to the Renaissance birth of the modern. The classical is reclaimed as that which is 
positioned over and versus the continuation of, or return to, the ancient. Idea credited to thesis 
supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw 2011. 
284 Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science : The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, 
Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. To A.D. 1450, 18. 
285 B.V. Subbarayappa, 'The Roots of Ancient Medicine : An Historical Outline,' Journal of Biosciences, 
vol. 26: 2 (2001), 135. 
286 Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality, 7. 
287 Ibid., 7. Consider also that:  “Possession… is a broad term referring to an integration of spirit and 
matter, force or power and corporeal reality, in a cosmos where the boundaries between an individual 
and her environment are acknowledged to be permeable, flexibly drawn, or at least negotiable.  
Recent studies suggest that spirit possession rests on epistemic premises quite different from the 
infinitely differentiating, rationalizing, and reifying thrust of global materialism and its attendant 
scholarly traditions.” Janice Boddy, 'Spirit Possession Revisited: Beyond Instrumentality,' Annual 
Review of Anthropology, vol. 23:  (1994), 407. 
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mouthpieces.‖288 Literary sources suggest, however, that the mechanics of 
inspiration from spiritual sources were viewed by both Greeks and Hebrews in much 
the same way, but the production of Western history gradually subsumed poetics 
into the notion of ‗craft‘. The Greeks were adopted as the reason-seeking ancestors 
of modern science, whilst prophecy became sequestered and designated as Hebraic 
and thus, religious.289 Nancy calls this ‗Greek atheism‘ and argues that its ‗meeting 
with Jewish monotheism‘ was a comfort, and a contradiction, ―...a double and 
violent movement in which... the unicity of god... has evidently let itself be 
subsumed or absorbed through the unity of the principle.‖290 
As Matthew Dickie writes:  
―...in Deuteronomy 18.9-14 various forms of divination, spell-casting and 
consultation of the dead are declared to be the practices of the nations that 
will not enter the land of Israel and pronounced abominable. The practices 
abominated are, accordingly, alien to the religion of Israel and for that reason 
occupy a position akin to that of magic in relation to religion.‖291  
 
When contrasted with the emerging Judaic notions of divinity as transcendental, 
pagan cosmologies accepted a primordial realm anterior to, parallel with, and 
occasionally even independent of the gods: one which was bound to nature.292 The 
attempted exorcism of ‗spirit‘ from nature (through institutionalised transcendental 
reconceptualisations of deity, as specifically illustrated by the changes in medical 
practice) therefore marks a radical shift, as it is plausible to assume that alternative 
cosmologies including what we now call ‗animistic‘ views were somewhat universal 
before the distribution of the idea that the propitiation of nature (or ‗other‘) spirits 
was idolatrous.293 Whilst the healing arts were previously indistinguishable from 
                                                 
288 John Harold Leavitt, 'Poetics, Prophetics, Inspiration,' in Poetry and Prophecy: The Anthropology of 
Inspiration, ed. John Harold Leavitt (USA, 1997), 17. 
289 Ibid., 9-16. 
290 “Hence, Christianity became, through its own interventions, a humanism, atheism, and nihilisim.” 
Nancy, 'Atheism and Monotheism,' 396. 
291 Deuteronomy is the fifth book of the Jewish Pentateuch and one which sets out a very particular 
code of conduct. By the fifth century BCE there are also clear signs in Greco-Roman thought which set 
magic apart as a discrete category, generated perhaps out of conflict between certain forms of 
religious, but also, medical practices, as it is philosophers and doctors who appeared to have been 
chiefly responsible for promoting this distinction.  Matthew Dickie, Magic and Magicians in the Greco-
Roman World (London; New York, 2001), 22. 
292 Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality, 7. 
293 Although this is a huge claim to make, it is nonetheless reasonable as there is plentiful evidence 
within the Judeo-Christian lineage alone to suggest these were also religions of nature based on 
„proofs‟ of ritual efficacy, only later becoming religions of „faith‟ in a distant God, though a proper 
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what we would call religious practices, certain forms of healing became increasingly 
seen as forbidden and perverse, and most especially if they invoked spirits, forces, or 
powers which were not formally sanctioned. This is central to the reconfiguration of 
the human relationship with the natural world and the emergence of the authorising 
mechanisms of scientific discourse as mediators of this relationship.  
Some clarification on the context for the centrality of this point is required. Any 
comprehensive understanding of what occurred later in European contexts, when 
medical and other texts were retrieved from Muslim sources and translated by 
medieval scholars, hinged absolutely on the selection of materials that were available 
for translation. The majority of medical texts were from Hippocrates and Galen, and 
this is significant for the following reasons. As Dickie writes: ―The idea that the 
magician coerces the divine and lacks proper respect for it is first found in the 
Hippocratic treatise On the Sacred Disease (and can be traced down to the end of 
Classical Antiquity and beyond).‖294 Specifically, it was the first instance in which a 
body of beliefs was explicitly declared to be ‗magical‘ or occult, and in Tambiah‘s 
terms, represented an intellectual ‗paradigm switch‘.295 Tambiah notes he is 
borrowing from Kuhn here. To expand this point:  
―The text is landmark for these reasons: it rejected this disease [epilepsy] (and 
certain others) as being the result of divine intervention; in other words, it 
rejected a certain kind of explanation and action that was labelled ‗magical‘ 
or occult. It proposed as a substitute explanation a naturalistic explanation of 
disease, which itself was tied to a doctrine of the uniformity of nature and the 
regularity of causes…‖296  
 
However, because ―...the medical doctors of the Hippocratic School appealed to 
naturalist causes without possessing a real positivist methodology or an efficacious 
technology of curing, including pharmacopeia,‖297 they contributed mostly theory to 
                                                                                                                                                
defense of this would be an entire thesis in, and of, itself. The difficulty for this claim is that it echoes 
the theories of evolutionary anthropologists such as Tylor, Marsden, Fraser, etc., but it must be 
pointed out that the point as made here is neither a nod to primitivism, nor the claim for a 
Romanticised „return-to-origins‟. Acceptance of human-nature relationality seems to be both 
historically widely evidenced, and supported by so many present-day „religious‟, „spiritual‟, and 
„cultural‟ worldviews, that it seems a logical assumption. It should also be noted that as the term 
„animism‟ has had to carry the weight of several centuries of misguided „Western‟ scholarship it is 
unsurprising that even hinting in this direction incites a riot of objections. 
294 Dickie, Magic and Magicians in the Greco-Roman World, 22. 
295 Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality, 9-10. 
296 Ibid., 9-10. 
297 Ibid., 10. 
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a body of practices which were actually incubated in Islamic contexts; upon which 
modern medicine was founded, and for which the Greeks have retained credit. The 
authorisation processes which have constructed an illegitimate history of science 
which appears legitimate hinge on this sleight-of-hand with regard to lineage, and are 
implicated in the rational-irrational binary which sets apart Islam and confines it to 
the latter category right into the present day. 
Robert Wright makes some critical observations which help illustrate why an 
understanding of the shift to monotheism is so important for figuring modernity: 
firstly, whilst polytheism leaves room for the validity of other people‘s gods, the 
theology of monotheism breeds a belligerent intolerance; indeed, intolerance may be 
an intrinsic property of a monotheistic worldview.298 Secondly, looking for 
mechanistic laws of nature (as science came to do) does not make much sense ‗if 
nature is animated by the ever-changing moods of various gods.‘299 The eradication 
of polytheistic pagan rites, the elimination of pagan spirits and gods, and the 
disempowerment of the local ‗priest-healer‘ were therefore absolutely fundamental 
to the emergence of modernity; most especially its institutions. The irony is of course 
that despite the ‗rational necessity‘ of eliminating these ‗others‘, multiple, if 
unsanctioned, pagan worldviews, polytheistic beliefs, and priest healers never 
actually submitted to the hegemonic new world order but simply became 
marginalised; surviving in an everyday context which was never absolutely 
controlled by the proliferation of institutions which have sought to codify belief.300 
                                                 
298 As an example of monotheistic intolerance: in the 14th century BCE, Akhenaten, banned all images 
of the divine except for those of the solar disk (Aten) and destroyed references to other gods. 
299 Wright, The Evolution of God, 100-101. 
300 Philosopher Hans Blumenberg, in his writings on the origins of modernity, identifies the birth of 
Christianity as the first attempt to overcome this „problem of Gnosticism‟ (and he argues that 
modernity is the second attempt). Whilst the use of the term Gnosticism does not quite summarise 
the abundance of still surviving practices, Blumenberg‟s argument certainly prefigures the one being 
made here: the first attempted exorcism of paganism by Christianity did fail. Blumenberg, The 
Legitimacy of the Modern Age. As Voegelin notes, citing Clement of Alexandria: “Gnosis is „the 
knowledge of who we were and what we became, of where we were and whereinto we have been 
flung, of whereto we are hastening and wherefrom we are redeemed, of what birth is and rebirth.‟ The 
great speculative mythopoems of Gnosticism revolve around the question of origin, the condition of 
having-been-flung, escape from the world, and the means of deliverance.” He also identifies the spirit 
of modern Gnosticism, as residual within modernity, in Bohme, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel, 
Heidegger, Marx, Nietzsche, and others: “...the assumption of an absolute spirit that in the dialectical 
unfolding of consciousness proceeds from alienation to consciousness of itself; or through the 
assumption of a dialectical-material process of nature that in its course leads from the alienation 
resulting from private property and belief in God to the freedom of a fully human existence; or through 
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The notion that there is ‗no magical means for attaining the grace of God‘, an 
observation made by Weber,301 was too radical a demand, and – as evidenced by the 
on-going persistence of alternative ritual-belief structures within modernity – perhaps 
remains too radical a demand. 
Monotheism, increased transcendentalism, and the codification of thought in 
biblical terms also had a wider geographical influence wherever the presence of 
Judaism was felt: the Judaism inherited by Christianity was overall a Hellenised 
Judaism, the combination of two distinct rationalisms.302 Louis Ruprecht, writing on 
the ‗uses and abuses of Hellenism‘ by historians, stresses that the core ethnic identity 
which must be attached to early Christianity is overwhelmingly Greek.303 In fact, the 
he considers the successful detachment of the Latin churches from this ‗Greekness‘ 
did not occur until Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453 CE; far later 
than is often claimed.304 Ruprecht argues that Byzantium culture is central to 
understanding the bridge between pagan practices and Christianity, but often gets 
ignored because scholars do not know how to think about a culture which claims 
both an ancient (pagan and Judaic) and modern (Greco-Roman and Christian) 
identity.305 
As Christianity became further entrenched throughout these historically critical 
regions, a complex angelology and demonology emerged, supplying an alternative 
framework for understanding spirits and mediating the gap between the cultic abode 
of the deity and the isolated human communities. The demonological aspects were 
derived from a range of different cultural traditions, which in hindsight appear to 
                                                                                                                                                
the assumption of a will of nature that transforms man into superman.” Voegelin and Henningsen, 
The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin: Modernity without Restraint, 255. 
301 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 105. 
302 John Ferguson, 'Athens and Jerusalem,' Religious Studies, vol. 8: 1 (1972), 8. Further: “…the Jews 
of the Hellenistic Age had been… imbued with the prevailing Hellenism… Judaea was for the most part 
subject to the Seleucids or the Ptolemies. Greek cities sprang up to east and west… As early as 300 
B.C. there was alliance with Sparta, renewed in the second century… and subsequently with some of 
the Greek cities of Asia. In the third century it was bilingual Jewish scholars from Jerusalem who 
translated the Law and Prophets into Greek…  The establishment in Judaea were not averse from 
reading Greek; to speak Greek was apparently normal among the lower classes…” ibid., 5-6. 
303 Ruprecht, Was Greek Thought Religious? On the Use and Abuse of Hellenism, from Rome to 
Romanticism, 79. 
304 Ibid., 80. 
305 Ibid., 80-81. 
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have been ‗fitted‘ into a dualistic system which quickly became politically useful. As 
Janowitz explains:  
―The deity was still to be the focus of certain prayers… [but] some of the 
supernatural manifestations on earth which might earlier have been thought 
to be the work of the deity were now considered to be the work of angels and 
daimons… The divine presence no longer dwelt in a Temple… instead the 
deity was everywhere, with a special cultic abode in the highest reaches of 
heaven. The Ancient Near Eastern theological staple that the deity/deities 
are to be pleased by and partake of animal sacrifice was rejected throughout 
the Mediterranean basin... The hereditary priest who watched over the cult 
lost his domain of expertise and power. Classical prophecy died out as 
well.‖306  
 
In addition: ―In the hands of the Roman lawmakers… the practice of mageia became 
a capital offense.‖307 As the discourse on magic and religion developed, power was 
systematically shifted away from the independent priests and diviners, undermining 
their social influence. Under Constantine I (whose conversion to Christianity early 
in the fourth century set in motion the fusion of church and state in Rome), any 
diviner who operated privately, as opposed to practicing as a part of the standard 
public rites, was likely to be burned alive.308 These dictates were designed to effect 
social controls through the elimination of challenges to Christianised Roman 
authority. Spirits, in the modern (that is, post-Judeo-Christian) conception, are 
fundamentally different to gods, in that gods introduce, maintain, and reaffirm order, 
whilst spirits often pose a threat to it.309 This is meant very generally, but when 
comparing their ontological status, spirits seem to be perceived cross-culturally as 
more liminal. Within the Christian framework, in which there is a singular God, 
there is no space available for other gods to exist, so the act of classifying gods as 
spirits immediately increases their volatility whilst dis-locating their power. This 
occurs quite literally, as the obliteration of the concept of a local god is central to the 
success of both Christianity and modernity. Thus, the volatility of the god is 
transferred to the person who maintains a relationship with the god. The material 
                                                 
306 Janowitz, Magic in the Roman World : Pagans, Jews, and Christians, 30-31. 
307 Ibid., 11. 
308 Ibid., 11. Lindberg, 'Science and the Early Christian Church,' 513. 
309 Robert I. Levy, Jeannette Marie Mageo, and Alan Howard, 'Gods, Spirits and History: A Theoretical 
Perspective,' in Spirits in Culture, History, and Mind, ed. Jeannette Marie Mageo and Alan Howard 
(New York, 1996). 
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means of control that can be effected upon a person, cannot be effected upon a non-
material or spiritual being. Recalling that ‗spirits exist‘ during the time period under 
investigation here, the elimination of persons who are ‗attached‘ to any god that is 
not Christian (and resists conversion) is therefore a means of dealing with this 
volatility, though the appearance of other gods could never be assured: there was 
always the possibility that persons would ‗carry‘ the god (now reframed as a 
‗demon‘) with, or within them.310  
This divide between the human world and a controlled transcendental supernatural 
realm is critical to an understanding of the period because this sharp divide between 
self and deity creates the other divisions: between religion and magic; between 
‗scientific‘ medical practices and the ‗occult‘ healing arts; between the natural world, 
the human world, and the ‗otherworld‘; and ultimately, between subjects of the late 
Christian Roman Empire and the ‗other‘. These conceptual oppositions – derived 
from the sense of isolation or ‗home elsewhere‘ foundational to Christian thought – 
came to support the transition from theism, to deism, to secularity.  
Monotheistic concepts became gradually strengthened, for although both dualistic 
and monist thought had been evident in earlier philosophical treatises, by the time of 
the Roman Empire philosophy had become increasingly dominated by monist 
thinking; reducing everything to a single principle.311 If the world was to be subdued 
by one state and a single autocratic ruler, in heaven also would be a single and 
omnipotent god to whom the leader and the inhabitants of the Empire were 
answerable.312 The shift from Judaism to a Christian interpretation and re-
interpretation of Judaism is both the first secularisation and the most significant, for 
it eliminated conclusively whatever Judaic tribalism remained through breaking the 
necessity for familial inheritance and promoting the universalistic ethic of 
Christianity as its replacement. Concurrently, the adoption of a monotheistic 
worldview gradually wedded power to the state, forcing out (often polytheistic) 
alternative claims to power. As noted by de Certeau, following Foucault, institutions 
                                                 
310 The notion that immigrants of unknown religious persuasions could be accompanied by „demons‟ 
of various kinds („social evils‟, for example) is a prejudice that continues into the present day.  
311 Francois de Blois, 'Dualism in Iranian and Christian Traditions,' Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 
of Great Britain and Ireland, vol. 3: 10 (2000), 2. 
312 Ibid., 2.  
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were slowly ‗colonised‘ by silent procedures which increased in determinism 
concurrently as this determinism became less obvious.313 
Though the rise of the secular institution as a mark of ‗advanced culture‘ occurred 
much later, the formation of the institutions themselves and the conformity of the 
institutions to a particular Christian ethos and worldview certainly becomes evident 
during this period. In addition (and keeping in mind that the history of ancient 
education is particularly romanticised), the new simplicity of alphabetic writing (as 
developed by the Greeks) made it possible for the Greek city states to establish a 
literate citizenry, and establish educational institutions in which the learning of 
languages – which was a central goal of education – was greatly reduced.314 This 
insight, as opposed to the common, yet essentialist notion that ‗The Greeks were the 
first to consider consciously the perennial problems of education‘,315 has possibly more to do 
with the voracity with which the Greek style of education (and implicit goals) 
became distributed, than the particular type of education they offered, which was no 
more or less innovative than those of the Mesopotamians or Egyptians. Whereas in 
the latter cases the epistemological and structural orientations of the educational 
system were confined by language, territory, and class distinctions, the Greek and 
Roman systems (as the latter derived from the former) were more immediately 
accessible. Thus, particular types of institutions (political, educational), Christianity, 
and the early expansion of the Roman Empire with its military strength, became 
interconnected in a particular manner under a sovereign power: a disciplinary 
arrangement of forces which has persisted. 
                                                 
313 de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 49. 
314 Butts is instructive on this: “The best evidence seems to be that fully alphabetic writing in Greek 
was introduced into the Ionian city-states sometime in the ninth century B.C. Since their language did 
not have so many consonants as the Semitic language of the Phoenicians, the Ionian Greeks had five 
signs left over, so they applied these signs to their five vowels. Every basic sound now had a written 
letter. This meant that reading and writing could be learned in something like three years instead of 
ten. Since writing could spread so rapidly through the population, a special class of scribes… was not 
necessary. The estimate is made that it took only 100 years from the introduction of the alphabet to 
its widespread use… It was this achievement which really „democratized‟ literacy and made it possible 
for the knowledge of reading and writing to be learned by virtually every person in a society… The 
Greeks made a demoliterate society possible and created the school to go with it.” Robert Freeman 
Butts, The Education of the West : A Formative Chapter in the History of Civilization (New York, 1973), 
83, 85. See also  Jack Goody, ed., Literacy in Traditional Societies (London, 1968)., I.J. Gelb, A Study 
of Writing (Chicago, 1952). 
315 Christopher J. Lucas, Our Western Educational Heritage (New York, 1972), 49. 
P a g e  | 83 
 
In philosophical terms, the struggle between Christianity and paganism is far more 
complex than is revealed by the contrast between monotheism and polytheism, 
largely because there has never been any monolithic Christianity to speak of. Unlike 
their Judaic predecessors, Christians have always lacked a united voice and coherent 
position; this was supplied through the alliance of the institutions of the church with 
the political institutions, but it has never overcome the inconsistencies between what 
different groups of Christians practiced and believed. It follows, then that 
institutionalised Christianity would become progressively divorced from the 
institutions of the state over the long period leading into ‗modernity‘, especially as 
Christian sects and churches continued to diversify and absorb local ‗powers‘ and 
traditions. This tendency of early Christianity to absorb multiple mythic and ‗pagan‘ 
rituals, festivals, and beliefs, is foundational to the ultimate triumph and spread of 
the religion, as it became adept at ‗incorporating elements from other religious cults 
that were flourishing at the time‘.316 In accordance with the replacement ethos which 
has come to characterise Christianity, churches were established on sites formerly 
sacred to other traditions, and the efficacy of these traditions was reconfigured by a 
Christian hermeneutic; entrenching the distinction between truth and error within 
philosophically influenced Christian rhetoric. To recall Debray once more: ―Optimal 
transmission is transmission forgotten.‖317 
In the hands of Greek philosophers, mythos and logos had been intimately related: 
Hesoid‘s Works and Days associated the speech of mythos with truth and logos with 
lies and dissimulation.318 Bruce Lincoln argues that whilst mythos originally marked 
                                                 
316 Chris Harman, A People's History of the World (London; New York, 1999), 93. .  In his discussion of 
„the art of oblivion‟, Assman is instructive on this point.  He writes: “…the best way to make people 
forget an idolatrous rite is to put another rite in its place. The Christians followed the same principle 
by building their churches on the ruins of pagan temples and by observing their feasts on the dates of 
pagan festivals,”  Assmann, Moses the Egyptian : The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism, 59. 
Also, consider this note from Asad: “The series of booklets known as the Penitential manuals, with the 
aid of which Christian discipline was imposed on Western Europe from roughly the fifth to the tenth 
centuries, contain much material on pagan practices penalized as un-Christian. So for example, „The 
taking of vows of releasing from them by springs or trees or lattices, anywhere except in a church, and 
partaking of food or drink in these places sacred to the folk-deities, are offenses condemned‟… At the 
same time Pope Gregory the Great A.D. 540-604 „urged that the Church should take over old pagan 
temples and festivals and give them a Christian meaning‟…  The apparent inconsistency of these two 
attitudes (rejection or incorporation of pagan practices) is less important than the systematic exercise 
of Church authority by which meaning is assigned.” Multiple citations in Asad, 'Anthropological 
Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz,' 253, fn.13. 
317 Debray, Transmitting Culture, 14-15. 
318 Bruce Lincoln cited in Asad, Formations of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 26. 
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the speech of heroes or powerful males in positions of authority, logos was ‗feminine‘ 
and soft, or gentle and persuasive, however, these categories were deliberately 
disrupted by Platonic thought to become eventually reversed: the persuasiveness of 
Reason commanding logos (stylistically speaking), whilst the harshness of mythos was 
consigned to ‗the poets‘.319 This did not at all resemble what their predecessors had 
taken the two terms to mean.320 Lincoln‘s conclusion is that, at some point or other, 
because aristocratic Greek males could no longer maintain their dominance via 
force, they adopted a discourse of well-crafted persuasion, shifting the basis for their 
claim to pre-eminence and thus, labouring to redefine and revalorise the terms in 
question.321 He writes: ―...these words... were the sites of pointed and highly 
consequential semantic skirmishes fought between rival regimes of truth.‖322  
The reputation of Rome as a ‗tolerant‘ environment for a variety of religions 
(formally established in 311CE) became eclipsed as Christianity became dominant, 
and by the fifth century the conversion was complete. For Romans, the shift in the 
meaning of the word fabula,323 which built on the distinction between mythos and 
logos, created a fictitious genre into which non-Christian mythologies and pre-
Christian Roman mythologies could be relocated. Originally possessing a very broad 
usage (primarily oral transmission of stories, proverbs, sayings, prophecies, etc), in 
                                                 
319 Bruce Lincoln, 'Gendered Discourses : The Early History of Mythos and Logos,' History of Religions, 
vol. 36: 1 (1996), 5, 11. 
320 “What Heraclitus championed as logos – „not simply language but rational discussion, calculation, 
and choice: rationality as expressed in speech, in thought, and in action,‟ as one commentator puts it 
– is not what his predecessors took logos to be. Similarly, the mythos Plato sought to devalue had 
little in common with what Hesiod and Homer understood by that term.” Bruce Lincoln, Theorizing 
Myth : Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship (USA, 1999), 18. 
321 Lincoln, 'Gendered Discourses : The Early History of Mythos and Logos,' 11-12. 
322 Lincoln, Theorizing Myth : Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship, 18. 
323 The Latin fabula is derived from two words in the Greek, which are in turn derived from Sanskrit, 
and was originally a vague term which was used with modifiers to fix its meaning. Used alone, it came 
to refer to a myth or any fabulous story; a much narrower meaning than it had in the Greek sense. 
Francisco Rodríguez Adrados, "History of the Graeco-Latin Fable: Introduction and from the Origins to 
the Hellenistic Age, Part 3," ed. Gert-Jan van Dijk (Leiden, The Netherlands; Boston, USA, 1999), 3-5. 
„Fable‟ “c.1300, „falsehood, lie, pretense,‟ from O.Fr. fable (12c.) „story, fable, tale; fiction, lie, 
falsehood,‟ from L. fabula „story, play, fable, narrative, account, tale,‟ lit. „that which is told,‟ related to 
fari „speak, tell,‟ from PIE base *bha- „speak‟ (see fame). Sense of „animal story‟ (early 14c.) comes 
from Aesop. In modern folklore terms, defined as „a short, comic tale making a moral point about 
human nature, usually through animal characters behaving in human ways.‟ Most trace to Greece or 
India.” Also, “fabulous. early 15c., „mythical, legendary,‟ from L. fabulosus „celebrated in fable; rich in 
myths,‟ from fabula. Sense of „incredible‟ first recorded c.1600.” Online Etymology Dictionary, 
retrieved 25 September 2010. We also get the words prophet, proverb, fame, and fate from the same 
PIE root *bha.  Note also, the shift to „animal story‟ as stories about animals suggests a parallel with 
the notion of „myth‟ as a racialised category. 
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Roman contexts it begins to more closely resemble our modern notion of fable or 
fabulous; equivalent to a fiction, a rumour, or a persistent lie, as directly underwritten 
by the emerging notion of mythos as fiction. This shift is foundational to the entire 
genre of modern ‗secular arts‘; a classification which contains a wealth of what 
might previously have been called ‗religious‘ materials, and distinguishes between 
‗good‘ or ‗true religion‘ (later, ‗truth‘), and fiction in a manner which continues to 
structure the episteme into the present day.324 
The on-going attempt of Christianity to expel other gods and traditions was 
concurrent with the gradual narrowing of the category of logos and its attachment to, 
on the one hand, the ‗speech‘ or ‗word‘ of the Judeo-Christian God, and on the 
other, truths identified through the application of philosophical reason. In a very real 
sense, what was called logos, was more properly doxa (belief and opinion). Christians 
set mythoi ―...in stark opposition to the one story they judged authoritative, but 
emphatically nonmythic: that of the Bible and, above all, Christ‘s passion.‖325 The 
shift from mythos to myth occurred as the newly conceived ‗rationality‘ of the logos 
perpetually put the myths into question; never the other way around. As the logos 
became more firmly attached to philosophically educated Christian apologetics, so 
did religious claims that were competing with Christianity become progressively 
divorced from the notion of ‗truth‘.  
                                                 
324 These re-translations of meaning, or that which Saussure would have noted as a subtle shift 
between signifier and signified, have enormous significance for the configuration of the episteme: the 
modern distinctions between truth and fiction emerge from Romanised Christianity directly. Gradually 
the episteme became monolithic in a manner which has overwhelmed Christianity, and, wherever the 
political powers were supportive, has become hegemonic, as evidenced later by the witch trials of the 
European Middle Ages, the widespread violence of colonialism, and the ascendency of the sciences. 
In fact, the episteme has only lost its inherent compatibility with the religions of Christianity in 
relatively recent times with the rise of the anti-modern „obsessively secular‟ institutions, as illustrated 
particularly well by the debates over bio-ethics. Further, as Althusser hints: “...art can function as a 
privileged category that provides an „internal distance‟ from ideology by relating histories, writing 
reports.” As paraphrased in Robert Young, White Mythologies : Writing History and the West (London; 
New York, 1990), 72. 
325 Lincoln, Theorizing Myth : Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship, 47. In the second century 
Christianity began to develop a distinct intellectual tradition which attempted to make Christian 
doctrine compatible with Platonic metaphysics and Stoic ethics. Lindberg, 'Science and the Early 
Christian Church,' 513. Notable figures such as Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, 
Tertullian, and Augustine are representative of this tradition, Augustine especially for his 
Christianisation of Neoplatonism: his use of reason to defend faith. Ibid., 513-517. “Augustine rightly 
said that he read about the Logos in the Greek philosophers but had to come to the Christian gospel 
to read about the Word made flesh… the contrast between the world of reason and the world of flesh 
is a Platonic contrast.” Ferguson, 'Athens and Jerusalem,' 11. 
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Reconfiguring how the mythic was to be thought about did not immediately alter 
everyday practice. Paganism was interwoven with Christianity right through until 
late medieval times, as was perhaps unprecedented violence – perhaps a more apt 
reason for the appellation of ‗dark ages‘ to this period. Le Goff gives an account of 
this period in ‗Western Europe‘ which notes the gradual emergence of professional 
and social compartmentalisation as a response to increased mobility. He writes: 
―The avoidance of certain professions and the mobility of rural labour had led the 
late Roman emperors to make certain traded hereditary and had encouraged the 
great landlords to attach tenant farmers to the land, the farmers being destined to 
replace the slaves who were becoming increasingly scarce.‖326  
The ‗tenant farmers‘ le Goff is referring to here were often former nomads from 
‗barbarian‘ tribes, as the attachment to individual rural property was, in his view, 
more attractive than it was to Romans ‗on the morrow of the invasions.‘327 Also, as 
the predominant religious views among these farmers were primarily pagan, the 
gradual expansion of Christianity was reliant upon its accommodative and syncretic 
tendencies. Roger Osborne‘s observation is central:  
―Even in Roman times, around 90 percent of western Europeans lived in the 
countryside. Rural dispersal gave Christianity the opportunity to become the 
religion of these ordinary peasant people; but in doing so the faith had to 
adapt to the needs of its new adherents. This process was subtle and 
unconscious, but there is plenty of evidence that western Christianity took on 
many aspects of old Celtic and Germanic pagan cultures. Eastern 
Christianity, with its Jewish inheritance and urban background, was utterly 
concerned with humanity and its relation to God, but the western faith 
showed signs of a greater interest in the natural world. The state of the 
harvest, the magical nature of ‗sacred‘ plants and animals, the tangible 
spirituality of the great forests, as well as festivals of spring, midsummer, and 
midwinter, and specific beliefs such as the magic nature of threefold objects, 
were all brought within the Christian orbit.‖328  
                                                 
326 Le Goff, Medieval Civilization 400-1500, 26. 
327 Ibid., 27. 
328 Roger Osborne, Civilization: A New History of the Western World (London, 2006), 140. There is an 
interesting connection here between this type of modified „barbarian‟ pagan/Christianity and its 
„secular‟ successors: both the Enlightenment (and the pursuit of „nature‟ through science) and its 
Romantic counterparts (including the volksgeist, or „blood and soil‟, philosophy which underwrites 
modern concepts of ethnicity, culture, and nationalism) reflect this desire for synchronicity between 
humanity and nature. Focus upon „nature‟ discourses and practices can often be observed as 
providing continuity amongst disparate parties in the modern world; even the „most urbanised 
citizens‟ appear to be susceptible to the habit of locating something transcendent in nature. The most 
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The cosmopolitanism of Greece and Rome had birthed a particular type of 
philosophy which, though originally quite rich, had narrowed almost to the point of 
non-existence in the West by the fall of Rome. As Christianity grew through Roman 
expansion, pursuit of the natural sciences became particularly scarce in the Roman 
world as scholarly interests became reoriented towards ethics and metaphysics.329 As 
Lindberg writes:  
―With the declining economic and political fortunes of the Roman Empire in 
late antiquity, people of independent means decreased in number and 
initiative was directed elsewhere. Moreover, changing educational and 
philosophical values were diverting attention from the world of nature. 
Inevitably, the pursuit of science suffered. Christianity did little to alter this 
situation… Christianity regarded science as important only insofar as it 
served the faith‖;330 and this remained so throughout the medieval period and 
beyond.  
 
Critically, successive administrative divisions of the Empire into eastern and western 
halves meant that Rome progressively became isolated from original Greek science 
and natural philosophy, and by the fifth century had managed to preserve only a 
very limited version of the Greek intellectual tradition.331 In addition, Judaism and 
Hellenism had, by the seventh and eighth centuries, become somewhat heretical. 
John of Damascus, who had a decisive influence on Christian thought in the 
medieval world, named the four heresies (circa 700CE) as Barbarism, Scythianism, 
Hellenism, and Judaism; of which the last two are arch-heresies, the prototype for 
every subsequent (specifically Christian) ‗folly‘.332 
In terms of the Church (Roman Catholic), le Goff calls it a ‗false ally‘ for Rome and a 
false ally for the disparate powers thereafter. Following the sack of Rome, the 
church maintained a degree of autonomy from up until the point when: ―Finally, 
                                                                                                                                                
banal „health‟ practices derive from the elevation of what is „natural‟ in the body of the human (and 
this is further capitalised upon by advertisers). There is also a theological angle that might be 
perceived within this: the compensation that is promised by maintaining good „health‟ practices is 
longevity but also, a „good life‟; thus, relocating the other-worldly promises of Christianity to a „this-
worldly‟ natural world context. 
329 Lindberg, 'Science and the Early Christian Church,' 519-520. 
330 Ibid., 522-523. 
331 Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science : The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, 
Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. To A.D. 1450, 148-149. 
332 Ruprecht, Was Greek Thought Religious? On the Use and Abuse of Hellenism, from Rome to 
Romanticism, 81-82. 
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wishing to make use of each other, the kings and bishops neutralized and mutually 
paralysed each other.‖333 Clerics wished to ‗restore Rome‘ but the powers in Western 
Europe had become diluted to the point where five hundred years of history reads 
like a list of vaguely interesting battles, kings, and religious disputes. As previously 
noted, and aside from widespread (though false) assertions that Aristotle dominated 
the philosophical scene in the interim, the ‗received wisdom‘ on philosophy only 
picks up again with the Italian Renaissance.334  
The major sources translated in the twelfth century were Arabic, and can be thought 
of as ‗restored‘ in the sense that Greek thought disseminated by Muslim scholars was 
interpreted very differently than it had been in Rome. Underlying Greek thought is 
Egyptian, Persian, and Indian thought. Despite the fact that Islam follows in the 
Judeo-Christian lineage of traditions, there are what might be called ‗cultural‘ 
aspects to Islam that owe more to the geography of its early Empire – similar to how 
paganism and Christianity had intermingled in a Western European context. When 
Muslim scholars approached Greek texts, they did so (in Lindberg‘s terms) 
‗faithfully‘, which means they did not attempt to pull down the edifices of Greek 
thought, but applied themselves diligently to ‗completing the project of Greek 
philosophy‘ by bringing their own innovations to the process.335 In addition, Islamic 
philosophers  
―...picked up and developed those aspects of Greek philosophy that chimed 
with Islamic theology, insisting that human beings are not only part of the 
entire Universe, but are also miniatures of it. For Muslims, every individual is 
reflected in the cosmos, and the cosmos itself is a mirror image of life. This 
                                                 
333 Le Goff, Medieval Civilization 400-1500, 35. “…Christianity was a false ally for Rome. To the 
Church, the Roman structures were only a framework on which it could model itself, a foundation on 
which it could support itself, an instrument for strengthening itself. As a religion with a universal 
vocation, Christianity was hesitant to shut itself up in the limits of a particular civilization. Of course it 
was to be the principal agency by which Roman civilization was to be transmitted to the medieval 
west. Of course it was to inherit from Rome and from its historical origins a tendency to turn in on 
itself. But against this closed religion the western middle ages were also to know an open religion, 
and the dialogue between these two faces of Christianity was to dominate this whole period. The 
medieval west took ten centuries to decide whether it was to be a closed or an open economy, a rural 
or an urban world, a single citadel or many mansions.” Ibid., 4-5. 
334 Fara, Science : A Four Thousand Year History, 77. Note that Aristotlean philosophy dominated 
medieval scholarship outside Western Europe until the twelfth century, and translations of his work 
(and others) after this „influx‟ were mostly from Arabic sources.  
335 Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science : The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, 
Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. To A.D. 1450, 176. 
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macrocosm-microcosm model of humanity… was tremendously important in 
Renaissance Europe.‖336  
 
Despite the fact that this idea is culturally logical in many other near Eastern 
contexts, such as India, it is not difficult to see how the translation of this idea in a 
Christian European monastic context challenged and altered the Christian pursuit of 
science, eventually leading to secularisation. Though the monks had been preserving 
the natural sciences and philosophy, were known to openly discuss both religious 
and secular texts, and did not reject classical learning as pagan or heretical, the 
direction of their inquiries appears to shift radically around the twelfth century.337 
After the Crusades, and with places like Spain passing from Islamic to Christian 
hands, monastic scholars, prompted by the influx of classical sources, began moving 
away from the view that ‗God is the direct, immediate cause of everything that 
occurs‘, and towards the view that there was a ‗harmony‘ to nature that could be 
interrogated:338 the beginnings of deism.  
Also, by insisting students complete ‗rational logic and natural philosophy‘ before 
being admitted to the ‗divinity‘ faculty, the new European universities founded by 
the churches sowed the seeds for their own demise.339 It was not so much that the 
pagan classics displaced Christian sources, as Lindberg notes, but ―...rather, the 
newly recovered sources took their place alongside the Bible… simply expanding the 
sources from which one might legitimately learn.‖340 Despite the supposed innocence of 
this assertion, the expansion of legitimisation beyond its previously limited religious 
frame meant that it was inevitable that reason and faith were destined for conflict on 
                                                 
336 Italics mine. Fara, Science : A Four Thousand Year History, 67. 
337 Ibid., 72. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science : The European Scientific Tradition in 
Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. To A.D. 1450, 193. The other significant 
thing that occurs at this time is the establishment of actual Churches en masse. The impulse to 
„contain‟ the growing religious community in buildings cannot be divorced from the growth of the idea 
of the institution and its relation to architecture; consider specifically the „correct‟ form for churches, 
universities, and public buildings such as courts and government offices versus the relative 
unimportance of the private dwelling. The similarities between the „house of God‟ and the „house of 
Law‟ are not accidental. To borrow from Berger, this may act as proof of the successful transfer of the 
„plausibility structure‟ of the former to the latter. For the theory of „plausibility structures‟ see  Berger, 
The Sacred Canopy : Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion, 47. 
338 Fara, Science : A Four Thousand Year History, 72. 
339 Ibid., 73. 
340 Italics mine. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science : The European Scientific Tradition in 
Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. To A.D. 1450, 193. 
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epistemological grounds, though it took until the inception of the Age of 
Enlightenment for this to be fully realised. 
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EXORCISM 2: WITCHES, HERESY, & LAW 
―In a sense, we might say that ‗modern‘ philosophy has 
always attempted to bury this irrational Other in some neat 
crypt, forgetting that it would thereby lead to further ghostly 
reapparitions.‖ 
The Ghosts of Modernity, Jean-Michel Rebate, 1996.341 
 
―…justice, which is wrested from fatality, bears the marks of 
fatality…‖ 
Dialectic of the Enlightenment,  
Theodor Adorno & Max Horkheimer,1944.342 
Despite the widespread belief that the gods fell into the gap between Athens and 
Jerusalem, and irrespective of the relatively harmonious co-existence of Christianity 
and magic for over a thousand years, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation 
heralded another (and much more deliberate) attempted exorcism.343 In Berger‘s 
succinct terms: "Protestantism cut the umbilical cord between heaven and earth."344 
Scholasticism pursued under the rubric of ‗learned‘ or ‗natural‘ magic helped bolster 
scientific inquiry in ways which quietly advanced it beyond the purview of the 
churches, in fact, Renaissance thinkers identified consistencies between ‗natural‘ 
magic and the doctrines of Christianity. Thomas Aquinas had devoted a treatise to 
the use of astronomical talismans, and Renaissance thinkers, such as Marsilio Ficino 
and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, clearly distinguished between ‗natural magic‘ 
and the demonic and drew their inspiration from newly rediscovered Greek and 
Egyptian occult texts as interpreted with a Christianised lens.345 Hermetic inquiry 
attempted to seize those very methods of inquiry into nature that had been rejected 
                                                 
341 Jean-Michel Rabaté, The Ghosts of Modernity (USA, 1996), xviii. 
342 Adorno and Horkheimer, 'Dialectic of the Enlightenment,' 336. 
343 Osborne, Civilization: A New History of the Western World, 300. 
344 Peter L. Berger, The Social Reality of Religion (Harmondsworth, UK, 1973), 118. 
345 Anthony Gottlieb, The Dream of Reason : A History of Western Philosophy from the Greeks to the 
Renaissance (London, 2001), 415-417. Consider Scarborough: “...intellectuals were searching for an 
archetypal religion and science… Once magic had emerged from the depths of a medieval 
necromancy and rise to a vaunted respectability, equipped with classical philology, philosophy, 
exegesis, and an aesthetic balance, it took on the role of a desired path through which Renaissance 
savants could rediscover the very ancient sources of pre-Christian knowledge… the Renaissance 
found that Aristotle, the medieval Scholastics, and ancient Jewish, Arabic, Indian and Persian sources 
could also be marshaled to the defense of a Christian mysticism… Ficino and Pico became major 
players on this stage…” John Scarborough, 'Hermetic and Related Texts in Classical Antiquity,' in 
Hermeticism and the Renaissance : Intellectual History and the Occult in Early Modern Europe, ed. 
Ingrid Merkel, Allen G. Debus, and Folger Institute of Renaissance and Eighteenth-Century Studies. 
(Washington, USA; London, UK, 1988), 20. 
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by medieval theology.346 Anthony Gottlieb writes with regard to early natural 
philosophy: ―...one scarcely knows where science begins and the séance ends.‖347 
Simultaneously, the industry with which the churches were converting local 
communities gradually increased. The discourse on ‗heretics and magicians‘, as 
incubated by the churches since Roman times, also impacted on how the churches 
viewed ‗learned‘ magic. In a medieval context, these evils were central: magic was 
the most illicit form of human commerce with demons, and heresy was shaped by 
the same fears.348 Edward Peters notes however that: ―The chief theological problem 
faced by hermetic magicians was the Church‘s firm statement that there were only 
two kinds of spirits, angels and demons.‖349 This immediately excluded any liminal 
positions or beliefs:  phenomenon that could not be tied directly to churchly or 
angelic sources was a priori demonic and thus, incurred whatever penalties were in 
vogue at the time. As the rise of science and the attempted exorcism on the 
‗magician‘ or ‗heretic‘ were simultaneous and intertwined, any treatises that were 
too heretical and made church authorities‘ uneasy created arguments over ‗truth 
claims‘ (such as the trial of Giordano Bruno and the Galileo affair) which intensified 
over several hundred years.  
Peters holds that there is a need to delineate sharply between the rhetoric on 
superstitio, idolatria, and maleficiam (salient until approximately 1450), and the 
distinctions that came after, which included a more complex idea of ‗making a pact 
with the demon‘ in combination with a new sense of sacramental responsibility, 
principally on the part of secular magistrates.350 Of particular interest is the notion of 
curiositas – ‗the passion for knowing unnecessary things‘ – and its relation to 
legitimate knowledge, which came to conclusively exclude the magician, the heretic, 
                                                 
346 Eugenio Garin cited in Edward Peters, The Magician, the Witch, and the Law (USA, 1978), 162. 
347 Gottlieb, The Dream of Reason : A History of Western Philosophy from the Greeks to the 
Renaissance, 415. 
348 Italics added. Peters, The Magician, the Witch, and the Law, xiv. Note: as this section is pre-
Reformation, where „church‟ is used without a modifier the institution referred to here may be 
denominationally Catholic or Protestant. Though the designator „Protestant‟ is a post-Reformation 
term there were churches which can be retrospectively identified as pre-Protestant, or had sufficiently 
self-identified as divorced from the Catholic orthodoxy prior to the Reformation to be somewhat set 
apart.  
349 Ibid., 163. 
350 Peters is to be noted for his careful use of words: maleficus, from the Latin, was a word employed 
for both the magician and the witch, the latter of which does not appear in a form that corresponds to 
the „sixteenth century ideal-type‟ until the mid-fifteen century. Ibid., xiii-xvii. 
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and the witch, and collapse all three into a single understanding that was explicitly 
linked to demonology.351 Thomas Carlson notes:  
―Taken as the unrestrained desire to look and to see, as a restless greed for 
inquiry and knowing without determined, productive, and hence justified end 
or purpose, curiosity has been met with deep suspicion, if not dread, and 
often prohibition and condemnation, throughout a Christian tradition shaped 
decisively by Augustine and subsequent heirs, such as Bernard of Clairvaux 
and Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages, Blaise Pascal in the early modern 
context, and on the later end, Keirkegaard and Heidegger…‖352 
 
It would be incorrect, then, to misinterpret the fusion of Christianity and pagan 
nature-magic (which was absorbed, transformed, and viewed as relatively benign), 
or the relative cosmopolitanism of the late medieval period within Europe, as a 
general tolerance of magical practitioners by either the churches or the secular courts, 
which is an issue concerned with legitimacy, justification, and power. The limits of 
tolerance were shifted by degrees until they became defined in response to the extent 
of public influence or respect garnered by any person who was thought to ‗compel‘ 
supernatural forces: as opposed to the perceived ability of the churches or courts to 
manage these ‗threats‘ (specifically, hinging upon how powerful the institution in 
question wanted to be perceived as in the eyes of the same public). Edward Bever 
argues that, as opposed to a purely ‗top-down‘ management of said threats, medieval 
social controls rested on four main types of repression: the judicial system, the local 
church, the bonds of the local community, and the workings of individuals‘ 
psychophysiologies.353 Thus, the individuals who surrounded the accused, even if 
only via compliance with social or religious norms, have to be counted as complicit 
in the empowerment of the authorising bodies. According to Bever:  
―Prosecutions were generally initiated by individuals with specific complaints 
about their neighbours... With literacy limited among the ordinary people, 
sermons formed an important source of ideas and information... the ‗official 
                                                 
351 The idea that curiosity is „aimless erudition‟ and is potentially dangerous is found as early as 
Greece, though it becomes attached to deception, injury, compulsion by demons, and all things 
forbidden, in approximately the ninth century. Ibid., xiv, 3, 17, 90-91, ibid., xiv.  
352 Thomas A. Carlson, The Indiscrete Image: Infinitude & Creation of the Human, Religion and 
Postmodernism (USA, 2008), 51. Curiositas was for Augustine, the „lust of the eyes‟ which he linked 
to the temptations of science, technology, art and entertainment; limited theologically by their relation 
to what is forbidden by God, and encouraging the „neglect of the everlasting father‟. Ibid., 52-53. 
353 Edward Watts Morton Bever, The Realities of Witchcraft and Popular Magic in Early Modern 
Europe : Culture, Cognition, and Everyday Life, Palgrave Historical Studies in Witchcraft and Magic 
(UK; USA, 2008), 349. 
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duty of the preacher... to hold witch sermons... was the strongest impulse 
behind a rapid popularization of the witch demonology. Sermons not only 
conveyed important ideas to the people, but, at least when delivered well, 
also generated strong emotions in them, instilling fear and inspiring devotion, 
which exert a stronger influence on behavior than ideas alone.‖354 
 
Additionally, the churches enculturated their congregation by way of direct religious 
instruction, which was the main element of the curriculum within elementary 
schools: administered by the churches and the first point of service for junior 
clergy.355  
In Osborne‘s view: ―The effect of the Reformation was to sever the [official] links 
between Christianity and the natural world, which was the source of all customary 
magic.‖356 Contrary to the notion that the Reformation was about the liberation of 
the masses from authoritarian Catholic rule, the Churches within the later medieval 
period had not yet been pushed to their epistemological limits and were still 
tolerating mystics, magicians, visionaries, and so forth.357 The Reformation was 
therefore more accurately a deliberate correction of what was viewed by Calvinists, 
Puritans, and others, as religious impropriety.358 Peters writes that  
―…certain implicit contradictions in late medieval theological approaches to 
the subject of magic became explicit, and reformers could and did attack 
Catholic ceremonial practices and beliefs as manifestations of demonic 
magic. Indeed, one of the themes that sustained much of the literature 
concerning magic and witchcraft throughout the sixteenth century was the 
diabolical magic of which the Catholic church was accused.‖359  
                                                 
354 “The church‟s admonishments and symbolic sanctions were far less powerful external forms of 
repression than the punishments that the secular arm could impose, but the church had far more 
potent means of instilling internal forms of repression than the state. To begin with, sermons served 
to both educate and indoctrinate, informing parishioners of the do‟s and, more importantly from the 
point of view of magic, the don‟ts of Christian morality, and of the rewards to be gained by conforming 
to them and the penalties in this world and the next for transgressing against them. By the late 
sixteenth century pastors were generally the best educated people in villages and among the most 
educated in towns, having passed through a stringent educational process starting with elite „Latin‟ 
schools for the university bound, continuing in special cloister schools for prospective clergy, and 
culminating in a course of study in a special section of the university… and generally an additional 
year or two of theology.” Ibid., 350, 358. 
355 Ibid., 359. 
356 Osborne, Civilization: A New History of the Western World, 300. 
357 Ibid., 230. 
358 Ibid., 230. “The general secularization of life in the West after the Reformation is significantly, 
though only partly, an unintended consequence of [a] religious idea. Luther was indeed a man of his 
times, a tragic medieval figure, who ushered in a modern age that he would hardly approve of.” 
Madan, 'Secularism in Its Place,' 753-754. 
359 Peters, The Magician, the Witch, and the Law, 163. 
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In response, the Catholic Counter-Reformation, in Osborne‘s words, achieved its 
momentum by ‗stealing its opponent‘s clothes‘, opening the way for the Inquisitions 
and the order of Jesuits to clamp down on unorthodox beliefs, visionaries, prophets, 
and heretics.360 Thus, the second attempted exorcism was aimed, once again, at the 
medieval equivalent of the priest-healer (generally, the witch) and whatever claims 
to power they exercised, with the subtle difference of including the heretic as an 
equally ‗evil‘ threat. 
The angelology and demonology unique to Christianity, with its pervasive distrust of 
all ecstatic, spiritual, sensual, and experiential states, thus collapsed these parts of 
the religion conclusively into the demonic realm, along with all religious expressions 
which were deemed ‗not Christian‘.361 The privileges of Christianity that had been 
somewhat reified when it first became the state religion in Rome fused the 
ideological to the political in a manner which had locked into place the distinction 
between Christianity and its ‗others‘, exorcising any obeisance to, or right to pursue, 
alternative conceptions of divinity. Christian authorities in the early modern period, 
who had considerably more power at their disposal due to the gradual strengthening 
of the churches in the intervening years, simply expanded upon this division. Whilst 
the existence of a demonic realm had always been taken for granted, the legitimacy 
of the cosmological order was now reinforced; thus, supplying a new framework for 
reconceptualising the ‗gods‘ in nature (a problematically polytheistic belief) as ‗evil 
spirits‘ that could be exorcised, whilst remaining consistent with the external 
monotheism and internal dualism of Christian belief and practice. 
This second attempt to exorcise ‗spirits‘ is the last that occurs within the framework 
of Christianity (as a pre-modern, pre-secular distinction), although it is often an 
ongoing attempt for contemporary adherents of the Christian traditions. It pays to 
note that reframing gods as firstly, ‗spirits‘, and then ‗evil spirits‘ does not necessarily 
‗eradicate‘ them however, but simply creates a new legitimate means of mitigating 
whatever influence or powers they may possess. In fact, neither the prevailing 
episteme of the churches, nor the beliefs of people generally, allowed for the 
                                                 
360 Osborne, Civilization: A New History of the Western World, 232. 
361 Levy, Mageo, and Howard, 'Gods, Spirits and History: A Theoretical Perspective,' 15., and Leavitt, 
'Poetics, Prophetics, Inspiration,' 26. 
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possibility that spirits did not exist, as this would have been an incomprehensible 
notion. Such an idea is only possible in the wake of replacement discourses emergent 
from a belief in Reason, such as science, atheism, and secularity.  Spirits existed; it 
was just a matter of what discursive frame was used to name them, and how their 
nature and powers were to be understood.362  
Further, the discourse on sexuality, animals, nature, and women that extended from 
the classical period into medieval times was eventually reified in the figure of the 
witch. Although the witch was an ancient liminal (generally female) figure 
mythologically dispersed across various cultures, the stereotype was codified under 
Christianity.363 As Ruether writes: ―Ruling class males come to be seen as closer to 
mind and reason, women and lower class people as... more ‗carnal‘, both in the 
sense of irrational, prone to sensual impulses, and... prone to evil. This pattern of 
thought is particularly developed in Plato and Aristotle. Christianity took over these 
patterns but also exhibited countervailing theories of evil.‖ 364 This notion combined 
three powerful mythological constructions that were popular with early theologians: 
Hebrew Eve, Greek Pandora, and the Virgin Mary.365 By the time of the writing of 
                                                 
362 It is only with the emergence of post-Enlightenment hindsight and the comparative powers of 
scientific judgment that such ways of conceptualising are referred to as „incorrect‟, the result of 
human error, „religion‟, or „superstition‟. 
363 There are an enormous range of other cross-cultural versions of the „witch‟ archetype, found as 
widely distributed as in early Mesopotamia, India, and Egypt, but also in mystical Judaism and early 
Celtic and Germanic folk conceptions of the sorceress or magician. The stereotypical witch has loose 
hair and dubious sexual morals; has a negative effect (often culminating in death) upon fertility, 
pregnant mothers, and infants; is generally associated with birds (such as in the flight of Diana, or as 
the yogini‟s of India); female horses (as in the origin of the term night-mare); herbs, drugs, or potions; 
dangerous knowledge; and blood rituals of all kinds. The line of cultural inheritance which culminates 
in the witch trials considered herein is therefore impossible to pin down geographically because the 
idea of the witch was so widespread as to have no clear fixed origin, per se.  
364 Rosemary Radford Ruether, 'Dualism and the Nature of Evil in Feminist Theology,' Studies in 
Christian Ethics, vol. 5: 26 (1992), 26. 
365 To clarify, it is important to point out that the creation story in the biblical chapter of Genesis has 
two forms: in the first, Adam and Eve are created simultaneously, in the second, Eve is created from 
Adam‟s rib, and Christianity directly appropriated the idea of Eve‟s subordination from a rabbinic 
tradition which favoured this second version, wherein the creation of Eve is secondary. As John 
Phillips notes, overwhelming preference for the second account shows that interpreters preferred an 
Eve who is religiously, socially, politically, and sexually under the control of her husband. Eve‟s 
culpability with respect to the fall of humankind occurs when, according to Phillips, the story is 
somewhat fused with the Mesopotamian story of Lilith (in Judaism, Adam‟s „first wife‟), from which the 
relationship between the woman and the serpent „devil‟ is developed; New Testament writings on the 
proper „place‟ of women (especially those of Paul); and the pagan story of Pandora, „which seems to 
have both repelled and fascinated the earliest Christian theologians.‟ John A. Phillips, Eve, the History 
of an Idea, 1st ed. (San Francisco, USA, 1984), 16, 27-30, 70, 135. Whilst Eve is subordinate to 
Adam, all is well: but the evidence for her „sin‟ (however that is interpreted) is reflected in the on-going 
susceptibility of women to indulge in deceit; thus, reinforcing the necessity that they be controlled. 
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the Malleus Maleficarum,366 the tendency of a woman to be a ‗witch‘ is justified as 
follows: 
 ―[Woman] ‗is more carnal than a man, as is clear from her many carnal 
abominations‘. She is deceitful, with a ‗slippery tongue,‘ ‗a liar by nature.‘ 
She is naturally credulous and impressionable, therefore ‗quicker to waver in 
her faith, and consequently quicker to abjure the faith, which is the root of all 
witchcraft.‘ Since women are ‗feebler both in mind and body,‘ they have 
weak memories, are undisciplined, impulsive, and particularly dangerous 
when given authority over anything. The author‘s conclusion is a testimony 
to the strength and tenacity of blending [these] stories...‖367 
 
The dangerous sexual powers attributed to women may be particularly ancient, 
however the place of women in the new cosmological order was far more rigidly 
enforced than it was previously, and the method of control – accusations of, and 
punishments for, ‗consort‘ with the Devil – had become increasingly legal and 
contractual in the secular (or temporal) courts. As Peters writes,  
―…certain innovations [of the thirteenth century], such as the spread of 
torture, the introduction of the inquisitorial process, and new rules of 
evidence, were common to a number of societies. They were not... solely the 
invention of ecclesiastical inquisitors. Although heretics were more severely 
handled by the law after 1225, the same is true of all classes of criminal 
offenders, and one could be tortured for other offenses besides heresy and 
executed by public authorities acting as other than the ‗secular arm‘ of an 
ecclesiastical tribunal. When the legal aspects of heresy, magic, and 
witchcraft are considered, it should be remembered that the law in general 
had grown more severe, more remorseless, and more systematic, for the 
hardened criminal as well as the heretic.‖368 
 
That penalisation of heresy in the temporal courts was often more severe than Papal 
law (with the exception of the Inquisitions) illustrates the earlier point regarding the 
                                                                                                                                                
The Virgin Mary, on the other hand, is the reversal of this form. As Phillips writes, if: “...sin, sexuality, 
and death were thus woven into the tapestry depicting Eve; obedience, virginity, and eternal life 
become the shining attributes of Mary…  The characterizations of Eve, Mary, and the Christian life all 
dealt with the questions of what Woman is, and what may be expected of her. In the first place, the 
sexual interpretation of the Fall became validated by the doctrine of the virginity of Mary. Paradise is 
virginity; the loss of virginity is the fall from grace. Mary‟s celibacy is her victory; Eve‟s disobedience is 
therefore her sexual defeat.” Ibid., 135. 
366 “…the Malleus Maleficarum, reprinted fourteen times before 1521 and another fifteen times after 
1576, uses the feminine form Maleficarum rather than the masculine Maleficorum in its title.” 
Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature : Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution, 1st ed. (San 
Francisco, 1980), 138. 
367 Phillips, Eve, the History of an Idea, 70. 
368 Peters, The Magician, the Witch, and the Law, 150-152. 
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impact of the sovereign fusion of ‗one ruler, one state, one God‘ in Rome. Roman 
law had been revived in twelfth and thirteenth century Europe, and had carried 
within it particular Judeo-Christian prejudices which were compatible with, and 
thus, disappeared into, civil law by the Middle Ages. This point evidences the 
aforementioned transfer from theology to jurisprudence or the sovereignty of 
institutionalised law (in Schmitt‘s terms),369 that is: the reproduction of hierarchy in 
the model of authority and fields of discourse and authorisation (structured through 
biblical instructions, such as found in the Commandments), is clearly already 
developed by the time of the European witch trials. Though the sovereignty of law 
appears fully secularised (and historical accounts stress this point), the obscured detail 
is that it became so via a combination of the hegemonic enforcement of a sharpened 
cosmology and strengthened legal administrative powers: effectively resulting in 
more conclusive punishments for those individuals who challenged the dominant 
epistemology. The institution of law (already established as a power independent 
from the Churches) was thereby the channel through which the theological ideal 
became tied to actual physical practice: the internal state of possessing beliefs 
designated as heretical was translated into external punishment. 
As to the issue of gender and its entanglement with law (a popular trope when 
navigating scholarship on witchcraft), it is important to note that it is not that there 
was any marked increase in misogyny, but that the power relations between the 
churches, ‗secular‘ institutions, and the public were served more readily by more 
rigorous constructions of femininity.370 This was considered especially important in 
light of the numerous women (with specific religious agendas) who had risen to 
                                                 
369 Schmitt, Political Theology : Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Also significant for the 
development of the concept of sovereignty are Schmitt‟s predecessors: Bodin and Hobbes. For 
sovereignty to become secularized, as Fitzpatrick (citing Bartelson) points out, the „epistemic 
underpinnings‟ must remain „neglected‟, as they carry traces of a previous age. Sovereignty must 
mediate between two orders, the worldly and the otherworldly, and must be indivisible, determinate, 
and transcendent for successful bringing together a „free, unchained, people‟ (in Rousseau‟s terms) in 
a civil society. Rousseau, of course, concluded that this „freedom‟ was enforced. Peter Fitzpatrick, 
''What Are the Gods to Us Now?' : Secular Theology and the Modernity of Law,' Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law, vol. 8:  (2007), 168. 
370 Further: “A general increase in misogyny around 1500 has not been demonstrated so far … The 
antifeminine cultural tradition is at least two thousand years older than witchcraft doctrine, and it is 
difficult to accept that this tradition would suddenly have led to witch persecutions between 1480 and 
1680.” Pieter Spierenburg, The Broken Spell (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 117. Cited in 
Jonathan Barry and Owen Davies, eds., Palgrave Advances in Witchcraft Historiography (UK; USA, 
2007). 
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power within the same time period.371 Carolyn Merchant interprets this as a 
reification of the nature-culture divide (a key factor in the advance of ‗civilization‘) 
in which women are fixed in place in the established hierarchical order of things, 
below the men in their status group.372 She writes: ―The reaction against the disorder 
in nature symbolized by women was directed not only at lower-class witches, but at 
the queens and noblewomen who during the Protestant Reformation seemed to be 
overturning the order of nature.‖373 The need for the reinforcement of control and 
the maintenance of the social order also coincided with ‗new‘ conceptions of nature 
extending from natural philosophy, and especially its medical aspects.374 The 
designation of ‗witch‘ was a convenient means for resolving difficulties within any 
area of perceived failure pertaining to the ‗healing‘ arts (including midwifery). Illness 
and death, especially in childbirth or among children, required satisfactory ritual 
mediation, but the Christian faith had largely failed to supply any replacement equal 
to that supplied by those who could ‗compel‘ the supernatural. As God could not be 
similarly compelled, the only possible theodicy hinged on a demonological 
explanation, which also had the effect of marginalising any remaining female 
‗health‘ practitioners so effectively that a general suspicion of, and prejudice against, 
herbal medicines, along with female doctors and midwives, has persisted right 
through until the twentieth century. 
It is important to note that the epistemological uncertainty of the time does not 
necessarily confirm, following Peter Elmer, that: ―The widespread victory of 
Enlightenment values, of which scientific and medical progress were staple 
                                                 
371 Merchant, The Death of Nature : Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution, 144-145. It is 
important to recognise also that the conflicts between Protestants and Catholics were reaching their 
height at around the same time. 
372 Ibid., 144. 
373 Ibid., 144. 
374 “Nature in ancient and early modern times had a number of interrelated meanings. With respect to 
individuals, it referred to the properties, inherent characters, and vital powers of persons, animals, or 
things, or more generally to human nature. It also meant an inherent impulse to act and sustain 
action; conversely, to “go against nature” was to disregard this innate impulse.  With respect to the 
material world, it referred to a dynamic creative and regulatory principle that caused phenomena and 
their change and development.  A distinction was commonly made between natura naturans, or 
nature creating, and natura naturata, the natural creation.  Nature was contrasted with art (techne) 
and with artificially created things.  It was personified as a female-being… The course of nature and 
the laws of nature were the actualization of her force.  The state of nature was the state of mankind 
prior to social organization and prior to the state of grace…  In Latin and the romance languages of 
medieval and early modern Europe, nature was a feminine noun, and hence, like the virtues 
(temperance, wisdom, etc.) personified as female.” Ibid., xxiii. 
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elements, thus sealed the fate of antiquated superstitions like magic and 
witchcraft.‖375 Many scientists were ‗radically supernaturalist‘, thus, the argument 
seems to hinge on the legitimacy, or lack thereof, of the practitioner, on which the 
distinction of ‗licit‘ (learned) or ‗illicit‘ magic hinges.376 Whilst Ficino, Pico, and 
their successors argued for two kinds of magic (distinguishing their own interests as 
‗spiritual‘),377 the largely female practitioners of a particular kind, in possession of a 
particular medical knowledge, especially knowledge regarding reproduction and 
herbal medicine, lost all formal or informal credibility as a result of the rhetoric on 
witchcraft. In addition, as Stuart Clark notes: ―Witches were the deviants of 
Christianization, with ‗witchcraft‘ acting as a catch-all term of cultural censure and 
conquest.‖378 The subsequent symbolic construction of the ideal Christian woman 
meant that female roles could be increasingly defined in terms of domestic functions 
and economic subordination, divorced from any illicit powers over life, death, 
illness, and childbirth (a field which was subsequently medicalised).  
In terms of the epistemological reconfiguration that occurs, critical consideration of 
the following introduction from a recent textbook on the historiography of witchcraft 
demonstrates the significance of what is occurring at this time.  
―Scholars of witchcraft have often been pioneers of new forms of historical 
study and interdisciplinary developments, as the... witch trials cannot be 
understood properly without considering the development of science, 
medicine, religion and the political and economic apparatus of the modern 
European state. The analysis of witchcraft accusations demands an 
understanding of the processes of social negotiation, the structure of communities, 
and the nature of gender relations. Decoding the meaning of witchcraft beliefs 
requires grappling with the research and theories of anthropology, folkloristics 
                                                 
375 Peter Elmer, 'Science, Medicine and Witchcraft,' in Palgrave Advances in Witchcraft 
Historiography, ed. Jonathan Barry and Owen Davies (UK; USA, 2007), 34. 
376 “Demonism then, just like Newton‟s concept of gravity, occupied a central place in the thought of 
many of the natural philosophers associated with the new science in late seventeenth-century 
England. Like gravity, it „was held to be intelligible in its effects but not in its causes, something real 
and manifest as an „experienced‟ matter of fact but as yet unexplained‟. Accordingly, witchcraft was 
designated as a suitable topic of investigation by certain members of the Royal Society, who wished to 
construct a natural history of the demonic by amassing well attested and verifiable (that is, Baconian) 
matters of fact. The process, as outlined by Glanvill, was collaborative and empirical, and like other 
forms of knowledge studied there, it was neither dogmatic nor doubting, but based on the precepts of 
probability and reasonable hypothesis.” Stuart Clark, Thinking with Demons : The Idea of Witchcraft in 
Early Modern Europe (New York; Oxford, 1997). Paraphrased in Elmer, 'Science, Medicine and 
Witchcraft,' 45. 
377 Peters, The Magician, the Witch, and the Law, 163. 
378 Clark, Thinking with Demons : The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe, 510. 
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and psychology, even if their application raises serious issues regarding the 
application of contemporary notions and behaviour to people in the past. 
Few topics in historical research invite so much interdisciplinary engagement, 
demand such a broad exploration of historical processes and yet give so much 
free reign to our historical imagination.‖379  
 
Performing a ‗reversal‘ on this statement illustrates very effectively that the 
combination of 1) the collapse of witches, heretics, magicians, herbal medicines, and 
so on, into a Christian cosmological framework simultaneous with 2) the 
transposition of ‗natural‘ or ‗learned‘ magic into science, culminates in a ‗moment‘ 
of epistemological fragmentation. This is evidence of Foucault‘s threshold, as 
isomorphic with Derrida‘s aporia (or a place of ‗cutting‘).  As opposed to the general 
ascription of this moment to the scientific revolution and the Age of Enlightenment, 
fragmentation actually occurs with the events which peak simultaneously and just 
prior. That this history cannot be accessed except via distinct disciplinary spheres is 
evidence that the ‗way‘, as demonstrated by the above quotation, is thereafter 
‗philosophically blocked.‘380  
As feminist scholars maintain, this epistemological break is also critical to an 
understanding of how a ‗white, male, and western‘ spirit of conquest came to power 
– under the guise of a universalistic claim – which cloaked a reality in which some 
human characteristics were valourised, whilst others were suppressed and 
devalued.381 Writing on the witch trials, Shiva notes:  
―After this orgy of violence against women… came a new yearning for the 
‗feminine‘... It seems that real living, and strong and independent women had 
first to be physically destroyed and subdued before the men of the new 
bourgeois class could create a new romantic ideal of womanhood… the 
necessary complement to the strong, enterprising, bourgeois white man who 
began to conquer and colonize the world for the sake of capital 
accumulation.‖382  
 
The threading together of discourses on sex, gender, power, class, and general 
deviance that derive from a normative (yet, increasingly hidden) Christian ethos was 
therefore expanded to include colour (or racial difference as deviance) with the 
                                                 
379 Italics added. Jonathan Barry and Owen Davies, 'Introduction,' in Palgrave Advances in Witchcraft 
Historiography, ed. Jonathan Barry and Owen Davies (UK; USA, 2007), 1.  
380 Derrida, Aporias : Dying - Awaiting (One Another at) the "Limits of Truth", 11, ibid. 
381 Kathryn Dean, Politics and the Ends of Identity (Aldershot, 1997), 22. 
382 Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, Ecofeminism (New Delhi, 1993), 134-135. 
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advent of colonialism. Thus, the contemporary perspectives forwarded by scholars 
working in the areas of gender, religion, and race (or culture) find their common 
ancestor for the dialectic of alterity that has structured power relations thereafter.383 
The Age of Exploration was simultaneous with the reconfigurations within 
European society that amounted to a new totalising order and new regime of truth. 
Cosmologically, because the only possible ‗correct‘ religion was Christian, and the 
only permitted spirits were either angels or demons, the criteria for discrimination 
through which the radically different others encountered during the Age of 
Exploration (and thereafter, the colonial expansion) would be ‗understood‘, was 
determined in a manner which continues to underwrite the civilising project of 
‗development‘ of modernity right through to the present day. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
383 It therefore becomes evident how Marx, Gramsci, Fanon, Foucault, Spivak, and others derive a 
similar theoretical basis for all these academic fields when the structures of marginalization are 
demonstrated to be based on theologically construed discourses on deviance. 
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EXORCISM 3: PAGAN ‘OTHERS’ 
―The strange God settles himself humbly on the altar beside 
the God of the country. Little by little he establishes himself 
firmly. Then one fine morning he gives his neighbour a shove 
with his elbow – crash! – the idol lies upon the ground.‖ 
Rameau’s Nephew, Denis Diderot, 1762.384 
 
 “Power is the passage from the local to the global.‖ 
The Parasite, Michel Serres, 2007.385 
The Age of Exploration, mediologically speaking, was reliant on ‗the map‘. The 
influx of classical sources translated during the Renaissance included a handful of 
obscure maps which, when distributed, invigorated interest in the exploration of the 
unknown regions of the world. The explorers, and the sovereigns they represented, 
conceived of themselves as ‗those with maps‘ and thus, power, compared to those 
without.386 Maps delocalised knowledge and incited a cartographic revolution 
which, by the seventeenth century, was extended to all fields of ‗modern‘ inquiry.387  
Though early exploration was motivated largely by the availability of means (and an 
eager curiosity), potential for the acquisition of new territories arose when the 
character of the ‗races‘ encountered was appraised and found wanting. Europeans of 
the times self-identified as ‗civilised‘ persons who were privileged members of a 
state, country, or empire, and they claimed to possess moral and elect ‗virtues‘ 
supplied by devout religious observance. The combination of these elements all fed 
into a spirit of exploration, conquest, and domination that quickly became resource-
driven and opportunistic. As David Goldberg writes regarding the rapid shift from 
exploration to imperial acquisition: ―Imperatives of European empire and expansion 
entailed territorial penetration, population regulation, and labor exploitation...  
                                                 
384 Diderot as cited in Dei, Karumanchery, and Karumanchery-Luik, Playing the Race Card : Exposing 
White Power and Privilege, 1. See http://www.globusz.com/ebooks/Rameau/00000011.htm for full-
text. 
385 Serres and Schehr, The Parasite, 215. 
386 David Turnbull, Masons, Tricksters and Cartographers : Comparative Studies in the Sociology of 
Scientific and Indigenous Knowledge (Amsterdam, 2000), 97.  
387 Further: “Maps are a prime vehicle for repositioning, reframing, rethinking science because 
theories are maps, maps are science instantiated, without maps science would not have been 
possible. The art of making pictorial statements in a precise and repeatable form is one that we have 
long taken for granted in the west. But it is usually forgotten that without prints and blueprints, 
without maps and geometry, the world of modern science would hardly exist.” McLuhan, 
Understanding Media : The Extensions of Man, 157. 
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racialized slave labor seem necessary for [resource exploitation]... in spite of 
Christian humanism.‖388 
Modernity, according to Enrique Dussel, had its ‗originary moment‘ in 1492, when 
Europe defined itself as the centre of the world in its relation with the non-European 
‗other‘. As he notes, ―...if 1492 is the moment of the birth of modernity as a concept, 
the moment of origin of a very particular myth of sacrificial violence, it also marks 
the origin of a process of concealment or misrecognition of the non-European.‖389 
This time period not only gave rise to the notion of a collective ‗we‘ (which 
designated ‗Europe‘, and internally, ‗Europeans‘) as a whole, but the idea of ‗race‘, 
and the notion of the ‗primitive‘; albeit only as a rather neutral designator for origins 
found in a ‗past age‘.390 Race itself was hardwired into the conception of community 
inherited from Judaism, and despite being largely unarticulated before this point, the 
Christians of the time had internalised a sense of divine entitlement, conferred by 
theological lineage, which closely resembled ‗race‘. Christians – in particular, 
Christian Britons and Europeans – were the chosen people.391 
As Caputo emphatically argues: ―Religion is most dangerous when it conceives itself 
as a higher knowledge granted a chosen few, a chosen people of God: that is a formula 
for war… the dangerous and absolutizing triumphalism of religion… is what spills 
blood.‖392 Thus, the notion of chosenness, also known as divine election, must be 
considered as central to the violence and politics of exclusion which characterise 
modernity. Deriving from a theological notion of supersession, this sense of mission 
(or proselytisation), when combined with the ‗flattering belief that Christians were 
                                                 
388 David Theo Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning (Oxford, UK; 
Cambridge, USA, 1993), 26.  
389 Enrique Dussel, 'Eurocentrism and Modernity,' boundary, vol. 2: 20/3 (1993). No pagination given, 
as cited in Turnbull, Masons, Tricksters and Cartographers : Comparative Studies in the Sociology of 
Scientific and Indigenous Knowledge, 227. 
390 The use of „Europe‟ in this sense is noted in papal letters from the mid-fifteenth century. Goldberg, 
Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 21, 155. 
391 This is especially so via the Protestant Reformation for they are further „chosen‟ over and against 
Catholics. Idea courtesy of thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011. 
392 Derrida and Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell : A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, 159. 
Richard J. Mouw points out that there is a “...deeply entrenched pattern in the United States of seeing 
the American people as „a chosen people‟… influencing foreign policy, through which [we] often acted 
as if we were a nation with a messianic mission in the world.” Richard J. Mouw, 'The Chosen People 
Puzzle,' Christianity Today, vol. 45: 4 (2001), 72-73. 
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god‘s elect‘,393 united to become a power which, when distributed through ‗empire‘ 
and expansion, ought not to be underestimated.394   
Bruce Cauthen notes that England was the first ‗proto-typical nation‘ to arise in the 
Middle Ages with an internal philosophy of ‗chosenness‘, and that the pre and post-
Reformation Protestant communities were particularly susceptible to the concept.395 
Cauthen quotes that ―...without such symbols as the ‗Old Testament‘ account of a 
chosen people… the frequently powerful union of nationalism and Christianity 
might have been less feasible in nations like Great Britain, Germany, and the United 
States.‖396 To appropriate his argument here: ―The myth of divine election… of a 
people anointed by God to discharge a providentially-ordained mission… who 
collectively possess a divine warrant to subdue, and propagate the faith in… a 
heathen land [or face]… the prospect of eternal damnation‖397 has fostered the 
arrogance that is well illustrated by numerous historical examples of religious 
persecution attributed to the bearers of the Christian doctrines. 
The biblical mission of the Jews, as described by Avi Beker, was to ―...act as a ‗Light 
unto the Nations,‘ [Isaiah 42.6]... and to deliver a special moral message whether in 
religious or secular life...  imbued with this sense of a special mission to ‗repair the 
world‘.‖398 Biblical instruction dictated, as Karen Teel writes, that ―...the strangers 
must be destroyed because, in presenting other gods as viable candidates for 
worship, these people threaten Israel‘s identity as the people of the covenant. Racial 
purity is deeply connected with Israel‘s identity and relationship to the divine.‖399 
Both Christianity and Islam claim to have inherited this designation of chosenness, 
and the inherent idea of ‗purity of bloodline‘, after the failure of the Jews to satisfy 
                                                 
393 Karen Armstrong, A History of God (UK, 1993), 68. 
394 “From the second century the Christian literature claims that God had himself rejected the Jewish 
people and that the Church has completely taken over the position of the elect or Chosen People. This 
was not just a change in tone but rather becoming a central pillar of Christianity: the theology of 
supersession (sometimes called „replacement theology‟ by critics).” Avi Beker, The Chosen : The 
History of an Idea, the Anatomy of an Obsession, 1st ed. (New York, 2008), 40. 
395 Bruce Cauthen, 'Covenant and Continuity : Ethno-Symbolism and the Myth of Divine Election,' 
Nations and Nationalism, vol. 10: 1/2 (2004), 20-21. 
396 Hartmut Lehmann and William R. Hutchinson cited in ibid., 21. 
397 Ibid., 20. 
398 Beker, The Chosen : The History of an Idea, the Anatomy of an Obsession, 3. 
399 Author also cites Yves Dubois, Slaves and Other Objects (n.d.) in paraphrasing this passage.  
Karen Teel, Racism and the Image of God (USA, 2010), 3. 
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God‘s commands.400 It would be incorrect to assume, however, that the 
appropriation of this election was immediate. Imbued as it was with anti-semitism, 
election was explicitly linked to corresponding discourses on magic that had been 
galvanized against Judaism for a thousand years. This was enhanced by the 
encouragement among Christians to denounce any means of financial or material 
acquisition that appeared as disassociated from ‗hard work‘ and was thus, perceived 
to be illicitly linked to the concept of ‗compelling‘ supernatural forces for personal 
gain. Election became ‗rightfully‘ Christian, and Judaism remained explicitly tied to 
sorcery. Peters notes that:  
―Jewish magicians… loomed large in Christian rhetoric. Jews were 
associated with the triumph of the Antichrist. Jews had been accused of 
widespread practice of magic and possession of magic lore in the Roman 
world before Christians made these charges their own, and the fondness of 
non-Jewish magicians for Hebrew lore and their use of the Hebrew language 
helped perpetuate the Jews‘ reputation as sorcerers down through the Middle 
Ages. From Origen on, the Jew as sorcerer remained a learned and popular 
motif.‖ 401  
 
Anti-semitic propaganda drove the various forced conversions, expulsions, and 
persecutions particular to Jewish peoples throughout England and Europe from the 
thirteenth to seventeenth centuries, capitalising on grotesque caricatures of the Jew-
as-other to incite political and social consensus which then reified the image of 
Judaism as a template for the ‗civilised‘, yet ‗fallen‘ other;402 not dissimilar to early 
conceptualisations of Islam.403 As Beker writes: ―Christianity ingested Judaism 
almost whole, turning it into one of the basic building blocks of European culture. 
                                                 
400 Beker, The Chosen : The History of an Idea, the Anatomy of an Obsession, 39.  
401 Peters, The Magician, the Witch, and the Law, 13. 
402 As Bale writes: “Extrabiblical anti-Semitic stories and topoi, largely developed from the twelfth 
century, were a staple of the wider devotional lives of late medieval English Christians: the Jewish 
grotesque appeared in ecclesiastical art, in personal devotional artefacts, in civic drama, in 
vernacular literature.” Anthony Bale, 'Christian Anti-Semitism and the Intermedial Experience in Late 
Medieval England,' in The Religions of the Book : Christian Perceptions, 1400-1660, ed. Matthew 
Dimmock and Andrew Hadfield (Basingstoke [England] ; New York, 2008), 24 
403 Consider Goldberg: “...the primary objection of medieval Christians to Islam was stated in 
theological terms – that is, in terms first of the absence of miracles from Muhammad‟s experience in 
contrast with Christ‟s, and second in terms of the emphasis on the Trinity as basic to Christian 
theology and its denial in the Islamic. Similar sorts of distinction were seen to define the differences 
between Christian and Jew. These doctrinal differences, in turn, were taken by medieval Christianity 
as signs of the cultural (or moral) incapacity of others to reap the fruits of salvation. In short, medieval 
exclusion and discrimination were religious at root, not racial.” Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy 
and the Politics of Meaning, 24. 
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But at the same time, the Church found it necessary to stamp the old religion as null, 
void, surpassed, and of no further consequence.‖404  
With respect to morality, the distribution of early modern values to the ‗others‘ 
encountered initially during the Age of Exploration was mediated via cultures 
possessed of churched orientations; in particular, a predominantly Catholic Church 
which claimed the material authority to preside over ‗moral‘ conduct. The notion of 
what was ‗moral‘ was implicitly tied to concepts of ‗justified‘ domination (on the 
basis of perceived ‗barbaric‘ behaviour of the ‗others‘), and the imperative to spread 
the Christian gospel. First contact, to follow Tzvetan Todorov, occurred in a 
―...transitional period between a Middle Ages dominated by religion and a modern 
period that places material goods at the top of its scale of values.‖405 At the lower 
end of the scale, the main organising category for otherness was derived from 
Christendom, the division between pagans and believers; at the upper end of the 
scale, the natural order of the Great Chain of Being, which derived from within 
Christianised Greek philosophy (notably, recalling Aristotle) and had formidable 
explanatory power.406 As Kenan Malik writes:  
―Man‘s relation was fixed to God and to nature. The world was ordered 
according to God‘s will and true knowledge was available only to the 
Supreme Being... In an age when witches were burnt because they were 
‗different‘, fear of the unknown led to irrational suspicions about people who 
spoke a different dialect... worshipped a different God or had a different 
colour skin.‖407 
 
The Great Chain of Being, a static interpretation which proceeded from divine 
ordinance, dictated that ―...the process of assimilation in practice meant a collapsing 
of diverse cultural types and histories into a single hierarchic conception of anthropos 
and concomitantly, human civility.‖408 Conceptions of ‗the other‘ therefore, were 
formulated according to an absolutist, universalistic, hierarchical and static 
                                                 
404 Beker, The Chosen : The History of an Idea, the Anatomy of an Obsession, 41. 
405 Cited in John Mandalios, 'Being and Cultural Difference: (Mis)Understanding Otherness in Early 
Modernity,' Thesis Eleven, vol. 62:  (2000), 93. 
406 Ibid., 97. 
407 Kenan Malik, The Meaning of Race : Race, History and Culture in Western Society (Basingstoke, 
UK, 1996), 44. 
408 Mandalios, 'Being and Cultural Difference: (Mis)Understanding Otherness in Early Modernity,' 93. 
P a g e  | 108 
 
cosmology, yet one which could not reconcile difference in human associations.409 
Thus, as a result of this difficulty, plus the fact that the historicism of the Bible had 
not yet been challenged, medieval Christians fell back equally on the division 
between the believer and the pagan for classificatory and justificatory purposes. The 
dispute between monogenetic and polygenetic origins was not yet resolved, and 
increased ocean travel contested the previously held beliefs that ‗lesser‘ or ‗savage‘ 
peoples (such as the Celts, Africans, Mongols etc.) had simply migrated across land 
masses – the origin of the people of the America‘s and the basis for their humanity, 
for example, was incredibly difficult to ‗explain‘. As John Mandialos notes:  
―From Aristotle to Leibniz the plurality of the human as well as natural life 
forms was conceived primarily in terms of a great hierarchy of beings... 
[which] posed major implications for the way in which significant 
civilizational encounters in the early stages of modernity unfolded... The idea 
of a subhuman being, who did not completely manifest either the attributes of 
a human soul or an ‗animal soul‘, created formidable problems...‖410  
 
The politics of discrimination and exclusion normative to Greece and Rome had 
embedded the notion of ‗humanity‘ within a polis, in which slaves, barbarians, and 
(to a lesser degree) women, were represented as culturally inferior; that is, lacking the 
virtue [arete] essential to citizenry within political space.411 According to Mandalios: 
―...man [was] a political animal who could only realize himself as a rational and 
communicative being within the public life of the polis, i.e. civility, civic virtues and 
the establishment of a polity were necessary prerequisites for full inclusion into the 
human Oikoumene.‖412 The Greeks had possessed no concept of race per se, but 
conceived of relations between disparate groups entirely in political, as opposed to 
biological, terms.413 Spirit and intelligence were thought to combine to create a 
                                                 
409 Ibid., 93-94. 
410 Ibid., 92, 101. 
411 “As a general category of discriminatory sociolegal exclusion, barbarianism was the invention of 
fifth-century Hellenism. A barbarian was one of emphatically different, even strange, language, 
conduct, and culture and lacking the cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. 
The principle distinction was political.” Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of 
Meaning, 21. Arete, as in virtue, or the culmination of an individual‟s human potential. 
412 Mandalios, 'Being and Cultural Difference: (Mis)Understanding Otherness in Early Modernity,' 100. 
Oikoumene, as connected to the oikos or household, as come to refer to a household within the 
„inhabited world‟, from which the modern notion of ecumene derives. 
413 Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 21-22. 
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capacity for governing other people – those who did not possess this were thought of 
as inferior.414   
In contrast, individuals and groups were perceived within European medieval 
thought according to mythological and theological constructions of otherness.415 As 
Goldberg writes: ―...the exotic people of the Middle Ages were referred to as monstra 
(monstrous)...  on one hand, the prophetic but awful births of defective individuals, 
and on the other, strange and usually mythological people...‖416 The implied threat 
from strangers, as mediated through this lens, translated into debates as to whether 
they possessed souls and could be saved, whether they were rational, and if they had 
the capacity for ‗civilised‘ behaviour, which translated into whether they could be 
successfully ‗governed‘.417 Furthermore: ―This defining of humanity in relation to 
rationality clearly prefaces modernity‘s emphasis on rational capacity as a crucial 
differentia of racial groups.‖418 Medieval categories of inclusion and exclusion mirror 
later racial categorizations, though – as within classical conceptions – there was not 
yet any formal acknowledgement of ‗race‘ as such.419 Goldberg describes the 
transition as follows:  
                                                 
414 Ivan Hannaford, Race : The History of an Idea in the West (USA, 1996), 53. Hannaford also writes, 
of the transition from Greek to Rome: “As Voegelin shows, the principle idea that the Romans brought 
forward from Greece and put into practice in much larger units of human association is not to be 
confused with the modern liberal democratic notion of popular participation in the activity of state, as 
so many modern theorists infer.  For Rome, the principle idea was the politics was a way in which 
human beings in a mortal existence could reconcile the different beliefs, traditions, motives, and 
interests according to the best procedures and practices of the Aristotelian nomocratic model. The 
emphasis was not democratic, but eunomic [roughly translated, as „of good order‟].” Ibid., 63. 
415 Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 22. 
416 Ibid., 22. 
417 Ibid., 23. 
418 Ibid., 23. 
419 Ibid., 23. This is evident in the following historical anecdote from Biddick. “On 18 February 1366, 
Lionel Duke of Clarence, third son of Edward III, presided over an Irish parliament that passed the 
Statures of Kilkenny. These statutes, which expressed deep anxiety about the Gaelicization of the 
Anglo-Irish, gathered together and codified a series of prohibitions against the mixing of the Anglo-
Irish with the Irish. Most saliently the statutes produced a notion of racial purity by proscribing, under 
pain of excommunication, any intimate Anglo-Irish alliance with the Irish, whether it be by marriage, 
godparenting, fostering of children, concubinage, or sexual liason…  a racializing moment, rather than 
an ethnicizing one, since they prohibited marriage between various Christians and denied the Irish 
entrance into English monastic communities. The statutes thus define both domestic and spiritual 
miscegenation and in so doing fabricate blood as a juridical substance… The statutes juridically 
constituted Englishness, even at the expense of „Christianness.‟” Biddick also notes that the statutes 
legislated language law (Anglo-Irish were forbidden to speak Gaelic), customs such as fashion and 
style of riding, the „Englishness‟ of ecclesiastical space, and so forth. Kathleen Biddick, 'The Cut of 
Genealogy : Pedagogy in the Blood,' Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, vol. 30: 3 (2000), 
453. 
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―The generic image of the savage represented violence, sexual license, a lack 
of civility and civilization, an absence of morality or any sense of it. Thus, 
with the... interiorizing of the moral space in late medieval thinking, the 
savage... came to represent the wild man within – sin or lack of reason, the 
absence of discipline, culture, civilization... morality – that confronts each 
human being.‖420 
 
Goldberg writes that the concept of race was gradually codified in the late fifteenth 
century, coterminous with the exploration and acquisition of imperial possessions 
(other lands) by European powers.421 ‗Race‘ was loosely defined in the same sense as 
‗root‘ – that is, a vegetable metaphor alluding to races as ‗of different roots‘ which 
‗took‘ in different geographic ‗soil‘, and as signifying a ‗genus, species, breed or stock 
of animal‘ (circa 1580-1605).422 The ―...absolutized moral distinction between good 
and evil,‖ as Rosemary Ruether writes, reified the differences between light and dark 
skin colour: ―On one side stands Pure Spirit, Pure Goodness and Truth, which 
Christianity identified with God; on the other side, ‗brute‘ matter that also comes to 
be seen as the principle of evil.‖423 This conflation of spirit with the daemonic, and 
‗the other‘ is, to paraphrase Latour, the exportation of the human/non-human 
distinction into a human/human discourse of radical alterity.424  
The identification of ‗positive‘ concepts of ‗light‘, ‗beauty‘, ‗intelligence‘, ‗truth‘, 
‗strength‘, ‗purity‘, ‗goodness‘ etc., with both whiteness (white skin) and God, meant 
that ―...the negative aspects of that dichotomy,‖ as George Sefa Dei and his co-
authors write, ―...have been reserved for the savage and exotic other. The visibility, 
or rather, invisibility of Whiteness positions ‗them‘ as the repository of civility and 
knowledge…‖425 Whiteness itself is primarily a metaphysical distinction which is 
                                                 
420 Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 23. Consider also Mandalios: 
“...nakedness, lawlessness, propertylessness, cannibalism, incest, licentiousness and disease-
susceptible bodies... gave rise to notions of a Wild Man who was in kind closer to the beasts that the 
species of the civilized European... they manifested characteristics... that were antithetical to the 
European self-image of Man... traceable at least as far back as Solon…” Mandalios, 'Being and 
Cultural Difference: (Mis)Understanding Otherness in Early Modernity,' 100. 
421 In addition: “The earliest recorded usage of the term occurs in 1508, in a poem by William 
Dunbar.” Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 62. 
422 Ibid., 62-63. 
423 Ruether, 'Dualism and the Nature of Evil in Feminist Theology,' 27, 31-32. 
424 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 97. 
425 Dei, Karumanchery, and Karumanchery-Luik, Playing the Race Card : Exposing White Power and 
Privilege, 87. 
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difficult to historically locate: it is an ambiguous Christian subject that possesses a 
‗whiteness‘ of Spirit and thus, a civilising power, because, in many instances, power 
was appropriated by early Europeans who are identified only retrospectively as 
‗white‘.426 The racialised body is primarily a natural and social conflation of 
assumptions which amount to ‗not White‘, which derive from biological racism and 
other non-biological distinctions such as uncivilised, pagan, and so forth. Whiteness 
is more of a respondent discourse than a primary self-designation, in that it is always 
posited against the notion of the other. The power of racialised discourse is therefore 
generated and maintained defensively. In Goldberg‘s terms: ―Racial knowledge 
consists ex hypothesi in the making of difference: it is in a sense [and paradoxically] 
the assumption and paradigmatic establishment of difference. An epistemology so 
basically driven by difference will ‗naturally‘ find racialized thinking comfortable; it 
will uncritically (come to) assume racial knowledge as a given.‖427 What has 
occurred, through the process of early European exploration, and later, a colonial 
spirit that was absolutely saturated with Christian morality, is the normalisation of 
racial discriminations which occur through these dialectics of alterity, especially 
through moral, or value-laden, contrasts.  
The combination of elements which contributed to the modern classification and 
hierarchical division of human subjects into value-laden categories rely, according to 
Goldberg, upon five central inheritances. Classical virtue, inherited from Greece and 
Rome; evil and sin, which are basic within medieval Christian thought, and upon 
which morality is contingent; autonomy and obligation, as proposed within the 
Enlightenment shift to secular ethics; utilitarianism, as proposed by 19th century 
bureaucratic and philosophical treatises; and rights, which derive from universalistic 
and individualistic moral concepts, as applicable to the modern citizens of nation 
states.428 It is from these, Goldberg surmises, that the modern conception of race and 
                                                 
426 The particularly racial mixtures and facts of skin colour appropriate to the countries from which 
these early explorers came is no longer always considered to be „white‟, so it is critical to separate the 
notion of historical „whiteness‟ from the fact of skin colour. 
427 Furthermore: “Power is exercised epistemologically in the dual practices of naming and evaluating. 
In naming of refusing to name things in the order of thought, existence is recognized or refused, 
significance assigned or ignored, beings elevated or rendered invisible... Naming the racial Other, for 
all intents and purposes... [denies] all autonomy to those so named and imagined, extending power, 
control, authority, domination over them.” Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of 
Meaning, 150. 
428 Ibid., 14. 
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associated racial discourses – including those of ‗culture‘, ‗ethnicity‘, ‗nationalism‘, 
‗indigeneity‘, ‗the Third World‘, ‗developing nations‘, and so on – derive. Drawing 
upon Foucault, he writes:  
―The political economy and culture... act upon the categories employed, 
and... inform the knowledge being produced. By furnishing assumptions, 
values, and goals, this economy and culture frame the terms of the 
epistemological project. Once produced, the terms of articulation set their 
users‘ outlook. Epistemological ‗foundations‘, then, are at the heart of the 
constitution of social power.‖429 
 
What occurred within the Age of Enlightenment and thereafter supplied the 
classificatory ‗glue‘ which has come to co-ordinate the elements of this 
epistemology; though the underlying ethical base has remained explicitly Judeo-
Christian. It was via the transference of the discourse of election to modernity that the 
explanatory mechanisms of science eventually attained primacy over religious 
equivalents.430 As suggested previously, what is understood as ‗modern science‘ may 
find historical precedents in Greek, Roman, Islamic, and Renaissance thought, but it 
is primarily the fields of natural philosophy and natural history which shaped it. 
Thus, election was transferred through the mediating discourses of shifting 
nature/culture and nature/human relations as biology and geology became 
independent from clerical influence as late as the nineteenth century.431 Darwin is 
central here, as it was his attempt to understand creation which led to the theory of 
evolution.432 
In addition, the fusion of the philosophy underpinning the Great Chain of Being 
with the value-laden contrasts internal to Christianity had prefigured the specific 
                                                 
429 Ibid., 149. 
430 Note also: “If there is no single „relationship between science and religion‟, if each faith tradition 
has encountered the sciences in very particular ways, and if neither „science‟ nor „religion‟ has even 
had a stable meaning across time, then it becomes extremely difficult for a discussion to take place 
about common experiences and shared concerns…  [yet] historians efforts have been directed almost 
exclusively towards the destruction of conflict narratives.” Thomas Dixon, 'Introduction,' in Science 
and Religion New Historical Perspectives, ed. Thomas Dixon, Geoffrey Cantor, and Stephen Pumfrey 
(Leiden, The Netherlands, 2010), 13. 
431 “The nineteenth century saw the baton of authority pass from those pursuing the religious 
vocation to the new breed of scientist. As historian A.W. Benn observed firsthand, „[a] great part of the 
reverence once given to priests and to their stories of an unseen universe has been transferred to the 
astronomer, the geologist, the physician, and the engineer.” Peter Harrison, ''Science' and 'Religion' : 
Constructing the Boundaries,' in Science and Religion New Historical Perspectives, ed. Thomas Dixon, 
Geoffrey Cantor, and Stephen Pumfrey (Leiden, The Netherlands, 2010), 28. 
432 As noted by thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011. 
P a g e  | 113 
 
hierarchical and classificatory system that is unique to modern thinking. Within 
Enlightenment thought, skin colour was connected to rational ability, which 
proposed innate distinctions (especially those which were mentally conceived as 
‗lower‘ or ‗higher‘) to explain perceived behavioural disparities.433 The shadow of 
biological racism, despite the egalitarian ethic of the Enlightenment, was never quite 
overcome.434 Subjugation of those deemed hierarchically lower was enacted 
according to religious presumptions. The first distinction was the subjugation of 
nature (as per Biblical instruction) by the human intellect.435 Secondly, subjugation 
of the racialised others through colonial, physical, and cultural domination, as 
justified largely by the colonial right to autonomous governance, utilitarian means, 
and the moral obligation to ‗improve‘ (or progress), which, by default, included 
moral improvement via the Christianisation of colonised subjects.436 The third 
subjugation was enacted via economic superiority through the mastery of the laws of 
the market,437 which was driven by a renewed focus on intense ‗worldly activity‘ 
(following Weber) after the Reformation; thus, invigorating the teleological and 
eschatological thrust underpinning continued ‗progress‘.438 As Goldberg writes: 
―The confidence with which the culture of the West approached the world... 
is reflected in the constructs of science, industry, and empire that principally 
represented the wealth of the period... This recovered confidence was both 
expressed in and a consequence of the epistemological drive to name the 
emergent set of conditions, to analyse... catalog, and map them. The 
                                                 
433 Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 28. 
434 The key to understanding the persistence of this particularism is the Romantic backlash against 
the Enlightenment, Romanticism being defined as several different and fragmentary strands of 
thought which both drew upon, and reacted against, Enlightenment precepts. Tradition, instinct, 
community, nation, and the importance of the collective over and above the individual were central 
components in the development of a racialised discourse. Johann von Herder, in particular, 
maintained that every situation, historical period, and civilization was possessed of a „unique 
character‟ (the volk) which was expressed through its spirit and history (volksgeist). Unintentionally, 
von Herder thus invigorated the very specificity of culture (later, to become ethnicity) which the 
egalitarianism of the Enlightenment had sought to cancel out. Malik, The Meaning of Race : Race, 
History and Culture in Western Society, 73-79. 
435 Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 29. 
436 Ibid., 29. 
437 Ibid., 29. 
438 Weber‟s Protestant Ethic thesis argued that the difficulty of determining election by grace or 
works, so relevant to the religious wars of the early modern period, may have been overcome by the 
early modern focus on an „intense worldly activity‟ aimed towards dispersing religious doubts, 
guaranteeing grace, and counteracting feelings of anxiety. Combined with the emerging individualism, 
the ability to own property, accumulate wealth, distribute information, increase literacy, etc. that 
followed the Protestant Reformation, it is not difficult to observe that „intense worldly activity‟ quickly 
became a means to an end, in and of itself. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
112. 
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scientific catalog of racial otherness, the variety of racial alien, was a 
principal product of this period.‖439 
 
The discourse of election was central to these subjugations in that it configured 
relations between humanity, and an elect authorising and elevated figure upon 
whom responsibility for maintenance of the cosmic order rested. This is patently 
religious in terms of both structure and outcomes. Furthermore, not only is the 
sovereign elect, but the subjects upon whom edicts (dominating discourses of all 
kinds) are conferred are also elect, in that they are part of a chosen community, and 
thus, may retain the privilege of being selected for the exception, which it is the 
exclusive right of the sovereign to grant.440  
The transfers of authority occurred as election shifted from humanity‘s relation with 
a transcendent all-knowing God, then a local all-knowing and all-powerful 
sovereign, to, by special dispensation via said sovereign, the superior discourses of 
scientific inquiry. The Jews had possessed exceptional status under their God. During 
the Middle Ages and through to the Enlightenment, the Christians of Europe and 
similar countries possessed exceptional status under both God and his earthly 
                                                 
439 Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 29. Further: “The paper world… 
did not simply provide a means for accumulating and storing what everyone knew. Rather it was a 
matter of inventing the conceptual means for coordinating the bits of geographical, biological, 
mechanical and other forms of knowledge acquired from many sources into an adequate and 
common frame of reference. This common frame of reference became the theoretical model into 
which local knowledge was inserted and reorganised. This is the sense I believe in which Western 
science of that period acquired the distinctive property of being theoretical science.” David R. Olson, 
The World on Paper : The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading (New York, 
1994), 232. 
440 Power over the exception represents ultimate authority. Consider Schmitt: “Sovereign is he who 
decides on the exception… It is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty, 
that is, the whole question of sovereignty…  If the individual states no longer have the power to 
declare the exception… then they no longer enjoy the status of states.” Schmitt, Political Theology : 
Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, 5-11. Giorgio Agamben has historically situated the 
precedent in Rome: the iustitium, which literally means „standstill‟ or „suspension of the law‟. In this 
reading, citing Nissen (1877), Agamben writes “...the iustitium „suspends the law and, in this way, all 
legal prescriptions are put out of operation. No Roman citizen, whether a magistrate or private citizen, 
now has legal powers or duties.‟” Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (USA; London, 2005), 40-51. 
Thus, if the state of exception is, by designation, applicable to those for whom the law does not apply, 
then it is a kind of grace, but may also constitute a withdrawal of rights, as administered by the 
sovereign or state. In the Jewish example, the „special‟ or elevated character attributed to the Jewish 
people was attached to both privilege and obedience – God possessed absolute power to determine 
the exception. Exceptionality is rendered here as specifically related to divine election (as opposed to 
the political-legal connotations it possesses within Schmitt, Agamben, and others) for the reason that 
sovereignty and exceptionality appear to have a much broader influence that a purely political reading 
allows. Consider Taubes, as cited in de Wilde, for whom the intersection of sovereignty and 
exceptionality ultimately constitutes a „separation of friend and foe‟. Such a reading is therefore 
interpreted as being isomorphic with the self/other distinction discussed herein. de Wilde, 'Violence in 
the State of Exception : Reflections on Theologico-Political Motifs in Benjamin and Schmitt,' 193. 
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representative, the sovereign. Citizens of a modern nation state, particularly those 
considered to be ‗Western‘ are no less privileged, provided (which is true of all the 
above instances), the moral conduct proscribed by the authorising agency is adhered 
to without question. However, to follow Goldberg, because the ―...colonising of the 
moral reason of modernity has been effected... by constituting racial others outside 
the scope of morality‖,441 the type of moral conduct inherited by modernity is already 
compromised.  Adhering to the ‗law of the land‘ henceforth requires secularity, and 
conduct befitting ‗white‘ citizens, which is by proxy, adherence to the dominant 
epistemic structures and networks of power institutionalised in accordance with 
these. The ideals of equality and autonomy hinge upon the notion that rational 
subjects recognise common interests,442 and therefore, the moral person and the good 
citizen become conflated and attached to the obligation for moral improvement, vis-à-
vis compliance with moral (read: Christian, Western, secularised) norms. These 
norms include the awareness of categorical prerogatives and their equivalent 
disentitlements as understood from within a secular hermeneutic framework, 
especially within the public collectives.443  
Conduct befitting ‗white‘ citizens also derives from an evolutionary standard which 
aligns gradual ‗civilising‘ processes (as reliant on rational minds) with progress; 
specifically, consensual participation in the increased industrialisation and thereby, 
economic ‗development‘, which is seen to rely on secularity in order to maintain the 
fictional and humanitarian ‗world without violence‘, as discussed previously. 
Evolution, though presumed to be absolutely scientific, and thus, ‗objective‘, 
internalises moral distinctions via the application of gradiated stages of human 
progression, which culminates in the goal of the eventual elimination of religion as 
the opposite pole to ‗rational‘ thought. Despite the claims of the social sciences to 
have moved ‗beyond‘ evolutionary modes of thinking, political and economic 
‗progress‘ still relies on ‗development‘ as a central model, and ‗religion‘ as a central 
problematic or obstacle to progress. The stages of progression are thought broadly to 
advance from animism, to polytheism, to monotheism, to atheism, to scientific 
                                                 
441 Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 39. 
442 Ibid., 17. 
443 This last observation with regard the „secular hermeneutic framework‟ courtesy of thesis 
supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011. 
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rationalism; the latter two being covert forms of monotheism, which remains 
structurally predominant within the transcendental modern state. 
As the contemporary authorising agencies of such states continue to reproduce the 
religious/other, and modern/traditional binaries in various forms, exclusionary 
politics await application at the moment of making public whatever variance is to be 
confessed (or observed), at which point exceptional status may be withdrawn. 
Several variances may act as a priori designators of exclusion: the visibility of race or 
ethnicity (specifically, colour), the visibility of religious observance (on which point the 
French have recently been most emphatic), and/or a location which is outside the 
episteme, though not necessarily outside the imagined territory of ‗the West.‘444 In 
accordance with the logics particular to modernity, these act as permanent 
exclusions.445 In the language of exorcisms, modernity has been structured as if the 
pagan and religious others were already eliminated, though their continued presence 
requires ongoing mediation: the pagan and religious others may remain ‗in the 
territory‘, yet are not included ‗on the map‘. Inclusion depends, to borrow from 
Niklas Luhmann, on the manner in which humans are ‗indicated‘, or made relevant 
in communication;446 thus the equality of voice problem is linked to not only to 
compliance with social norms, but is also reliant on the elimination of difference. Those 
who are permanently excluded do not always possess the ‗right‘ to ‗indication‘. The 
ideals of modernity are not hospitable to difference but, in line with universalistic 
Enlightenment thinking, prioritise utility; thus requiring an ethic of toleration, which 
attempts to impute rational meaning to inequality.  
                                                 
444 This last designation includes liminal spaces within modern Western countries, such as churches, 
marae, natural food or health stores, or other spaces labelled similarly; and conversely, may not apply 
to „Western‟ spaces (such as McDonald‟s, or an internet cafe) in otherwise liminally designated 
countries. 
445 This follows the same logic as with Christianity. Consider Zizek: “What the Christian all-inclusive 
attitude (recall St Paul‟s famous „there are no men or women, no Jews and Greeks‟) involves is a 
thorough exclusion of those who do not accept inclusion into the Christian community.” Slavoj Zizek, 
Violence : Six Sideways Reflections, 1st Picador ed. (New York, 2008), 46. 
446 Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (California, 1995), 241. Furthermore, in Luhmann‟s scheme, the 
differentiation of society may block total inclusion by establishing different rules for different societal 
institutions, e.g. successful economic inclusion may not automatically result in political or educational 
inclusion. Additionally, exclusion from one system invariably leads to exclusion from others. e.g. In 
some parts of India, children cannot be enrolled in school if their families live on the street and have 
no permanent address. Ibid., 259. Whilst I agree with this point about exclusion, I disagree with the 
first – differentiated societies are perhaps over-inclusive, in the sense that once counted within one 
system (e.g. education) a person is statistically represented as having membership in all regulated 
systems and is thus, accountable, responsible, and/or culpable on multiple levels. 
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As Gray notes, toleration is grounded in the acceptance of the imperfectability of 
humankind. It is also ―...unavoidably and inherently judgemental. The objects of 
toleration are what we judge to be evils. When we tolerate a practice, a belief or a 
character trait, we let something be that we judge to be undesirable, false or at least 
inferior; our toleration expresses the conviction that, despite its badness, the object of 
toleration should be left alone.‖447 The alternative, when toleration is deemed to be 
impossible, is an apocalyptic that has now ‗gone global‘. Gray writes that, in the 
twenty-first century, spectacular violence is almost commonplace, and the 
justifications, once again, echo the theological: ―The ‗war on terror‘ is another 
version of the secular faith in the evanescence of evil‖,448 an ironically violent 
promise that freedom and safety will be conferred only upon the condition of faith or 
trust being extended to the benevolent governmental powers which rule on who has 
the right to life or death: that is, power over the exception.449 
Brian D. McLaren considers these politics of inclusion and exclusion to be fatally 
flawed.450 He writes: 
 ―In this view, to put it baldly, God plays favorites, electing some and 
rejecting others, calling some to grace and condemning others to despair… 
God could be expected within this scenario to act on behalf of his favorite 
people without regard for the dignity, well-being, or even survival of those 
who were not so chosen. The historic injustices done by Christians to Native 
Americans and African slaves in the Americas, to Jews by anti-Semitic 
Christians across the centuries, and to Palestinians today in the Middle East, 
                                                 
447 Gray, Enlightenment's Wake : Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, 28. Further: 
Gray considers the abolishment of prejudice, like the Marxist project of transcending alienation, an 
epistemological impossibility, and thinks we should reconsider prejudice as inevitable and be 
prepared to curb its expression where it has demonstrably harmful effects.  He writes: “In general… 
we should guard against the harmful effects of prejudice, not by engaging in the futile attempt to 
eradicate it, but by trying to ensure that everyone has the same civil and personal liberties. A policy of 
toleration… will even be one that tolerates the many false beliefs we have about each other – 
providing these do not result in the deprivation of important liberties and opportunities. When 
prejudice does have such an effect, it is usually the liberties and opportunities it threatens that we 
should aim to protect, rather than the prejudice we should seek to eradicate.  The argument so far, 
then, is that we will do better if we seek to rub along together, tolerating each other‟s prejudices, 
rather than attempting the impossible task of ironing them out from social life.” Ibid., 41. 
448 Gray, Heresies, 12. 
449 The inherent power of determination of the exception and its relation to culture, race, and religion, 
is discernible in several modern examples: the „return of the camps‟, counter-terrorism legislation and 
policy, increased focus on border controls, military interventions legitimated by humanitarian ethics 
and international law, Guantanamo Bay, etc. See Jef Huysmans, 'The Jargon of Exception - on Schmitt, 
Agamben and the Absence of Political Society,' International Political Sociology, vol. 2:  (2008). 
450 Brian D. McLaren, 'Chosen for What?,' Tikkun, vol. 23: 3 (2008), 60. 
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all flow, in part, from this dangerous misunderstanding of what it means to 
be God‘s chosen or elect.‖451  
 
To take McLaren further, the influence of the doctrine of divine election was never 
limited to Christianity (though it is still covenantally upheld by many, if not all, 
Christians), but generates an evangelistic fervour towards conversion that now 
underpins globalisation and the chief discourses of development and modernisation 
as a means of salvation. The notions of both election and salvation remain present 
within modernity but paradoxically, sans God: the ultimate authority (formerly) 
capable of judging both what election means and what achieving salvation requires. 
To draw upon the work of Gerrit Berkouwer:  
―Soteriology is immediately evoked by and connected with an emphasis on 
God‘s free will. If we separate these two from each other we can speak of 
election on in an abstract manner. Our salvation is then causally and 
objectivistically ‗derived‘ from God‘s sovereignty, and the consolation of 
election gives way to a powerless submission which cannot be distinguished 
from submission to destiny and fate, and in which the Savior of the world can 
no longer be detected.‖452  
 
The damnation of the pagan other, who is separated from the grace of God and must 
be ‗saved‘, has evolved to become the damnation of the cultural or religious 
neighbour who is self-othered by either their failure to comply, or their ‗ignorance‘ of 
the benefits of compliance. An inordinate percentage of the world‘s people are 
presently living in the shadow of the consequences of this ‗ignorance‘, often in 
extreme poverty. The evolutionary trajectory which underpins this exclusion 
determines that, according to the underlying mission of proselytisation, the ‗other‘ 
(of whatever marginalised or ‗deviant‘ persuasion) ought to be ‗saved‘ by the fruits of 
a messianic modernity. The moral injunction determining precisely how this 
salvation is to be achieved was just as questionable in the hands of Christian 
colonialists as with the bearers of globalisation: both elect, and both interpreters of 
morality on behalf of a partially exorcised sovereign God.  
                                                 
451 Ibid., 60. 
452 Gerrit Cornelius Berkouwer, Divine Election, Hugo  Bekker trans. (Michigan, USA, 1960), 12-13. 
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It is also possible that salvation via modernity is blocked for those who display any of 
the visible signs of variance. As Goldberg notes, and this can be extended beyond 
race to include all such marginalisations:  
―In the case of discriminatory exclusions it can be concluded... that what the 
moral order fails to explicitly exclude it implicitly authorizes... So though the 
formal principles of moral modernity condemn and discourage some racist 
expressions, they fail, and fail necessarily, to condemn and discourage such 
expression exhaustively. Indeed, where they fail in this way, they extend 
discriminatory racialized expression either indirectly and inadvertedly by 
seeming to condone and approve what they do not explicitly disapprove, or 
directly by enabling racialized expression and effectively authorizing 
discriminatory racial exclusions on the basis of the principle of moral reason 
itself.‖453  
 
As religious, and especially, racial prejudices run extremely deep in modern 
societies, albeit under the guise of seemingly controllable ‗ethnic‘ prejudices, the 
double shift that is required to accommodate epistemological positions which are 
neither white nor Christian poses an enormous challenge.454 The ‗double‘ or 
‗contradictory‘ consciousness of racialised and post-colonised positions also blocks 
this hospitality, in that the racialised other may have internalised exclusionary 
politics to the point of normalisation.455  
                                                 
453 Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 39. 
454 Goldberg notes that the production of social knowledge about the racialized other establishes a 
library or archive of information which prefigure a set of guiding ideas and principles about otherness; 
characteristic behavior or habits, and predictions of likely responses. Additional, the other may be a 
subject of study, but only as informant, as a representative translator of culture. This set of 
representations thus confines those defined by the constraints of the representational limits, 
restricting the possibilities available to those rendered racially other as it delimits their natures. The 
„locations‟ of the other (prisons, cities, ghettos, and so on) become „laboratories‟ for testing the 
epistemological precepts. Literature, art, languages, and general cultural expression of these ‟others‟ 
are appropriated as proper objects of „scientific‟ evaluation; judged not as works among works of art 
in general, but expressions of otherness, and representative of the cultural condition and mentality – 
thus reifying and condoning the processes of marginalisation. For instance, artifacts are not art, 
primitive formulations are not rationally ordered linguistic systems, and so forth. Ibid., 150-151. 
455 For theoretical history of this idea see W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (Millwood, New 
York, 1953), Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Harmondsworth, UK, 1967).  Frantz Fanon, 
Black Skin, White Masks, 1st Evergreen Black Cat ed. (New York, 1968). Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-
Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Consider this example from Sefa 
Dei, which signals both an unsettling gratitude at recognition, and gratitude with regard inclusion: 
“Resistance... means seeing „small acts‟ as cumulative and significant for social change. As one of my 
Caribbean-born, African graduate students wrote, „I can‟t tell you how affirming it is to see „patois‟ in 
the books I am evaluating for my thesis. A few years ago, this would never have been possible... The 
fact that these languages make their way into texts at all is a phenomenal act of resistance.” George 
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In summation, the formerly Christian, ex-Judaic, privileges of election, transcendent 
power, moral authority, and soteriological promise were relocated, via modernity, to 
a new rational worldview that rapidly became hegemonic. In effect, all theological 
derived transfers now central to modernity were transformed from being internal 
components of Christianity to being internal components of the new scientific 
modern worldview simultaneously with this final shift of authority. The transition of 
authority from God to the new scientific worldview abandoned theism, then deism, 
for a theo-scientific logic in which humankind would possess ultimate power and 
control through knowledge of creation and consequence.456 To borrow a metaphor 
from Harrison: a new myth of power in which science was the victor arose as 
‗Galileo finally overcame the Inquisition‘.457 The heirs of Galileo, then, inherited the 
clothes of the Inquisitors.458 Whilst science and technology made the manipulation 
and transformation of nature possible, capitalism supplied the economic tools, and 
Christianity, the hidden justifications, to exploit the rest of the world.459  
According to Charles Taylor, prior to the shift ―...God was the ultimate guarantee 
that good would triumph and the forces of darkness would be held at bay.‖460 
Thereafter, although God was gradually erased as science, technology, and the 
transcendental state powers became authoritative, the promise of this remained; albeit 
concealed within an ideology that became progressively more persistent with the 
next few hundred years. The twist is that the precise point wherein Christianity and 
the Judeo-Christian God were dismissed as ‗unnecessary and primitive explanatory 
devices‘ (to be quickly eclipsed by Enlightenment science), the attempt was made to 
confine ‗religion‘ to its own sphere: a clearinghouse for the irrationalities of the other 
                                                                                                                                                
J. Sefa Dei, 'Rethinking the Role of Indigenous Knowledges in the Academy,' International Journal of 
Inclusive Education, vol. 4: 2 (2000), 128-129. 
456 Tambiah suggests that our overreliance on employing technological means for organising our 
space has resulted in a kind of „moral cul-de-sac‟. He writes that: “...the “technical sciences” that we 
have allowed to proliferate may not be able to deliver the best moral rules we wish to live by.” 
Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality, 151. 
457 Harrison, ''Science' and 'Religion' : Constructing the Boundaries,' 29. 
458 Poetic turn of phrase attributed to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011. 
459 Carolyn Merchant, Reinventing Eden: The Fate of Nature in Western Culture (New York, USA, 
2004), 77. 
460 Charles Taylor warns also that the story of modernity is not just a story of loss, or subtraction. He 
writes: “...what happened between 1500 and 2000? …The key difference we‟re looking for between 
our two marker dates is a shift in the understanding of what I called „fullness‟, between a condition in 
which our highest spiritual and moral aspirations point us inescapably to God, one might say, make 
no sense without God, to one in which they can be related to a host of different sources, and 
frequently are referred to sources which deny God.” Taylor, A Secular Age, 26. 
P a g e  | 121 
 
‗outside‘, and the other ‗within‘. Modern ‗Western‘ Christians became ‗once-
removed‘ from the secular modern (which became the sole arbiter of the messianic 
thrust), and the ‗others‘ were defaulted to the twice-removed category of not-
Western, and not-Christian.461 Yet, as the Christian roots of science had determined 
its moral and epistemological orientations, the deity was erased in name only, 
appearing to have been shifted by sleight-of-hand into this new sphere, though the 
transfer was incomplete. The God of the Jews, adopted by Christians and 
overthrown by science, thus became the most significant ghost to haunt the modern 
episteme.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
461 Thus, the „map‟ of modernity is often twice-removed from the „territory‟ it is purported to represent. 
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EXORCISM 4: THE BIRTH OF THE MIND 
―Every truth passes through three stages before it is recognized.  
In the first place it is ridiculed. In the second it is opposed.  
In the third it is regarded as self-evident.‖ 
Attributed to Arthur Schopenhauer, 1788-1860.462 
 
―What I tell you three times is true.‖  
The Hunting of the Snark, Lewis Carroll, 1874.463 
As Raimundo Panikkar writes: ―Historical man stands alone in the world theatre – 
without Gods or other beings, living or inanimate...  If some still accept God, he is 
transcendent, impassive, perhaps good for another life, but certainly not about to 
meddle in human affairs. God has left the world to the strivings of Men.‖464 
Prefiguring the context within which the final ‗exorcism‘ in this sequence can be 
understood, Panikkar argues that the world we inhabit has rendered the ‗forces‘ 
described by belief as impotent, innocuous, and subservient to human reason: ―If at 
all, they are energies to be studied by psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, 
parapsychologists... and so forth‖:465 in short, by the sciences of the mind. Yet spirit 
and mind (psyche) remain intrinsically related, as evidenced by the etymological 
history provided by Jean-Michel Rabaté: ―From the Greek pneuma or psyche, from 
the Hebrew ruah, all suggesting ‗breath‘ and ‗wind,‘ to the Latin spiritus or the 
German Geist – a term that is never far… from ghost on the one hand and gaz on the 
other hand… a whole prehistory of our spectral delusions remains possible...‖466  
To recall the sequence, whilst the first three exorcisms attempted to reclassify gods as 
spirits in the context of classical Greece and Rome, early modern Europe, and 
European expansion throughout the world (replacing the local gods with the Judeo-
                                                 
462 Despite an exhaustive search, an original and un-paraphrased source for this citation has 
remained elusive. Cited from the opening pages of Christian De Quincey, Radical Nature : 
Rediscovering the Soul of Matter, 1st ed. (Montpelier, Vermont, 2002). 
463 Lewis Carroll, The Annotated Hunting of the Snark,, ed. Martin Gardner (New York, 1976). 
464 Raimundo Panikkar and Scott Eastham, The Cosmotheandric Experience : Emerging Religious 
Consciousness (USA, 1993), 106. Panikkar, now 75, is a particularly well-respected transdisciplinary 
scholar – Eastham, in the cited work, introduces him as follows [sic]: “You are told that his father was 
Indian and Hindu and his mother Spanish Catholic, that he holds doctorates in the sciences, 
philosophy and theology, that he speaks about a dozen languages and writes books and articles in at 
least six. As if this were not enough, he himself says, „I “left” as a christian, “found” myself a hindu 
and “return” as a buddhist, without having ceased to be a christian.‟” ibid., v. 
465 Ibid., 106. 
466 Some italics added, some in original. Explanation of term provided by Rabaté citing Mallarme, Les 
Mots Anglais: “…gaz, from the Flemish GEIST, which corresponds to our esprit, as does GHOST in 
English.” Rabaté, The Ghosts of Modernity, xxi, 102. 
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Christian God), this last exorcism appears as an attempt upon the Judeo-Christian 
God (and all residual claims for the reality of spirits or gods) within the Modern.467 
This last attempt is also further localised, in that it deals with whatever residual 
beliefs may ‗contaminate‘ the individual. Unstable or unseen phenomena – already 
rejected by science and loaded negatively with anti-Christian sentiment – were 
collapsed entirely into the unconscious and relegated to psychology (and its siblings); 
generating multiple biomedical ‗management models‘ to deal with any irregularities 
relevant to an individual‘s ‗correct‘ perception of the world.468 Furthermore, 
although the individual may accept the scientific concepts of ‗mind‘ and hold these 
ideas in parallel with religious or cultural beliefs (as ‗explanatory devices‘), the 
dominant epistemology employed within modernity mandates that only the former 
retains any validity. This position is reinforced through the various legal and medical 
systems (or institutions) which supply the classificatory tools whenever belief ceases 
to be socially ‗benign‘.  
Bennett Simon, in his history of psychiatry, asks a revealing question: ―Does all of 
religious experience and all religious phenomena pertain to the history of 
                                                 
467 This attempt must be thought of as the legacy of Protestantism, which upheld the right of self-
interpretation. In addition, all of these exorcisms therefore possess a special relationship to each 
other, in that they supply interconnected means for the on-going removal of religion from public life at 
the global, local, and individual levels. Global „eruptions‟ of spirit are mediated by politics and war, in 
service to the twin goals of progress and capitalism, most especially when the irrational religion of 
„the other‟ ceases to remain „contained‟. Locally, societies which are predominantly „Western‟ identify 
eruptions of spirit through signifiers such as culture, ethnicity, religion – catch-all categories to watch 
in the event that the private becomes public. Individually, the mind is cultivated, socialised, educated, 
and marginalised or „treated‟, perhaps institutionalized, if unacceptable „eruptions‟ are observed. 
Furthermore, Christianity in its modern forms continues to operate at all levels, colonising 
consciousness wherever the project of modernity appears to have come unstuck. Similarly, world 
church-based charity organizations distribute very specific forms of education and healthcare.  
468 Such incorrect perception is thought to lead to incorrect behaviours, which contributes to the 
already existing rhetoric on „religious violence‟. Though religio-cultural beliefs and practices often 
escape being publically derided as such, they have come to be tacitly classified as a component of 
„rights‟ only up until the point where they are judged as intrusive upon the „public‟ sphere. This 
distinction often spills over into legislation pertaining to the designated private sphere, especially in 
countries where cultural and religious differences are perceived to contribute to increased violence 
within private households, often against women, children, homosexuals, and animals. There is also a 
gendered component, in that the perpetrators claiming or requesting exclusion from punishment 
under the local law are generally heterosexual men. Cultural difference and religious violence can 
become entangled in such situations. Although in some of these instances the designation of 
„religious violence‟ is certainly warranted, the use of the term in the media is often shorthand for what 
amounts to misunderstood „cultural difference‟. 
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psychiatry?‖469 His conclusion is yes. In Simon‘s terms, the common assumption is 
that the history of the mind sciences begins with Greek and Roman thought, not just 
as a single ―...current in the stream that becomes modern psychiatry, but [as] the 
caput Nili, ‗the head of the Nile.‘‖470 Yet, the construction of a ‗history‘ of psychiatry, 
citing origins in Greece and Rome, occurs in the nineteenth century as an attempt to 
create an ―…illustrious and interesting past… sometimes by way of showing how far 
we have come from a primitive and naïve view… sometimes to show that our 
seemingly modern concept has indeed the authority and dignity of millennia behind 
it.‖471 Like the scholarly interrogation of the witch trials, what are now referred to as 
the sciences of the mind are the products of a unique epistemological ‗break‘ which 
obscures their cultural origin; again, as derivative from the Judeo-Christian nexus of 
beliefs. 
Whilst the core ways of thinking about the mind are indeed derived predominantly 
from ancient Greek thought (perhaps extending even further back in time), the 
interpretation of these ideas within the medieval ‗period of revival‘ was perpetually 
subject to the religious gaze.472 As noted previously, the Hippocratic corpus became 
pivotal for medieval and early modern scholars who sought to determine the 
codification point of ‗philosophical‘ (as opposed to ‗superstitious‘) medical inquiry 
in Greece. Hippocrates decried magic, yet elevated the ‗mental‘ aspects of disease 
and correlated these with physical phenomena, although, as Simon argues, ―...this 
model... never entirely removes a place for the divine either in causation or cure of 
mental disturbance.‖473 As church scribes in the medieval era had a choice as to 
whether to focus on the differences or similarities between their own perspectives and 
the vast number of ‗religious‘ beliefs and practices detailed by hermetic texts, their 
manner of selection becomes central. Debray‘s view is pertinent: ―A historical milieu 
                                                 
469 Bennett Simon, 'Mind and Madness in Classical Antiquity,' in History of Psychiatry and Medical 
Psychology with an Epilogue on Psychiatry and the Mind-Body Relation, ed. Edwin R. Wallace and 
John Gach (New York, 2008), 179. 
470 Ibid., 175. 
471 Ibid., 177-178. 
472 Consider: “The history of psychiatry, therefore, must include the study of the interplay in any given 
age between what is considered „official‟ or „scientific‟ or „medical‟ knowledge (including the methods 
of study that are deemed appropriate to those forms of knowledge) and other forms of knowledge 
that those holding the keys to „scientific‟ knowledge consider „superstition‟ or „folk medicine.‟” ibid., 
180. 
473 Italics added. Ibid., 176. 
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of transmission crystallizes concretely in, and through, the socialized operators of 
transmission...‖474 Furthermore, citing de Certeau, he adds: ―They select, make 
available and control the dynamos of information; they render it desirable and 
assimilable, they are the active agents of its appropriation and transformation.‖475  
With respect to Hippocrates, for instance, the ‗creation of ancestry‘ occurred very 
early, as Simon notes: 
 ―Hippocrates as the ―father of medicine‖ was a creation of physicians 
writing some three to five centuries after he lived, practiced, and wrote 
whatever few works of his own that we may actually have. As the work of 
Wesley Smith has shown, Galen, in the second century C.E., in particular 
was responsible for elevating Hippocrates to this status and thereby 
canonizing him. Galen had his own reasons in terms of needing to justify and 
elevate his own theories, and there is also the distinct possibility that Galen 
created a particular Hippocrates out of several possible (and somewhat 
contradictory) available notions of Hippocratic medicine.‖476 
 
Hippocrates, therefore, was already a representation by the medieval era, so his 
second representation and appropriation during the medieval and early modern 
periods (as termed paradigmatic, recalling Tambiah)477 needed only to be further 
harmonised with natural philosophies – by-products of both ‗Galenesque‘ and 
Islamic influences – in order to offset the religious view. Demonic possession, which 
was already mandated against by the churches, was reconfigured in Hippocratic 
treatises as an ‗impossible superstition‘, thus, complementing the religious position. 
The notion that healers could mediate in situations where unusual or disturbed 
mental states were observed, was superseded by prayer, petitions to saints, and 
official versions of exorcism; all acceptable within the Christian framework.  
The shift towards a ‗modern‘ view and what were to become the ‗neurological 
sciences‘ must begin with Rene Descartes, who is often lauded as a ‗founding father‘ 
of the scientific revolution for his attempts to deal conclusively with the ‗mind-body‘ 
                                                 
474 Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 16. 
475 If the original work by de Certeau were in English, as opposed to French, it would be cited directly. 
As it is not, Debray‟s citation will have to suffice. Ibid., 16. 
476 Simon, 'Mind and Madness in Classical Antiquity,' 181. 
477 Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality, 9-10. 
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problem.478 Duane Schultz writes that: ―During the Christian Middle Ages the 
dominant concern was with the eternal salvation of the... [immortal] human soul... 
as divorced from the body and composed of an immaterial substance always striving 
to unite with God.‖479 In contrast, Descartes‘ approach was a physical-psychological 
one in which mind and soul were possessed of an ‗insubstantial‘ or ‗free‘ quality 
which were ‗diffused‘ throughout, and thus, could ‗interact‘, with the body.480 The 
difficulty, as later critics have been keen to point out, is that Descartes never decided 
upon the means by which this occurred, creating, in John Cottingham‘s terms, a 
―...nest of problems that were to become notorious stumbling blocks for Cartesian 
philosophy‖.481 However Descartes never omitted God from his philosophy, and 
though he supported Reason, the application of his senses to problems with which 
he was enamoured (and their solutions) were the endowment of a benevolent deity,  
and are therefore characteristic of the shift to deism.482 
The other major attribution scientists and philosophers make to Descartes is the 
adoption of a ‗mechanised‘ view of the body. Schultz argues that the success of 
Descartes‘ concept must be linked to a zeitgeist that was ‗ready‘ for a mechanised 
worldview: the idea of predictability was attractive, and there was considerable 
enthusiasm in general for machines leading up to the industrial revolution.483 The 
                                                 
478 Schultz, citing White, writes that: “Descartes was condemned by Catholics and Protestants alike. 
Since Roger Bacon, perhaps, no great thinker had been so completely abased and thwarted by 
theological oppression.” Duane P. Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology (London, 1969), 15.  
479 Ibid., 16. 
480 Ibid., 16. 
481 John Cottingham, The Rationalists, A History of Western Philosophy (Oxford, UK, 1988), 124. 
482 Deism is the attempt to harmonise early science, focused on the natural world, with religious 
beliefs, and is intimately connected with the removal of „gods‟ from nature. The world became „alive‟ 
as the creation of the Judeo-Christian God in a way which has persisted as an „awe‟ to be found in 
nature for its own sake – „the Ionian Enchantment‟. 
483 Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology, 17. It is possible that the inspiration for this enthusiastic 
appropriation of a „mechanised‟ worldview was taken from China, as argued by Joseph Needham in 
the twentieth century. In Fara‟s words: “One of Needham‟s coups was to rewrite the timescale of 
human invention… Most famously, Needham‟s table [of Chinese innovations] includes the magnetic 
compass, and printing – placing them all in China and giving them earlier dates. As he point out, the 
Silk Road not only enabled exotic goods to travel westwards, but also encouraged the migration of 
technological and agricultural products…  Needham argues that China needed to be reassessed – 
instead of being a scientific backwater steeped in ancient mysticism, Chinese civilization had be 
technologically vibrant and way in advance of Europe‟s during the so-called Dark Ages. By studying 
China… Needham queried the very nature and origins of science in Europe. Writing to convert rather 
than to convince, Needham introduced the heretical notion that modern science is not uniquely 
Western but is „ecumenical‟, depending on local truths which flow into it like rivers into the sea. In 
particular… traditional Chinese knowledge made vital contributions to the scientific enterprise of 
producing universal knowledge.” Fara, Science : A Four Thousand Year History, 49. As to the reasons 
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notion that the functions of the body could be explained using this type of 
reductionist logic has never entirely been overcome. The model of the heart as a 
‗pump‘ is still derivative of the nineteenth century fascination with steam engines, 
which contrasts with the electromagnetic and neural components central to heart 
function. Nor has a type of Cartesian dualism been transcended, despite popular 
claims it has been entirely enveloped by monist views. In Descartes‘ opinion, 
humans were physical machines with a ‗mind-soul‘ that was absolutely distinct, 
thereby establishing the ground upon which the notion of a ‗secular mind‘ could be 
later founded. This absolute distinction between a transcendental mind and body 
mirrored the theological gap between humankind and a transcendental Christian 
God; thus, the dualism which underpinned psychology had, from the onset, the 
familiarity necessary to become a logical epistemological replacement discourse. In 
addition, Descartes‘ idea (posed scientifically) that animals do not possess souls and 
are thus, automata (or machines that move themselves), preserved the chasm 
between humans and animals that was integral to Christian thought.484 For 
Descartes, thought exists: cogito ergo sum, and humans were the creations of a deity 
who was in control of a radically infinite universe.485 
Despite Descartes‘ noted religious perspectives and theological solutions, Margaret 
Wertheim notes: ―To many of his peers Descartes seemed to have written God out 
of the universe in any meaningful way... yet many scientists of the seventeenth 
century wanted to accept some form of mechanism... What they wanted, in effect, 
                                                                                                                                                
why science took a different form in Europe, consider Nicolescu: “My idea… was in fact that the 
Christian way of thinking, with making distinctions and with the idea that this world is here for us to 
take advantage of and to dominate, was the background of modern science. Europeans were able to 
think about nature, a fact that China refused to do. China refused to cut things, to cut slices of reality. 
European thinking, founded on Christian religion, adopted the method of slicing reality. We saw 
emerging the idea that by slicing reality with mathematical methods we will generate the process of 
understanding all reality. I discovered later that Hans-Georg Gadamer had the same view on the 
European origin of modern science.” Russ Volckmann and Basarab Nicolescu, 'Transdisciplinarity : 
Basarab Nicolescu Talks with Russ Volckmann,' Integral Review : A transdisciplinary and transcultural 
journal for new thought, research, and praxis - http://integral-review.org/index.asp, vol. 4:  (2007), 
79. 
484 Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology, 17. 
485 The notion of an infinite universe marked an absolute shift from „steady-state‟ conceptions 
common in the Middle Ages; in fact, it was the key heretical feature underlying Giordano Bruno‟s trial 
and subsequent burning in 1600. Margaret Wertheim, The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace : A History of 
Space from Dante to the Internet (London, 2000), 145. 
P a g e  | 128 
 
was a more Christian machine.‖486 Thomas More, Isaac Newton, and others, were 
therefore responsible for making acceptable, within just two centuries, the notion of 
an infinite formless universe pervaded by infinite void space that was, in Newton‘s 
terms: ―...God‘s ‗sensorium‘ – the medium through which the deity exercised His 
all-seeing eye and His all-encompassing power.‖487 This is the central pivot point for 
the notion of a transcendentalist power which can be re-located, re-attributed, and 
secularised, as occurred relatively quickly following Newton‘s death. Wertheim 
writes:  
―...while the divinization of space had been psychologically necessary to 
overcome initial resistance to infinity... a theological view of space was not in 
truth necessary to the new cosmology. ...in the eighteenth century... we 
witness the spectacle of less religiously inclined scientists stripping away the 
theological frills from his system. By the middle of that century the new 
cosmology had been almost totally secularized, and it is this essentially 
atheistic Newtonianism that has come to dominate the modern West. In the 
end, the anti-Cartesians were right: Mechanism leads almost inevitably to an 
atheistic world picture.‖488 
 
Wertheim‘s conclusion is that it is the ‗homogenisation‘ of space –  a scientific view 
which accommodates only one possible reality – which has finally reduced Western 
philosophical thought to appear as a singularity in which there is no ‗room‘ for any 
kind of ‗spiritual space‘.489 The consequence of this is the inevitable collapse of 
Heaven and Hell and the loss of any celestial ‗location‘ for God: in Euclidian space, 
Heaven and Hell become ‗empty symbols‘.490 As Wertheim writes: ―...from the late 
seventeenth century on, the... physicalist vision has been invoked as a powerful 
epistemic scythe to hack off anything that could not be accommodated into the 
                                                 
486 Italics added. Ibid., 146-147. Descartes, in the words of Thomas Berry, was the „master magician‟ 
who plunged humanity into a darkness of disconnection with the natural, from which the edifices of 
modern civilisation emerged. Berry cites the division of the world into a collection of objects, rather 
than a communion of subjects, the separation of res extensa from res cognitans, as the foundational 
event which determines our contemporary relationship to the world around us. Thomas Berry, 'Into the 
Future,' in This Sacred Earth : Religion, Nature, Environment, ed. Roger S. Gottlieb (New York, 1996), 
410.  
487 Wertheim, The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace : A History of Space from Dante to the Internet, 150. 
488 Ibid., 150. 
489 Ibid., 151.  
490 Ibid., 152-153. 
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materialist conception of...  reality [which] has come to be seen as the physical world 
alone.‖491  
Essential to this physicalist conception was the discovery of the ‗neurological body‘, 
in which the conflation of mind-soul attributed to Descartes begins to merge with a 
replacement discourse which conflated mind and brain. As Foucault notes, there was 
a double absence of the body and the cure in psychiatric practice of the nineteenth 
century,492 which left ‗madness‘ outside the field of ‗medical practice‘ and located it 
in the realm of religion, or as a kind of physical phenomenology. Neurology 
represented the beginning of a process of localisation of madness within the brain, 
which was vital for the abolishment of ‗superstitions‘ and vague medical theories 
regarding madness. Foucault determines there to be a critical link between ‗madness‘ 
and ‗dreaming‘, drawing upon Moreau de Tours (1845), who postulated that sleep 
acts as a barrier between the internal and external life. Because the dreaming state 
can be empirically observed and reported upon, and as the content of dreams appear 
to conform with a pattern of ‗irrationality‘ or an absence of logic, the dream was said 
to ‗envelop‘ madness and enable its comprehension. 493 Furthermore, between 1860 
and 1880, a new definition of the body appears in which the notion of a body as 
‗organs and tissues‘ becomes a body with ‗functions, performances, and 
behaviours‘.494 As Foucault notes:  
                                                 
491 Ibid., 153. Consider Weber also: “Every increase of rationalism in empirical science increasingly 
pushes religion from the rational into the irrational realm…” Weber, Gerth, and Mills, From Max Weber 
: Essays in Sociology, 351. And commenting on Weber, Jenkins writes: “Weber is drawing our 
attention to the decline of magic… the presumption that… the world is embarked on a path at the end 
of which there will be no more mysteries.  All things are taken to be potentially capable of explanation 
in terms that are acceptable to the rationality of science, and susceptible to intervention the 
outcomes of which are predictable. As a result, religious and magical understandings of the world 
become at best charming, at worst, ignorant and backward.” Jenkins, 'Disenchantment, Enchantment 
and Re-Enchantment : Max Weber at the Millenium,' 15.  
492 Michel Foucault et al., Psychiatric Power : Lectures at the Colláege De France, 1973-74 
(Basingstoke, UK, 2006), 275. 
493 “the mad are waking dreamers”, Esquirol, cited in ibid., 282. Further: “In other words, the founding 
point was not Descartes, who said that the dream goes beyond madness and includes it, but Moreau 
de Tours, who put the dream in a position such that it envelops madness, includes it, and enables it 
to be understood. And following Moreau de Tours, the psychiatrist says, and the psychoanalyst 
basically never stops repeating: I can well understand what madness is, because I can dream. With 
my dream, and with what I can grasp of my dream, I will end up understanding what is going on in 
someone who is mad. This is in Moreau de Tours and his book on hashish.” Ibid., 283. 
494 Ibid., 288. “However, we must be clear here, because it is absolutely certain that, on the one hand, 
from the beginnings of the development of nineteenth century psychiatry, there was a search for 
organic correlations, the domain of lesion, the type of organ that might be involved in an illness like 
madness. There was the search for this, and in some cases it was found; in 1822-1826 it was Bayle‟s 
definition of general paralysis, and meningeal lesions as after-effects of syphilis. This is true, and we 
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―All of these clinical differences of performance between different levels of 
behavior make possible the clinical analysis of the individual at the level of 
his intention… the will, in fact, on which and to which disciplinary power 
had to be applied… Neuropathology now provides the clinical instrument by 
which it is thought the individual can be captured at the level of this will 
itself… [the] patient can be circumvented and short-circuited… So, neurology 
is… a new apparatus which replaces questioning with injunctions, and… 
seeks to get responses, but responses which are not the subject‘s verbal 
responses… [but] responses which can be clinically deciphered at the level of 
the body… Broadly speaking, the neurologist says: Obey my orders, but keep 
quiet, and your body will answer for you by giving responses that, because I 
am a doctor, I alone will be able to decipher and analyze in terms of truth.‖495 
 
As Foucault is concerned with power and the disciplinary mechanisms by which the 
individual ‗will‘ is controlled, the clinician, in his estimation, becomes elevated to a 
sovereign authority in matters of mind, which also involves elitist discourses that 
persist into the present day. State sovereign authorities then capitalise upon already 
existent networks and institutions which have elite leadership, or discourses, 
becoming ‗superstructural‘ in relation to a whole series of already existing power 
arrangements involving the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, 
technology, and so forth.496 ‗Truth‘, in this constellation of relations, is produced by 
virtue of multiple forms of constraint.497  
 
Psychoanalysis, which represents the Freudian strand of thought allied with 
psychology, is also significant in the creation of the modern ‗mind‘. Whilst Freud is 
preceded by Plato and Leibnitz with respect to the idea of an unconscious, his work 
hinged upon understanding behaviours which had eluded conventional 
psychologists. As Schultz notes, psychoanalysis developed as a type of revolt against 
those ‗somatic‘ (or organic, brain-based) explanations which dominated the mind 
                                                                                                                                                
can say that the body was no more absent from the psychiatric order than it was from standard 
medicine.” The significant shift occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Michel Foucault 
et al., Psychiatric Power : Lectures at the Colláege De France, 1973-74 (Basingstoke, 2006), 266. 
495 Italics added. Ibid., 302-304. 
496 Foucault and Gordon, Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, 
122. 
497 Ibid., 131. 
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sciences throughout the nineteenth century.498 Freud‘s work was characterised by its 
overwhelmingly introspective nature, as noted by Eli Zaretsky:  
―In the modern West there have been two episodes of genuine, widespread 
introspection: Calvinism and Freudianism…  Calvinism urged people to look 
inside themselves to determine whether they had been saved… Freudian 
introspection aimed to foster the individual‘s capacity to live and 
authentically personal life…  In both cases, finally, the turn towards self-
examination generated a new language. In the case of Calvinism, the 
language centered on the Protestant idea of the soul, an idea that helped 
shared such later concepts as character, integrity, and autonomy. The new 
Freudian lexicon, by contrast, centered on the idea of the unconscious, the 
distinctive analytic contribution to twentieth-century personal life.‖499  
 
Although the ‗individualisation‘ and elevation of the elites via the artistic excesses of 
the Renaissance paved the way for the increased individualisation that followed the 
Reformation (culminating in the modern ‗self‘), this self was still cosmologically 
situated. What Freud did, which was unique, was to merge the notion of the 
unconscious with the idea that it was personal, as opposed to the amorphous and 
cosmic unconscious already surmised by Gnosticism, medieval alchemy, and 
German Romanticism.500 The unconscious takes on the role and status of the soul.501 
To borrow from Charles Taylor:  
―The process of disenchantment is the disappearance of this world [of spirits, 
demons, and moral forces acknowledge by our predecessors], and the 
substitution of what we live today: a world in which the only locus of 
thoughts, feelings, spiritual élan is what we might call minds; the only minds 
in the cosmos are those of humans…; and minds are bounded, so that these 
thoughts, feelings, etc., are situated ―within‖ them.‖502  
 
The Freudian legacy (which as Zaretsky noted, links into Protestantism) was this 
concept of the distinctly personal: a combination of body-mind dualism and 
individualism which resulted in an individual self that was absolutely private. 
                                                 
498 Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology, 267-268. 
499 Eli Zaretsky, Secrets of the Soul : A Social and Cultural History of Psychoanalysis, 1st ed. (New 
York, 2004), 15. 
500 Ibid., 15-16. 
501 Idea attributed to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011. Consider also Freud‟s own words 
here: “All supposedly educated people have ceased to believe officially that the dead can become 
visible as spirits, and have made any such appearances dependent on improbable and remote 
conditions.” Freud, The Uncanny (1919), c.f. Gordon‟s response: ““Official suppositions give him 
away; Freud is not sure.” Both cites from Gordon, Ghostly Matters : Haunting and the Sociological 
Imagination, 31. 
502 Taylor, A Secular Age, 30. 
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Simultaneously, to recall Foucault, this same privacy is illusory by way of a 
medicalisation process which locates ‗truth‘ within the observable body-brain.503 This 
‗private‘ mind is also subject to disciplinary mechanisms of authorisation, which 
determine what may, or may not be, expressed, and by whom. The mind, despite 
appearing as a value-free construct, must therefore be viewed also as a political object 
and discourse. As an example, following the scientific ‗establishment‘ of an 
isomorphism between brain and mind, the two primary discourses which emerged 
were that of ‗hysteria‘ and ‗madness‘; both, often sexualised and determined as 
‗deviant‘. A plethora of discourses on ‗deviant‘ behaviour subsequently emerged, 
many of them moral ascriptions, which were nonetheless accommodated by the new 
mind sciences.504  
Once the agency of the individual was superseded by the physical and mechanical 
epistemology pertinent to the body, and more specifically the mind-brain, all 
explanations could be located by the recourse to mind as 1) a priori existing, and 2) as 
first cause. The very concept of ‗mind‘, therefore, contains within it a series of 
propositions which are internally agreed with just by acknowledging the existence of 
‗mind‘. This epistemological territory is shaped, as in all scientific inquiry, by facts 
and values which are combined to create the so-called ‗value-neutral‘ sciences of the 
mind and a host of practices (such as diagnostic tools) which accompany it. 
However, in the attempt to correlate mental phenomena with brain states, any 
anomalies are not admitted as data, but remain excluded; thus, structuring the 
episteme that is attached to ‗mind‘ in a very specific way. Sub-disciplines of ‗mind‘ 
                                                 
503 Once behaviour had been categorised as a product of mind within the brain, the default to 
pharmacological mechanisms of control took less than a century to become entrenched. 
Deinstitutionalisation, which is the conclusive action which reifies the location of the mind (and thus, 
mental illness) as within the brain, started in the 1950s and continued throughout the 1960s. 
Psycho-pharmacology also developed quickly following World War II, and has subsequently become a 
normative control for mental behavior classified as anti-social, or involving an increased risk of self-
harm, harm of others, or, more recently, personal psychic comfort. Psychoanalysis, though respected, 
eventually lost „respectability‟ as a scientific method and was overshadowed by the dominance of 
somatic psychological medical practices which have since gained and retained this authority. 
504 Whilst there is certainly a notion of being „of a deranged mind‟ or „madness‟ in antiquity, key to this 
discussion is the confluence of categories within the scientised model, so that religion or cultural 
epistemologies may at any time be shifted into the realm of deviance. All kinds of marginalisations 
and exclusions work together and can be conflated (including divergence from the temporal 
normative model e.g. working 9-5) – prostitution, drug use, rock stars, mad folk, sexual deviants, etc., 
all working „under the cover of night‟ as opposed to „clean-living‟ day-folk. The sexualisation of all 
kinds of deviance (as formulated by Freud, and interrogated by Foucault) should not be 
underestimated. For example: the criminal or rapist is probably a black, young, drug addict with no 
religion, who frequents bars, has no job, and sleeps late. 
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(such as parapsychology) exist to continue the attempt to deal with these anomalies, 
but are epistemologically blocked from attaining any results which could be deemed 
‗successful‘. The anomaly cannot be admitted because it ‗breaks faith‘ with the 
ideologies of modernity, altering the trajectory of progress (optimally leading to 
secularisation) and disrupting the cumulative successes of ‗Western‘ (scientific) 
thought.505 The knowledge filters in operation are still very much constructed out of 
a Judeo-Christian heritage, and data that fits into neither an acceptable chronology 
nor an empirically testable category becomes clustered under ‗belief‘ and remains 
metaphysically uncertain.  
The birth of the mind, therefore, could only occur at the expense of the reality of the 
soul, and, eventually, via the death of God: belief in whom was ultimately seen as 
the antithesis of a Reason which must be upheld.506 Marx‘s writing is particularly 
characteristic of this kind of thinking, thus, to expand Marx via Voegelin:  
―‗The critique of religion is the pre-supposition of all critique.‘ God was never 
anything but a human product. The critique of religion yields this revelation 
and thereby restores man to the fullness of his nature... ‗The summons to 
abandon illusions about his condition is a summons to abandon a condition that 
requires illusions. The critique of religion is therefore in embryo the critique of the 
vale of tears of which religion is the halo. The struggle against religion is 
therefore indirectly a struggle against that world of which religion is the 
spiritual aroma.‘ It is therefore the task of history, ‗once the world beyond truth 
has disappeared, to establish the truth of this world...‘‖507 
 
The issue of ‗truth‘ and its association with the secular, and now scientific, logos 
appears self-evident in this citation. Yet despite appearing secular, the discourses 
                                                 
505 The status of any data set as rational or irrational is often less to do with scientific judgment as it 
is to do with mediation of knowledges and power relations. The epistemological limits or borders of 
modernity are maintained against the influx of „orphans‟ en masse. This general strategy is structured 
into the institutional arrangements themselves. Consider Chakrabarty (as paraphrased in 
Pouchepadass): “The overarching general language of science, which pretends to mediate between 
the infinite diversity of particular languages, effectively suppresses cultural differences which, by 
essence, are untranslatable…  In other words, the problem of capitalistic modernity should not any 
longer be seen as a sociological problem of historical transition, but as a problem of translation as 
well.” Jacques Pouchepadass, 'Review : Pluralizing Reason,' History and Theory, vol. 41: 3 (2002), 
384. 
506 Reason and God thus became mutually exclusive, as the location of Reason, is of course, found 
within the mind itself.  
507 Emphasis Voegelin‟s. Marx cited in Voegelin and Henningsen, The Collected Works of Eric 
Voegelin: Modernity without Restraint, 284-286. See also Marx: “…the criticism of religion is the 
premise of all criticism.” From Contribution to a Critique of Hegel‟s Philosophy of Law, 1844, in Neil J. 
Smelser, ed., Karl Marx on Society and Social Change (USA, 1973). 13. The argument could also be 
made (via the Frankfurt School) that theology is the criticism (and therefore, self-reflexivity) of religion. 
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attached to psychology et. al., have never been detached from the Western ethical 
structures of a post-Christian modernity which upholds monogamy, is based on the 
Ten Commandments, and is imbued with particular notions of sin/evil (and the 
soteriologically-based mandates which are attached to these). Neither the loss of 
Heaven and Hell, nor the loss of the certainty of God, changed the categories by 
which behaviour was ordered and controlled. Mind as an a priori first cause can be 
thought of as having replaced God in the cosmological order; and the unconscious 
as the only possible realm of enchantment, though remaining dangerously close to 
madness. Thus, the post-Christian (secularised) human community is separated first 
from God, and then from each other, and finally, atomised and isolated within 
bodies and minds that remain utterly separate from each other. Nihilism, alienation, 
apathy, and fundamentalism(s) become understandable in the wake of such an 
epistemological break. Luhmann encapsulates this sense of apathy: ―...calls for 
revolutionary action have become wholly archaic: ‗it is not possible to make 
revolution any more. There is no aim, no objective, no centre, or no top of the 
system which you could eliminate and then you would have a good society.‖508  
Yet the exorcism remains an ‗attempt‘ because the recourse to mind is by no means 
universally accepted as a ‗truth‘. How knowledge about ‗normal‘ and ‗abnormal‘ 
behaviour is constructed is entirely reliant on the type of priorities and religious (or 
anti-religious) inclinations that were inherent to the inquiries into ‗mind‘ throughout 
this period of modern history. As there is no room, to recall Wertheim, for any 
legitimate ‗spiritual space‘ in this atheistic conception of reality, what is excluded 
may be tolerated, but is nonetheless deemed (officially) not to ‗exist‘. In the words of 
Panikkar: ―Man… has spread the net of his intelligibility like DDT and killed all the 
intermediary beings he cannot master with his mind – the spirits, once his 
                                                 
508 Italics added. Luhmanns view is ultimately in support of a „functionally differentiated‟ society, He 
suggests it represents a „radical contrast‟ to totalitarianism. To read him through Borch: “Whereas 
totalitarianism is characterised by centring society on one of few systems (either politics or religion), 
with all the associated misfortunes (e.g. lack of independence and functional specialisation), a 
functionally differentiated society accepts the independence of the systems and uses this feature… 
not only for purposes of specialisation, but also as a democratic resource.” Luhmann cited in 
Christian Borch, Niklas Luhmann (London; New York, 2011), 95. What is missing from Luhmann‟s 
analysis is the recognition that it is precisely religion which characterises global society. In his attempt 
to create a cohesive theory for sociology, he has committed the error of ignoring the anomalies in 
order to keep the data „clean‟ – thus, whilst his observation with regards differentiation is logical, it is 
perhaps idealist to set this opposite totalitarianism in the manner he presents it. 
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companions, are no longer credible, the Gods have flown, and a solitary and even 
more superfluous God fades away.‖509  
Culturally, this poses a great difficulty for non-Western knowledge paradigms, 
which are often possessed of non-differentiated religio-medical practices. To follow 
William LaFleur, tracing the initial divide between medicine and religion as a point 
of pride among Christians:  
―...trust in the use of modern medicine became an index to the difference 
between a civilization with ‗enlightened‘ religion... and the rest of the world. 
A major difference in paradigms of the body and in healing modes became... 
[central] to what was seen as the uniqueness and superiority of Christianity. 
The connections between this view of religious difference, the empirical 
success of modern medicine, and Western colonizing moves were 
intimate.‖510 
 
The uniqueness and superiority of this Western, Christian, Modern culture (to which 
a medical layer is now added) was simply transferred to the sovereign transcendental 
and secular state(s) and institutions in toto. As Talal Asad writes: ―At the very 
moment of becoming secular, these claims were transcendentalized, and they set in 
motion legal and moral disciplines to protect themselves (with violence where 
necessary) as universal.‖511 All hospitals, governments, schools, universities, court-
rooms, banks, shops, factories, unions, newsrooms, prisons, and so on which 
                                                 
509 Panikkar and Eastham, The Cosmotheandric Experience : Emerging Religious Consciousness, 41. 
Consider Asad also, whose thoughts complement the historical trajectory of this argument well: “From 
early modern Europe – through what is retrospectively called the secular Enlightenment and into the 
long nineteenth century, within Christian Europe and its overseas possessions – things, words, and 
practices distinguished or set apart by “Nature Folk” [others] were constituted by Europeans as 
„fetish‟ and „taboo‟. What had been regarded in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in theological 
terms as „idolatry‟ and „devil-worship‟ (devotion to false gods) became the secular concept of 
„superstition‟ (a meaningless survival) in the framework of eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
evolutionary thought. But they remained objects and relations falsely given truth status, wrongly 
endowed with virtuous power. They had to be constituted as categories of illusion and oppression 
before people could be liberated from them, as Freud knew when he used „fetish‟ and „taboo‟ to 
identify symptoms of primitive repressions in the psychopathology of modern individuals.” Asad, 
Formations of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 35. 
510 Italics added. William R. LaFleur, 'Body,' in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor 
(USA, 1998), 41. As LaFleur argues however, the same point of pride taken in the „modern miracles‟ 
of science has been transformed into shame by the atrocities of the Third Reich, Hiroshima, 
Chernobyl, Thalidomide, and so forth. He writes: “The specter of man-made atrocities hovers closely.” 
Ibid., 43. Also consider Serres: “Science‟s rise to power supposes such a level of recruitment that 
soon, all-powerful, it creates a vacuum around itself.  Which is the reason for the sudden decline of all 
the surrounding areas of culture – the humanities, arts, religion, even the legal system.  Science has 
all the power, all the knowledge, all the rationality, all the rights, too, of course, all the plausibility or 
legitimacy, admittedly – but at the same time all the problems and soon all the responsibilities.” 
Serres and Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, 87. 
511 Asad, Formations of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 36. 
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conform with, or are modelled upon, the Western epistemological structure, are 
instruments of this culture. Secular modernity is an entirely spectral construct. 
Modernity is Judeo-Christian, and secularity as an apparatus of modernity is Judeo-
Christian, and any debates which appear as a binary between modernity and religion 
are constructed for what are usually political ends.512 As Gray writes: ―Of all modern 
delusions, the idea that we live in a secular age is the furthest from reality.‖513 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
512 Madan writes: “…once a cultural definition of a phenomenon or of a relationship (say, between 
religion and politics, or society and the state) has crystallized, it follows that subsequent formulations 
of it, whether endogenous or exogenous, can only be re-definitions. Traditions posit memory.” Madan, 
'Secularism in Its Place,' 754. 
513 Gray, Heresies, 41-42. 
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Part IV: Conclusions  
The reliance of the epistemological structures of modernity on the „successful‟ execution of these 
exorcisms is not to be underestimated, illusory though it may be. The proponents of modernity 
claim as „history‟ the elimination of competing gods and spirits by the agents of Christianity, 
followed by the swift dethronement of the Christian God himself. These are the victories via 
which the authority of the episteme has secured power, and the sources from which the secular 
institutions, including liberal humanitarian democracies, derive confidence. What is at stake is 
the singularity of Truth: dependent, to cite Asad, upon “...the subjection of all practices to a 
unified authority, to a single authentic source which [can] tell truth from falsehood.”514As with 
Christianity, the maintenance of authority within modernity relies upon a very particular leap 
of „faith‟ – one that is coercive – a fourth and final „hidden‟ exorcism, or illicit transfer, which 
reifies this claim of „success‟ and establishes Foucault‟s „threshold of epistemologization‟ for 
modernity itself. This fourth exorcism occurs when the historical process is „black-boxed‟, a 
term coined by Latour to describe the means by which discursive processes become sealed off 
and hidden, leaving only a „fact‟ or „settled truth‟ which is subsequently considered a priori;515 a 
transfer which converts a culturally and historically situated discourse, involving multiple truth 
claims and levels of inquiry, into fact (or „knowledge‟). Consequently, the dogma of positivism 
is now shaping our „secular priesthood‟, with its doctrinaire insistence that science has the 
explanation for all things,516 and an epistemological dominance which appears 
overwhelming.517 The energy and messianic thrust of modernity are generated through the „cold 
fusion‟ of secularity and science which „fixes‟ the limits of truth (to return to Arendt) through 
legitimacies derived from history, and justifications based on the ideal of „progress‟. As May 
writes: “Science, Nietzsche had warned, is becoming a factory, and the result will be ethical 
nihilism.”518 So – in the words of Latour – where then, do we land?519 
 
                                                 
514 Asad, 'Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz,' 244. 
515 Bruno Latour, Science in Action : How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (USA, 
1987), 1-17. 
516 Phillips, The World Turned Upside Down : The Global Battle over God, Truth, and Power, 263-264. 
517 As McLennan writes: “…why be worried about having a justificatory epistemology in the first place 
if one were not concerned to establish superior validity or objectivity?” McLennan, 'Feminism, 
Epistemology and Postmodernism: Reflections on Current Ambivalence,' 396. 
518 Rollo May, Existence : A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology ([New York], 1958), 36. 
519 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 128. 
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CONCLUSIONS 1: SECULAR MODERNITY 
(Tertium non Datur)520 
 
―Did they get you to trade your heroes for ghosts? 
Hot ashes for trees? 
Hot air for a cold breeze? 
Cold comfort for change? 
And did you exchange your walk on part in the war 
For a lead role in a cage?‖ 
Wish You Were Here, Pink Floyd, 1975.521 
If modernity is culture, then what, precisely, does this entail? Any relativisation of 
said culture reveals, to borrow from Bruce Robbins, that it is not a universal, but 
‗particular content‘ which ―...has been throwing its weight around under cover of 
positions either for or against... large abstractions.‖522 The categories of ‗secularity‘ 
(with its internalised Christianity), ‗religion‘ and ‗culture‘ (as clearinghouses for the 
‗irrational remnants‘ of history and conquest), and ‗relativism‘ itself (which, in its 
usual contextual position, can neither command power nor muster influence against 
the dominant episteme), must all be considered ‗trojan horses‘ which placate and 
conceal. None of the above are ‗unmarked terms‘, but obscure the demand for 
rigorous adherence to one permissible kind of truth which blocks the very ‗freedom‘ 
promised under the auspices of modernity.  
This ‗truth‘, in Homi Bhabha‘s terms, is nonetheless ―...informed by the 
ambivalence of the process of emergence itself, the productivity of meanings that 
construct counter-knowledges in medias res... within the terms of a negotiation... of 
oppositional and antagonistic elements.‖523 The sequence of exorcisms as failure, 
therefore, bolsters the truth claims of a scientised and secularised modernity in a 
paradoxical, yet equivalent relation with, the claim of success which reifies them. The 
dialectical relationship between these two elements, though contrary to the 
epistemological structure they support, conforms to Arendt‘s conception of the 
                                                 
520 Latin. “No third possibility exists.” „Tertium Non Datur‟, Oxford English Dictionary Online, Third 
Edition, (2010), retrieved 26 January 2011. 
521 Pink Floyd, Wish You Were Here (USA, Canada, Europe, 1975). 
522 Robbins seems to be paraphrasing Ernesto Laclau (1995) on postcolonialism here, with 
substantial modification. Bruce Robbins, 'Race, Gender, Class, Postcolonialism : Toward a New 
Humanistic Paradigm?,' in A Companion to Postcolonial Studies, ed. Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta Ray 
(USA; UK, 2000), 562. 
523 Homi K. Bhabha, 'The Commitment to Theory,' New Formations, vol. 5:  (1988), 8. 
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theology of the dialectic.524 She notes that both elements in any dialectical 
relationship are in a negotiation wherein even the negative (theologically, evil) 
becomes a force in service of ‗the good‘: neither obedience to the invisible powers, 
nor disobedience (generally, revolution), will materialise an exit from the dialectic. 
The proposed exit is by way of an ‗epistemological break‘ with the dialectical forces 
of modernity as sought by scholars such as Derrida, Serres, and others, who refer to 
a ‗third‘ position. If the theological basis for the dialectic fails to be properly 
reconciled with then this ‗third‘ possibility remains blocked, and the dialectical 
forces continue to transform what appears as ‗revolution‘ into either ‗failure‘, or 
‗reform‘. Post-colonial scholars and critical educators come up against this difficulty 
when proposing alternatives which eventually come to be seen as counter-
dominational strategies. This difficulty is consistent with Schneider‘s formulation of 
the contracts and warrants available within any epistemic register and the manner in 
which said strategies may fail to acquire power. As Strauss recognised, it thus 
becomes clear how the pursuit of freedom (in and of itself, and in terms of freedom 
from responsibility) can inevitably decline into nihilism.  
Modernity has failed to provide meaning because sovereign power (now, driven by 
capitalistic gain) relies on an articulation of difference to maintain a universal ideal; 
thus, blocking the self-reflexivity necessary to recognise and admit a moral and 
cultural identity which has been a priori deemed to be a disempowered position. The 
‗politics of location‘ which emit from this denial are maintained through what are 
often violent and totalitarian means more as a matter of historically-inherited habit 
than of intention, especially when epistemological compliance in the ‗public sphere‘ 
is entrenched through socialisation. What appears as the pursuit of ‗freedom‘ in the 
Western imaginary terrain requires non-engagement with either reform or 
revolution. The position of the revolutionary, essentially disobedient, engages with 
the promise of the dialectic by default; whereas the position of acquiescence or 
obedience (if only via fear) is fundamentally non-engagement, which recalls 
Schmitt‘s warning against any ‗neutralisation‘ or a continuing pursuit of a ‗safe 
                                                 
524 Arendt, On Violence, 56. 
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haven‘ on earth, that which he considered as modernity‘s ‗continuing quest‘.525 
Invisibility and neutrality ‗protect‘ the freedoms granted by the sovereign powers of 
modernity, whilst capitalism redirects piety toward perpetual acquisition as the new 
‗ultimate concern‘,526 reflected in the wide-spread fetishisation of objects, often 
virtual or technological.527 As Gray observes, technology also enables the affluent 
majority to live in the virtual world created by mass media: ―New media 
technologies enable us to blank out the environments in which we live. Plugged into 
our Walkman, we can forget the squalor by which we are actually surrounded… in 
the virtual world conjured up by interactive television we are all only a moment 
away from wealth and freedom…‖528  
Obedience (and the protection of liberty and justice it promises) is also contingent 
upon trust in the ability of the authorising mechanisms of modernity in firstly, 
securing dependable knowledge and secondly, the characterisation of said 
knowledge as a collective good.529  In Steven Shapin‘s terms: ―That means that the 
relations in which we have and hold our knowledge have a moral character...‖530 
These authorising mechanisms descend directly from the medieval edict, following 
Asad, ―...that only a single Church could become the source of authenticating 
discourse.‖531 This formal authority, which establishes the foundations for Truth 
within modernity, governed the boundary between the ‗religious‘, the ‗heretical‘, and 
the ‗secular‘ in precisely the same manner as is found in the present day. Drawing 
                                                 
525 As cited earlier, though a refrain seems appropriate: “Schmitt views the history of modernity as 
driven by a continuing quest for a neutral and safe haven on earth in denial of the necessity to take a 
side between good and evil… His entire work can be understood as taking sides against all attempt to 
„neutralize‟ the truth…” Schmidt, 'The Problem of Carl Schmitt's Political Theology,' 221. 
526 Paul Tillich and Robert C. Kimball, Theology of Culture (New York,, 1959), 8. For the argument on 
piety, which updates both Marx and Weber on the relations between religion and capitalism, see  
Goodchild, Capitalism and Religion : The Price of Piety. 
527 In addition, as Barber argues, capitalist consumerist culture increasingly infantalises adults into a 
fear response where egoism is privileged over altruism, rights over responsibilities, ignorance over 
knowledge, and impulse over everything else. The suspension of the requirement to deal conclusively 
with challenging experiences or process new information means that the prospect of forgoing 
pleasure for pain in the service of any „higher ideal‟ often becomes incomprehensible. Benjamin 
Barber, Consumed : How Markets Corrupt Children, Infantalize Adults, and Swallow Citizens Whole 
(New York, 2007), 83, 88. Berger comments also that the surrender of the self to the ordering power 
of society (the transcendence of individuality) is both commonplace, and entirely irrational. Berger, 
The Sacred Canopy : Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion, 54. 
528 Gray, Heresies, 51-53. 
529 Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth : Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England 
(USA, 1994), xxv. 
530 Italics added. Ibid., xxv. 
531 Asad, 'Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz,' 244. 
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upon Foucault‘s notion of  ‗repeatable materiality‘, or the process by which 
statements, thresholds, and limits from one institution can be transferred into the 
discursive apparati (or episteme) of another,532 it is instructive to thoroughly consider 
Asad‘s historical account of heresy whilst reflecting upon its transposition into 
modernity.  
Asad writes: ―[heresy] constitutes... a dangerous departure from objective Truth. For 
heresy is the stubborn denial that the practices which guarantee universal Truth do 
in fact do so... What is immediately at stake... is the authority to judge the Truth, 
and...the disciplines... by which that authority is secured.‖533 Furthermore, and 
recalling the specifically Christian context in which these powers were constituted: 
―Every time a Christian suspect is tried by the inquisitorial process, and 
sentenced, or cleared... the authority of the Church is affirmed. Every time 
heretical beliefs and practices are defined or identified as error, the single 
Truth is maintained. Every time the Church establishes a new rule, elaborates 
an existing doctrine or allocates a fresh responsibility, the forms and 
consequences of transgression are multiplied. Every time a transgression is 
properly dealt with, a danger is successfully overcome and the authority of 
the Church confirmed.‖534 
 
Heresy, in a ‗churched‘ context, only became an issue when a religion of ‗instability‘ 
was created, roughly coinciding with the Reformation, and began to overtake the 
stable monastic religion;535 thus, heresy was recognised as a danger precisely because 
it threatened whatever stability remained for an increasingly fractured church.536 Heresy 
is also explicitly verbal, not just based in praxis, and is an act of will – which not 
only evokes Foucault‘s conception of the requirement for the subjugation of the will 
by the authorising discourses of psychiatry, but vastly extends its applicability cross-
nationally and cross-culturally, via the dissemination of institutional and ideological 
influences. To cite Asad again, but re-reading in reference to modernity:  
―The heretic‘s attachment to error is... a wilful act, dangerous to his or her 
own soul and the souls of other Christians [Moderns]... A heretic [The 
                                                 
532 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 102-103. 
533 Talal Asad, 'Medieval Heresy : An Anthropological View,' Social History, vol. 11: 3 (1986), 355. 
534 Ibid., 357. 
535 Ibid., 356. 
536 Supplement the word „church‟, which denotes a congregation, circle, assembly, body of select 
counselors, or a group conceived of in relation to – „what‟, is unspecified, though in the Judaic sense, 
signifying God –  (Oxford English Dictionary Online, retrieved 30 June 2011) the „fractured‟ group or 
community which „ought to be‟, yet is not, „the West‟. 
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Other], properly speaking, is someone who wilfully chooses to resist the 
virtuous will of the guardians of Truth... So a battle of wills is an essential 
feature of heresy: an objective relationship, nor a subjective experience. It is 
not by destroying the heretic [Other] that the Church [Modern] can win this 
battle, but only if it can first overcome his or her will by using whatever 
means are available. Yet undermining the heretic‘s [Other‘s] will to resist is 
merely a necessary pre-condition of victory, not the victory itself. The danger 
of heresy to the Christian soul [Modern spirit] is truly removed only when the 
heretic [Other] makes the Church‘s [Modern] will his or her own as the will 
of Truth. There must be, in other words, a willing acceptance of the Church‘s 
[Modern‘s] authority.‖537 
 
This citational ‗experiment‘ ought to have made the parallels with modernity quite 
obvious: the more dissention, the greater the perceived need for violent control or 
subjugation of the will by the sovereign powers, whilst simultaneously preserving the 
illusion that said subjugation has a compassionately motivated soteriological agenda. 
It is not only obedience, but consensual submission which is the demand underlying 
the empowerment of the Truth claims central to the epistemological authority of 
modernity‘s agents.538 Gramsci, writing on the subaltern relation to hegemony, 
coined the term ‗contradictory consciousness‘ to account for this submissive posture, 
a term which cannot be restricted to subaltern or marginalised groups but must also 
extend to the ‗Western‘ indigenes. In Gramsci‘s words:   
―The active man-in-the-mass has a practical activity, but has no clear 
theoretical consciousness of his practical activity, which nonetheless involves 
understanding the world in so far as it transforms it. His theoretical 
consciousness can indeed be historically in opposition to his activity. One 
might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one 
contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity and which 
in reality unites him with all his fellow workers in the practical 
transformation of the real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, 
                                                 
537 Amendments mine. “It is worth noting that institutionalized techniques for securing this aim are 
foreign to Islamic history.” Asad, 'Medieval Heresy : An Anthropological View,' 356. 
538 Grundmann (1968) as cited by Asad, “…has pointed out that the concepts „heresy‟ and „heretic‟ 
are essentially negative, that they are constituted by the mere contrast with and contradiction to the 
Faith of the Church, to its dogma and cult, to the morals of its clergy or to the attitude of its hierarchy. 
The only thing all heretics had in common, he observes, was their conviction that they understood and 
practiced Christianity better than the Church which condemned them.” Italics added. Ibid., 355. 
Consider then, how this arrogance has been transferred into the „heretical‟ categorisations inherent 
to, and projected from, and onto, the project of modernity. A central claim of modernity, though 
obscured, is that „secular‟ modernity practices a Christianity-inspired absence of Christianity better 
than self-defining members of the „Christian‟ religion: a claim upon which secular liberal 
humanitarianism is founded, and through which mechanisms the religious „other‟ (for whom 
modernity itself is the „heresy‟) is subjugated. 
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which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed. But this 
verbal conception is not without consequences. It holds together a specific 
social group, it influences moral conduct and the direction of will, with 
varying efficacity but often powerfully enough to produce a situation in 
which the contradictory state of consciousness does not permit of any action, 
any decision or any choice, and produces a condition of moral and political 
passivity.‖539 
 
Implicit to the success of the episteme is not only trust in its authorising agencies, but 
belief as a pre-condition for knowledge, which again, complies to the Christian 
orientation, in that what is believed, is believed ‗because it is true‘. Negotiations 
around ‗truth‘ which result only in the edict that ‗it has no single expression‘ result in 
what looks to be a pluralistic and relative worldview but is, in fact, the replacement 
of plural truths with the single ‗no truth‘ made possible by the dialectic; the 
expression and distribution of which becomes the Truth. The idea that ‗different 
people live in different worlds‘ can only occur from within a cultural context that 
can accommodate alternative positions, but the a priori exclusionary tactics of 
rationality, which eliminates all truths outside the evaluatory capacities of the 
scientific method, create a closed methodological system that cannot admit ‗different 
worlds‘ on any basis other than that which affords them a ‗reduced truth‘.  Dialogic 
methods, which are promoted as a ‗process of constructive conversation that works 
to grasp truly alternative points of view‘, with the aim of ‗genuine intellectual 
progress‘,540 cannot grasp any point of view without submitting it to a reduction 
which forces either the socio-political or aesthetic integration of the religious 
‗remainder‘, or its abandonment.  
This silent referent takes a familiar ouroboric form: the Enlightened and scientific 
worldview is absolute, a substitution of ‗false‘ explanation with ‗true‘ explanation, 
which is ‗true‘ because it is a rational product of Reason, as opposed to irrational, 
which the domain of the ‗cultural‘ and ‗religious‘. By definition then, neither of these 
designators can be applied to modernity. Clearly, this creates a loop, an authorising 
                                                 
539 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 
641. 
540 Charles Camic and Hans Joas, 'The Dialogic Turn,' in The Dialogical Turn : New Roles for Sociology 
in the Postdisciplinary Age, ed. Charles Camic and Hans Joas (USA, 2004), 9. 
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mechanism which explains itself by reference to itself, or what psychology calls a 
homunculus problem,541 which can be illustrated by the academic organisation of 
knowledge. The two claims of the ‗rationalisation‘ thesis, as elaborated in Helen 
Longino‘s treatment of the sociology of knowledge, hold that rational or true beliefs 
are explained by the fact that they are true or rational, and that irrational (or false) 
beliefs call for a sociological or causal explanation.542 As all social scientific 
explanations are also rational, all explanations must be rational.  
 
Jonathan Z. Smith‘s claim that ‗religion has no data‘,543 Bellah‘s ‗empty sign‘,544 and 
Wernick‘s ‗black hole where meaning used to be‘545 are the progeny of this 
homunculus (or perhaps the outcome of the war initiated with it); the virus in the 
academy which seeks and destroys all residual ‗ghosts in the machine‘.546 As de Vries 
argues, scholars have simply flipped the theological doxa of privileged truth to its 
epistemic opposite, asserting falsity or unverifiability instead.547 This is not to suggest 
that any of the abovementioned claims do not have any heuristic value, but to 
highlight the incommensurability of rationality with the claim that modernity is 
either cultural or religious. The Gods are not invited to the academic feast. As Shiva 
writes: ―…the Age of Enlightenment, and the theory of progress to which it gave 
rise, was centred on the sacredness of two categories: modern scientific knowledge 
and economic development.‖548 Furthermore, as argued by Shiv Visvanathan: ―The 
violence of modernity arises not merely from the violence of the state, but from the 
violence of science seeking to impose its order on society... it is the grammar of 
                                                 
541 Crapanzano, Imaginative Horizons : An Essay in Literary-Philosophical Anthropology, 151. 
542 Helen E. Longino, The Fate of Knowledge (USA, 2002), 16. 
543 Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown, Chicago Studies in the History 
of Judaism (USA, 1982), xi. 
544 Cited in Russell T. McCutcheon, The Discipline of Religion : Structure, Meaning, Rhetoric (London; 
New York, 2003), 29. 
545 Andrew Wernick, 'Post-Marx : Theological Themes in Baudrillard's America,' in Shadow of Spirit : 
Postmodernism and Religion, ed. Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick (London; New York, 1992), 60. 
546 Like the early Christian Churches, the study of religion, having been liberated (yet, not entirely set 
adrift) from theology, has absorbed the irreligious and pagan doctrines of science for fear of 
persecution, and to prevent loss of territory, and thus, their ultimate disappearance. The heightened 
stakes for those who seek to study religion in the wake of Enlightenment means that attempts to 
systematically annihilate it finds scholars positioned between two incommensurable poles: rationality, 
and the continued existence of religious belief. One must have an object to study, but yet, said study 
must be undertaken with acknowledgement of the dominant modus operandi of Academia. 
547 Hent de Vries, 'Introduction: Why Still "Religion"?,' in Religion: Beyond a Concept, ed. Hent de Vries 
(New York, 2008), 30. 
548 Cited in George Jerry Sefa Dei, Budd L. Hall, and Dorothy Goldin Rosenberg, 'Introduction,' in 
Indigenous Knowledges in Global Contexts: Multiple Readings of Our World, ed. George Jerry Sefa Dei, 
Budd L. Hall, and Dorothy Goldin Rosenberg (Canada, 2000), 9. 
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science that provides for the everyday fascism of modernity-as-technocracy... The 
increasing accumulation of science is seen as a sign of ‗grace‘.‖549 The legitimating 
boundaries engineered via the application of Reason control what counts for 
knowledge and determine what kinds of knowledge remain forbidden, approving 
only the scientific and rational kinds of curiosity that are certain to generate (and 
propel) increasingly scientific knowledge and economic gain.550 Scholarship and 
‗modern society‘ are founded on this axiom.551  
To consider modernity as a ‗culture‘ and to query the claim for ‗secularity‘ – which 
by default, makes modernity ‗religious‘ –  is therefore immediately heretical. Yet, as 
signalled earlier, there remains a significant ‗ghost in the machine‘. The ‗spectral‘ 
secularity of the modern, which hinges on a metaphysics of presence and absence, is 
central to understanding the successful maintenance of its epistemological structure.  
According to Stefanos Geroulanos, Foucault confirms that ―…modernity is marked 
not only by the lack of a distinct process of secularization but also by the survival 
and persistence of idealist and theologically laden motifs, according to which man 
comes to know and understand himself.‖552 The status and position of humanity is 
characterised by a theoscopy: the ‗eyes of an absent God‘; yet concurrently, the 
epistemological unavailability of the Gods-eye view.553 Following Nietzsche, and 
reading through both Foucault and Guy Debord, Geroulanos writes that the 
operations of technology are deliberately distinct from any theological content that 
would tie them to the affirmation of God, but this is precisely what institutes God as 
                                                 
549 “It is science as the modern man‟s „gaze‟ that brings the primitive and the archaic back into 
contemporaneity. It is science once again that must aid in their march to modernity. In the meanwhile, 
the latter become the objects of the experiment, the programme called modernization.” Shiv 
Visvanathan, "On the Annals of the Laboratory State," in Science, Hegemony and Violence : a requiem 
for modernity, ed. Ashis Nandy (Tokyo; Delhi University; Oxford, 1988), 100-102. 
550 Consider Becker: ““…the physical or natural scientist trusts in the basic neutrality of his subject 
matter. If he thought that the world of atomic particles was inherently evil or malicious, this would 
cripple scientific advance, take it back to the stage of alchemy.” Becker, The Structure of Evil : An 
Essay on the Unification of the Science of Man, 365. 
551 The following citation is relevant to both. Consider Gold: “…it is often difficult to find much 
common ground in religious studies.  Scholars examine different materials, employ alternative 
analytic frameworks, and have their own – sometimes highly idiosyncratic – (ir)religious and/or 
metaphysical perspectives. There is little authoritative truth there, either empirical or theoretical. Like 
most other humanists, we have long been forced to make the pieces of our argument depend not on 
any authoritative foundation but on one another. We thus invoke an alternative principle of validity in 
knowledge, one informing much idealist epistemology and most practical logic – that of coherence.” 
Daniel Gold, Aesthetics and Analysis in Writing on Religion : Modern Fascinations (USA, 2003), 57. 
552 Geroulanos, 'Theoscopy : Transparency, Omnipotence, and Modernity,' 649-650. 
553 Ibid., 649-650. 
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the unfailing observer.554 It is only in his death ―...that the formalization, 
dehistoricization, and discharging of all religious content in the divine can be 
emphasized, that a dechristianized Christian God can be reconstructed in order to 
fill in the divine.... to affirm a divine presence in its conceptual and empirical 
impossibility.‖555 Where the influence of this God is most present is in precisely those 
areas of modern life defined quite literally by his absence: that is, in the public 
‗secular‘ institutions.  
 
These modern institutions operate as if secularity had ‗hardened and cooled‘ to 
become an immovable ‗fact‘ of modern existence – which is actually against the 
spirit of modernity as it was originally conceived.556 Bauman puts this well:  
―Was not modernity a process of ‗liquefaction‘ from the start? Was not 
‗melting the solids‘ its major pastime and prime accomplishment all along? In 
other words, has modernity not been ‗fluid‘ since its inception?  …once we 
recall that the famous phrase ‗melting the solids‘, when coined a century and 
a half ago by the authors of The Communist Manifesto, referred to the treatment 
which the self-confident and exuberant modern spirit awarded the society it 
found much too stagnant its taste and much too resistant to shift and mould 
for its ambitions – since it was frozen in its habitual ways… [the spirit] 
therefore called for the smashing of the protective armour forged of the beliefs 
and loyalties which allowed the solids to resist the ‗liquefaction‘.‖557 
 
This requirement for a ‗hardened‘ secularity is linked to the necessity for 
‗epistemological closure‘ as demanded by the rationalisation thesis, against the 
‗impossibility‘ declared by the Foucauldian maxim that knowledge can never been 
‗closed‘ but occurs in an indefinite field of relations.558 The rigour with which this 
secularity is claimed is directly relevant to the failure of modernity to admit 
alternative epistemologies. It is precisely because the episteme acts as culture – as 
underpinned by a theology that is concealed by the hard secularity as administered via 
the institutions – that alternative epistemes fail to ‗translate‘. In addition, there is 
                                                 
554 Ibid., 651. 
555 Ibid., 651. 
556 Which is the institutional rejection of the variety intended by the spirit of modernity in favour of a 
fixed interpretation that deliberately attempts to eradicate challenges to tenets like „progress‟ and 
„secularity‟, which have in themselves become dogma. 
557 Bauman, Liquid Modernity, 3. 
558 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 191. 
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possibly no conceptual apparatus available for translating the alternatives in such a 
way that can be comprehended by the dominant and largely scientific paradigm. As 
Kuhn is famous for arguing, the only way out of this bind appears to be 
revolution;559 and, to wit, the only way to achieve revolution is to disrupt the 
paradigm by recognising that ‗belief‘ drives ‗science‘ just as powerfully as religion.  
Any alternative worldview that is not doxastically permitted by an individual‘s belief 
system is an impossibility, which emphasises the urgency with which the chief 
mediological instruments par excellence, the educational institutions, should be 
examined. The ‗closure‘ of knowledge within these institutions contains the subject 
of ‗cultural difference‘ and forecloses on it, by which it is meant that the enculturation 
process initiated through the pedagogical exercise generates a very particular human, 
discursive, and epistemological product.560 Freire calls this the ‗banking‘ system of 
education, in which ―…the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as 
far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits… knowledge is a gift bestowed by 
those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to 
know nothing.‖561 Though the libertarian models for education may profess more 
equality, the ‗banking‘ system constructs the acquisition and expansion of 
knowledge as if it were an open-ended possibility, but paradoxically, within a closed 
system of epistemological certitude. Clarence Joldersma, reading Freire, notes that it 
is ―through this model…  students are… implicitly indoctrinated to believe that all 
the activity, power, authority, and expertise to develop knowledge is held by the 
teacher and the expert…‖562 This model co-opts students into a system that treats 
them as passive objects rather than active humans, thus, creating a dehumanising 
epistemological passivity.563 Simone de Beauvoir, rephrased here by Freire in 
                                                 
559 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago, 1996). 
560 Consider Bhabha here: “In order to be institutionally effective as a discipline, the knowledge of 
cultural difference must be made to 'foreclose' on the Other; the 'Other' thus becomes at once the 
'fantasy' of a certain cultural space or, indeed, the certainty of a form of theoretical knowledge that 
deconstructs the epistemological 'edge' of the West. More significantly, the site of cultural difference 
becomes the mere phantom of a dire disciplinary struggle in which it has no space or power… the 
cultural politics of difference become the closed circle of interpretation. The „Other‟ loses its power to 
signify, to negate, to initiate its „desire‟, to split its „sign‟ of identity, to establish its own institutional 
and oppositional discourse.” Bhabha, 'The Commitment to Theory,' 16. 
561 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (London, 1972), 46. 
562 Clarence W. Joldersma, 'The Tension between Justice and Freedom in Paulo Friere's Epistemology,' 
Journal of Educational Thought, vol. 35: 2 (2001), 132. 
563 Ibid., 132. 
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connection with his argument for educational oppression, echoes the earlier points 
made with regard to the coercion of the will: ―Indeed, the interests of the oppressors 
lie in ‗changing the consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation which 
oppresses them‘… for the more the oppressed can be led to adapt to that situation, 
the more easily they can be dominated.‖564  
Implicit to this model is not only the theological breach between humanity and the 
world (where the human is merely in the world and not in relation with it), but also, 
the assumption (from psychology) that the human is not a ‗conscious creator‘, but 
rather, the ‗possessor of a consciousness‘; existing from the outset as an ‗empty 
vessel‘ to be socialised and educated according to cultural norms.565 What follows 
logically from this is the formalisation of an educational system that can ‗mediate‘ 
the way the world ‗enters into‘ the students.566 In Freire‘s words:  
―The educated man is the adapted man, because he is more ‗fit‘ for the world. 
Translated into practice, the concept is well suited to the purposes of the 
oppressors, whose tranquility rests on how well men fit the world the 
oppressors have created, and how little they question it…  The theory and 
practice of banking education serve this end quite efficiently.‖567 
 
Whilst Freire writes somewhat problematically of ‗the oppressors‘ as if there is some 
agential force that can be named and identified within modernity, his central ideas 
are nonetheless pertinent. Furthermore, an understanding of how the mechanisms of 
sovereign authority work; knowledge of what is permissible, ‗possible‘, and 
specifically forbidden; and the will to participate in a manner which is compliant with 
the dominant epistemological structures of modernity, are all prefigured in the moral 
incubator known as the ‗family unit‘, and concretely established through education. 
Explanations for social ‗deviance‘ generally fall back upon a perceived failure by the 
family, or alternatively, it is framed as an inability of the education system to ‗even 
out‘ pre-existing difficulties which are seen to originate with the moral failure of the 
                                                 
564 Simone de Beauvoir, „La Pensee de Droite Aujourd‟hui‟ in Privileges, 1955, as cited in Freire, 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 47. 
565 Inspired in part from the ideas found in Freire. Ibid., 49. 
566 Ibid., 49. 
567 Ibid., 50. Consider Chakrabarty: “How do we think the political at these moments when the 
peasant or subaltern emerges in the modern sphere of politics, in his or her own right, as a member 
of the nationalist movement against British rule or as a full-fledged member of the body politic, 
without have had to do any „preparatory‟ work in order to qualify as the „bourgeois-citizen‟?” 
Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe : Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, 10-11. 
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family. Cultural, religious, political, racial, or moral differences (when problematised 
in this manner) are therefore inscribed retrospectively at the level of family, or 
personal, influence and liability. In many popular modern discourses, the secular 
institution and its representatives are not culpable. 
The university simply extends this, as David Lloyd argues, ―…by shaping its 
curricula around an assumption of Western cultural centrality.‖568 The priorities and 
procedures of the universities are modelled on a European system that promotes a 
mono-ethnic and universalistic culture which is assumed to supercede local or ethnic 
values and knowledges.569 The ‗disciplinary structure‘570 is also a reproduction of the 
model of ‗spheres‘ by the division into ‗faculties‘, such as the technological, 
economic, political and cultural.571 The result is a structure that closely resembles the 
nation-state, conforming, to follow Lloyd:  
―…in all respects to the West‘s notions of modernity, academic objectivity, 
relevance, and hierarchy of bodies of knowledge. In this sense, the terms 
‗Western,‘ ‗European,‘ and ‗white‘ all designate… not merely another 
ethnicity… but a principle fundamentally antagonistic to the social 
                                                 
568 David Lloyd, 'Foundations of Diversity : Thinking the University in a Time of Multiculturalism,' in 
"Culture" and the Problem of the Disciplines, ed. John Carlos Rowe (New York, 1998), 20. 
569 Ibid., 20. 
570 The history of the word „discipline‟ comes from the Latin disciplina, meaning the instruction of 
disciples, and referred to an educational context and specifically to teaching doctrina, or doctrine. 
Disciplinarity was originally restricted to education, the teaching of an established body of knowledge 
and its transmission, but did not apply to research, experiments, or any other form of empirical 
exploration and validation.  Johan Heilbron, 'A Regime of Disciplines : Toward a Historical Sociology of 
Disciplinary Knowledge,' in The Dialogical Turn: New Roles for Sociology in the Postdisciplinary Age, 
ed. Charles Camic and Hans Joas (USA, 2004), 26. The relation between the word „discipline‟ as used 
in a university context and the notion that „all aspects of life ought to be disciplined‟ can be linked to 
the Protestant Reformation, especially its Calvinist version. Benavides, 'Modernity,' 199. 
571 Lloyd, 'Foundations of Diversity : Thinking the University in a Time of Multiculturalism,' 20. 
Consider Monroe: “…any discipline‟s explicitly articulated terms of value, its sense of what counts and 
what doesn‟t, deeply shapes that disciplines self understandings and writing practices and the forms 
of knowledge such practices inscribe and disclose.” Jonathan Monroe, 'Introduction: The Shapes of 
Fields,' in Writing and Revising the Disciplines, ed. Jonathan Monroe (USA, 2002), 10. Disciplines 
define what it is permissible to know, legitimate and limit the number of books one must have read, 
provide a specific tradition and lineage, and bind knowledge by the employment of a common set of 
research practices which unify their members. Andrew Delano Abbott, Chaos of Disciplines (USA, 
2001), 130. Furthermore: “Disciplines themselves amount to a containment strategy designed to 
prevent conflict and promote the uncritical acceptance of the institution.  That is to say, disciplinarity 
is the regulatory mechanism which assures the continued success of the institution itself.” Diane 
Elam, commenting upon Samuel Weber, as cited in Helen C. Chapman, 'Becoming Academics, 
Challenging the Disciplinarians,' in Breaking the Disciplines : Reconceptions in Knowledge, Art and 
Culture, ed. Martin L. Davies and Marsha Meskimmon (London, 2003), 40. 
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formations it has designated differentially as ‗ethnic‘… actively and 
continually [producing] irreconcilable categories.‖572 
The university, and the ‗experts‘ produced therein, simultaneously represent the 
ultimate expression and embodiment of ‗closure‘, and, the possibility for preventing 
this closure throughout the entire constellation of modern secular institutions. For 
Lloyd, the rationale for the initial formalised autonomy of the university – to secure 
a space for freedom on inquiry within autocratic states and to permit critical thought 
outside the limits of dogma and religion – is precisely the opening which has come to 
possess a crucial (if not covert) political significance; specifically illustrated by the 
university‘s role in ‗forming citizens‘.573 Unfortunately, this same possibility is 
undermined by the increasing corporatisation of the universities.574 Academic 
freedom is not the same as ‗freedom of expression‘.575 To cite Lloyd again:  
―An autonomy whose initial function was to preserve critical thinking against 
one state form has now become the alibi of subordination to another state 
form, and critical thinking an observation of disciplines. Objectivity becomes 
                                                 
572 Lloyd, 'Foundations of Diversity : Thinking the University in a Time of Multiculturalism,' 20-21. 
573 Ibid., 26-27. 
574 „Knowledge‟, as produced within the universities, has come to be thought of as a „success term‟ 
that affords status to the beliefs, claims, theories, and so forth, which satisfy certain conditions. 
Gilbert Ryle, as paraphrased in Longino, The Fate of Knowledge, 10. Knowledge also becomes 
somewhat reified through the economic relationship a scholar has with the university, and its various 
publishing divisions, which are responsible for the manufacture and distribution of „serious‟ books 
and journals. Increasingly, acceptance of papers and manuscripts must meet certain criteria to be 
considered academic as opposed to commercial, and thus justify the lower revenue generated by the 
production and sale of scholarly works. For an in-depth analysis of this problem see T. David Brent, 
'Merchants in the Temple of Scholarship: American University Press Publishing at Century's End,' in 
Critical Anthropology Now: Unexpected Contexts, Shifting Constituencies, Changing Agendas, ed. 
George E. Marcus (USA, 1999), 361-386. The importance of the peer review process to publishing 
also provides a type of guarantee that the articulated terms of value distinct to a discipline will remain 
constant, and as the quickest method of extinction in scholarship occurs through an individual‟s 
inability to publish, the networks of power that control publishing become integral to the question of 
what counts as knowledge. As Latour writes: “No matter what a paper did to the former literature, if 
no one else does anything with it, then it is as if it never existed at all.  You may have written a fierce 
paper that settles a controversy once and for all, but if readers ignore it [it] cannot be turned into a 
fact…  Fact construction is so much a collective process that an isolated person builds only dreams, 
claims and feelings, not facts.” Latour, Science in Action : How to Follow Scientists and Engineers 
through Society, 40-41. As Menard writes, making explicit the links to capitalism: “…by being free to 
regulate itself, the profession is free to reject what does not intellectually suit it and essentially to 
compel, by withholding professional rewards… the work that it does.” Cited in D. G. Hart, The 
University Gets Religion: Religious Studies in American Higher Education (USA, 1999), 248. 
575 “The former does not give license (though it has) to any point of view, no matter how reasonable or 
noble its pedigree. Instead, academic freedom is designed to protect the university from external 
restraints, especially those of politics and religion, and thereby establish its own professional 
standards.” Louis Menard, as paraphrased in Hart, The University Gets Religion: Religious Studies in 
American Higher Education, 248.  
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the code word for a positivistic acceptance of the status quo and the 
recirculation of unquestioned and immobilized objects of knowledge.‖576 
 
In addition, the dominant curricula, in theorizing the individual as ‗free‘ yet 
simultaneously subject to the ‗authority‘ of a higher power (whether a text or 
tradition), responds to an ideology which privileges the autonomy and liberty of the 
subject along with the legitimising agencies to which the subject must be obedient.577 
As Rousseau famously claimed: ―Man is born free, and everywhere he is in 
chains.‖578 This contradiction leads to a ‗transcendental‘ solution579 which privileges 
theory and the elevation of the expert intellectual; the response to which is the 
urgent call to re-ground theory in the pursuit of acquiring an effective politics. ―This 
demands,‖ to follow Bhabha, ―that we rethink our perspective on the identity of 
culture.‖580 
An alternative to the present status quo is to relativise the secular institutions of 
modernity via the incorporation (in Debray‘s sense) of the self-reflexivity demanded 
by Adorno and Horkheimer.581 If a bridge between different knowledge spaces is to 
be created, it must be approached from multiple directions simultaneously; taking 
into account the epistemological contradictions and finding ways of synthesising 
what might ultimately become a socially valuable conversation. What must be 
entertained is the possibility of ‗talking from two directions‘, for as Serres writes: 
―Who can‘t give a thousand examples of material that was not a part of the sciences 
a little while ago and that suddenly became included in them?‖582 Furthermore, if the 
Enlightenment (recalling Gray) has become integral to how we think, then it is 
pertinent to recall that to become ‗enlightened‘ relies on two or more sources of 
                                                 
576 Lloyd, 'Foundations of Diversity : Thinking the University in a Time of Multiculturalism,' 27. 
577 Morton and Zavarzadeh, Theory/Pedagogy/Politics : Texts for Change, 3. 
578 Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762) as cited in Charles E. Butterworth, 'Political Islam : The 
Origins,' Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 524:  (1992), 28. 
579 Morton and Zavarzadeh, Theory/Pedagogy/Politics : Texts for Change, 3. 
580 Bhabha, 'The Commitment to Theory,' 19. 
581 The idea forwarded by Miller is that: “A university of respect rather than of knowledge, one based 
on dissensus rather than the search for consensus, would certainly be a transformation of the 
traditional university based on the search for a universalized truth...  Nostalgia for the old... or even 
the hope [for] ...a new unified multicultural university to replace the monocultural one will not be 
effective... The responsibility of those who teach and do research in the new university... is to see as 
clearly as possible where we are... and figure out how to make use of what is left. This remnant must 
be the instrument of our transformative praxis.” J. Hillis Miller, 'Liberty and Cultural Studies in the 
Transnational University,' in "Culture" and the Problem of the Disciplines, ed. John Carlos Rowe (New 
York, 1998), 64. 
582 Serres and Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, 129. 
P a g e  | 152 
 
light, or it is simply a ‗position‘.583 Serres calls the new scholar who is capable of 
integrating these two sources of light the ‗Troubadour of Knowledge‘, the hybrid 
offspring of the scientist and the humanist who finds ‗as much rigor in a myth or 
work of literature as in a theorem or experiment‘, and simultaneously, myth in these 
also.584   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
583 Ibid., 178. 
584 Ibid., 183. As Latour writes: “…we cannot retain the illusion[s]… that moderns have about 
themselves and want to generalize [and distribute] to everyone: atheist, materialist, spiritualist, theist, 
rational, effective, objective, universal, critical, radically different from other communities, cut off from 
a past that is maintained in a state of artificial survival due only to historicism, separated from a 
nature on which subjects or society would arbitrarily impose categories, denouncers always at war 
with themselves, prisoners of an absolute dichotomy between things and signs, facts and values.” 
Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 133. 
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CONCLUSIONS 2: MEDIATING THE THIRD 
(Tertium Quid)585 
 
―Enchantment conjures up, and is rooted in, understandings 
and experiences of the world in which there is more to life 
than the material, the visible or the explainable; in which the 
philosophies and principles of Reason or rationality cannot 
by definition dream of the totality of life; in which the 
quotidian norms and routines of linear time and space are 
only part of the story; and in which the collective sum of 
sociability and belonging is elusively greater than its 
individual parts.‖  
Disenchantment, Enchantment and Re-Enchantment,  
Richard Jenkins, 2000.586 
As Eco suggests: ‗we are the primitives of an as-yet unknown civilisation‘.587 That 
our insistence, for a few hundred years, on the epistemological dominance of 
modernity may yet become a ‗quaint relic‘ of an out-dated and primitive way of 
thinking is both a peculiar and hopeful thought. If the project of science has been de-
animation, the new challenge is re-animation. How, then – to borrow from Dipesh 
Chakrabarty – do we claim the right to re-enchant a world that has been disenchanted 
by the nihilism of modernity?588 If the solution is pedagogical, as scholars like Serres 
argue, then what does this necessitate? How can scholarship be navigated, but also, 
grounded in a politically relevant and socially applicable manner which can go beyond 
secularity, in order to leave behind perpetual deference to the maxim that religion is 
the ‗primitive‘ error of the ‗primitive‘ remnants of incomplete modernisation – the 
‗cultural‘? As this question follows on from the deconstruction of the epistemological 
structure, and subsequent relativisation of modernity, potential answers can only be 
signalled herein, taking the premises tentatively established as its precondition of 
possibility. It would be a failure of theory (if theory is defined as the attempt to 
respond to a problem) to neglect the articulation of some of these possibilities. 
Considering culture and religion seriously means, ultimately, to consider all that the 
scientific discourses eliminate, and to be open to existing tensions and 
                                                 
585 Latin. “Some third thing.” „Tertium Quid‟, Oxford English Dictionary Online, Third Edition, (2010), 
retrieved 26 January 2011. 
586 Jenkins, 'Disenchantment, Enchantment and Re-Enchantment : Max Weber at the Millenium,' 29. 
587 I carry this quote in my head, perhaps paraphrased. Exact source, alas, unknown. 
588 As compiled from multiple sources in the original text: Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe : 
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Paraphrased in Pouchepadass, 'Review : Pluralizing 
Reason,' 385. 
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contradictions.589 This is not to suggest that there is no empirical value in scientific 
models of observation and explanation, but to situate them in their proper context as 
post-theo-scientific – that is, after theology. This leads directly into the issues that arise 
from the dominance of the social scientific reductionist methods that are generally 
employed to render objects of study, as designated by these terms: counter-balanced 
by hermeneutic, symbolic, and phenomenological methodologies.  
Scientific reductionism can be illustrated best by the discourse on spirits.590 There are 
no spirits, there never were spirits, and there never can be spirits, so any claim for said 
spirit ‗phenomena‘ is categorised as the irrational behaviour of individuals who 
falsely, if rationally, yet, contextually, believe in forces beyond that which science 
suggests as a reality. Social, psychological, and political explanations (such as those 
found in Marx, Freud, Weber, etc.,) conform to this scientific approach, with some 
alternation of emphases on the type and nature of explanation, in accordance with 
the social climate of a particular time period and location.591  
A hermeneutic or symbolic approach to this same problem is an analysis enacted 
from a critical distance, maintaining relativism, and therefore makes no value 
judgments or truth claims. This approach results in a narrative account which is 
generally literary, ethnographic, or comparative. ―The hermeneutic tradition,‖ as 
Chakrabarty writes, ―‗produces a loving grasp of detail in search of an understanding 
of the diversity of human life-worlds‘...  But it imposes no ‗third term of equivalence‘ 
supposed to ‗successfully mediate between differences‘...‖592 Proponents of the 
hermeneutic approach refuse to enter the dialectic, or to go beyond it, and it 
                                                 
589 Norbert Lechner, 'A Disenchantment Called Postmodernism,' boundary, vol. 20: 3 (1993), 136. 
590 Many examples of the reductions extended to possession phenomenon are possible, but as just 
one example consider the work of Michael Lambek, who has studied possession in Mayotte.  He 
states boldly that attempts to deal with possession must consider it to be within the realm of the 
imaginative, preferring to follow Evans-Pritchard in avoiding propositional assertions (“spirits exist”) in 
favour of various kinds of attitudes or degrees of focus.  At no point does he consider alternative 
medical or epistemological frameworks for moving the discussion beyond what he has clearly decided 
to be „imaginative‟ and related to „belief‟ (religion). Michael Lambek, 'Afterword: Spirits and Their 
Histories,' in Spirits in Culture, History, and Mind, ed. Jeannette Marie Mageo and Alan Howard (New 
York, 1996), 242, 247. 
591 With the exception of Weber‟s treatment of charisma, which may be considered as 
phenomenological. See William R. Garrett, 'Troublesome Transcendence : The Supernatural in the 
Scientific Study of Religion,' Sociological Analysis, vol. 35: 3 (1974), 173-176. 
592 As compiled from multiple sources in the original text [Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe : 
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference.] and paraphrased in Pouchepadass, 'Review : 
Pluralizing Reason,' 386. 
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therefore fails to be grounded in any manner which makes the interrogation of 
alternative epistemological claims possible. Furthermore, the claim of such scholars 
that it is not their ‗place‘ to investigate epistemological claims is only valid if they are 
aware of their own epistemological positionality, and can stand apart from this, 
which, at this time, appears structurally impossible given the nature of the academic 
idiom and its formalised reductions.  
The phenomenological (or transcendental) approach, in which religious and cultural 
phenomenon appear sui generis – neither reducible, nor contingent upon other 
empirical causes – protects the object of study absolutely, but also renders it 
impenetrable.593 An explanation procured by the use of this method claims the same 
distinction and the same difficulty as the scientific method, in that it also explains 
itself via reference to itself, and is thus, a ‗closed‘ inquiry. The institutionalised 
rational bias, which drives scholarship in one direction and spiritual ‗phenomena‘ in 
the other, is impossible to match to data procured via this process. 
All of these methods occur within the limits of the epistemological structure and in 
relation to, the silent referent for truth/knowledge. As Serres writes:  
―The subject of knowledge... is much less a matter of a common oral or 
written language, fluctuated and varied, than has commonly been believed. It 
amounts, rather, to a tacit and stable contract behind or under this language, 
a contract whose legal subject is the subject of science: virtual, current, 
formal, operational.‖594  
 
In addition, the only possible relationship between the scholar and object of study is 
representational: in fact, an excess of proximity to the object of study creates its own 
difficulties, as is illustrated by the ‗insider/outsider‘ problem which plagues 
disciplines such as anthropology.595 To cite Basarab Nicolescu: ―Our modernity—
what we call modernity in academic terms—appeared via a split between the Subject 
and Object. We say there is an Object, there is a Subject that observes it, and in 
                                                 
593 William R. Garrett, 'Troublesome Transcendence : The Supernatural in the Scientific Study of 
Religion,' Sociological Analysis, vol. 35: 3 (1974), 173-176 
594 Serres, The Natural Contract, 21. 
595 To cite Jacques Pouchepadass: “...at question here is the a priori valorization of „reason‟ 
understood as a liberal-secular form of reasoning, the underlying rationality built into the knowledge 
protocols of the social sciences... With this totalizing principle, the social-scientist can only create a 
subject-object („anthropologizing‟) relationship between himself and the evidence.” Pouchepadass, 
'Review : Pluralizing Reason,' 383. 
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between there is nothing else. That‘s the basis of what we call classic reality.‖596 
There is a total separation between the knowing subject and reality, from which the 
subject is assumed to be completely independent.597 If Christian transcendentalism, 
the dislocation of time and space, Protestant individualism, Descartes, the nature-
culture division, and so forth, are re-considered here, then it becomes clear how this 
one assertion of ‗fact‘ has been built upon a long history of negotiations. 
What is missing in this modern conception of reality is the incorporation into the core 
conception of identity (or, in modern parlance, ‗personhood)‘, of the various 
dimensions (and re-conceptualisations) of time, space, and nature/culture 
relationality which differ from the received post-Christianised version.598 As argued 
by Margaret Somers and Gloria Gibson, this abstraction of identity into a singular 
concept underpins the ontological impasse between actor and society in social 
theory.599 The human object of knowledge (the actor) is conceived of in what are 
claimed to be universalistic terms, whilst, in actuality, this universalism conceals a 
particular concept of the human individual transposed from (most recently) 
Enlightenment thought. Somers and Gibson write: ―The classical story of modernity 
was constructed... through a particular epistemological filter conjoining eighteenth 
and nineteenth-century social naturalism with a revamped seventeenth-century 
ontology of the social agent. Both were epistemological escapes from... time, space, 
relationality.‖600 This ‗universalised‘ individual is classified (to follow Freire) in 
accordance with the degree of ‗normative‘ socialisation and type of education to 
which they have been exposed, and can be represented and socially constructed only 
in reference to a similarly particularised social structure. Within the context of 
modernity there appears to be no possibility of any alternative representation; 
especially so in the system of ‗closed‘ modernity. 
                                                 
596 Volckmann and Nicolescu, 'Transdisciplinarity : Basarab Nicolescu Talks with Russ Volckmann,' 
83. 
597 “Objectivity, set up as the supreme criterion of truth, has one inevitable consequence: the 
transformation of the subject into an object. The death of the subject is the price we pay for objective 
knowledge.” Basarab Nicolescu, Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, Karen-Claire Voss trans. (USA, 
2002), 9, 13. 
598 For an application in the area of social construction and narrative strategies within sociology, see 
also Margaret R. Somers and Gloria D. Gibson, 'Reclaiming the Epistemological "Other" : Narrative and 
the Social Construction of Identity,' in Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, ed. Craig J. Calhoun 
(UK; USA, 1994), 41. 
599 Ibid., 47. 
600 Ibid., 58. 
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How, then, to create a space of hospitality, or even reciprocity, with respect to the 
alternative epistemological positions forwarded under the signifiers of religion, 
culture, ‗worldview‘, race, gender, and so forth? The pedagogical solution is 
exemplified in the transdisciplinary model of scholarship.601 This third position is 
projected ‗beyond‘ the dialectic via a critical and philosophical self-reflexivity similar 
to that which is attempted by the internal critiques of disciplines taken up by scholars 
in the Philosophy of History, the Philosophy of Science, and the Sociology of 
Knowledge.602 Transdisciplinarity attempts to move beyond the heavily restricted 
spaces of disciplines by combining these critical positions in order to deal with the 
dynamics of several types of reality simultaneously – a possibility which only 
becomes evident when differentiated knowledge positions are unified. Key to this is 
the assertion that knowledge is not an ‗object‘, but emergence from an interaction or 
point of interface/coherence ‗between‘ subject/object positions: transdisciplinarity 
ultimately claims to capture the action of the third, the interaction between the 
Subject and Object.603 As Nicolescu writes: ―The hidden third is there is mediate. 
This is the new aspect of what we can call transmodernity… which means three 
components of reality: Subject, Object, and the interaction term.‖604 In Bhabha‘s 
terms, a third space rejects any primordial unicity or fixity to enable some 
repositioning in response to seemingly irreconcilable cultural difference.605  
                                                 
601 Consider Nicolescu: “The term transdisciplinarity first appeared three decades ago almost 
simultaneously in the works of such varied scholars as Jean Piaget, Edgar Morin, and Erich Jantsch. It 
was coined to give expression to a need that was perceived – especially in the area of education – to 
celebrate the transgression of disciplinary boundaries, an act that far surpassed the multidisciplinary 
and interdisciplinary approaches.” Nicolescu, Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, 1. 
602 For the former, consider the work of Hayden V. White, The Content of the Form : Narrative 
Discourse and Historical Representation (USA, 1987), Hayden V. White, Metahistory : The Historical 
Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (USA, 1974). For the latter two, see Diederik Aerts, Bart 
D'Hooghe, and Nicole Note, eds., Worldviews, Science and Us : Redemarcating Knowledge and Its 
Social and Ethical Implications, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, 10 June 2003 (Singapore; USA, 
2005), K. Knorr-Cetina, Epistemic Cultures : How the Sciences Make Knowledge (USA, 1999), Kuhn, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas S. Kuhn, James Conant, and John Haugeland, The 
Road since Structure : Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview (USA, 
2000), Bruno Latour, Pandora's Hope : Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (USA, 1999), Latour, 
Science in Action : How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, Latour, We Have Never 
Been Modern, Longino, The Fate of Knowledge. 
603 Volckmann and Nicolescu, 'Transdisciplinarity : Basarab Nicolescu Talks with Russ Volckmann,' 
83. 
604 Ibid., 83. 
605 Bhabha, 'The Commitment to Theory,' 18-21. 
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An example of this epistemologically rendered cultural difference is required. 
Consider this passage on hunting practices from British Columbia, as documented 
by Hugh Brody: 
―Some old-timers, men who became famous for their powers and skills, had 
been great dreamers.  Hunters and dreamers.  They did not hunt as most 
people do now.  They did not seek uncertainly for the trails of animals whose 
movements we can only guess at.  No, they located their prey in dreams, 
found their trails, and made dream-kills.  Then, the next day, or a few days 
later, whenever it seemed auspicious to do so, they could go out, find the 
trail, re-encounter the animal, and collect the kill.‖606 
 
Such intuitive techniques involving dreaming or meditative practices are generally 
interpreted as ‗religion‘, ‗storytelling‘, or ‗myth‘, despite the claim that they are 
utilised as a part of subsistence practices.607 The ‗impossibility‘ of this narration of 
events prevents it from being seen as anything but ‗religious‘, or perhaps, a ‗mythical‘ 
re-ordering of reality which has ‗story-value‘.  Even when it is presented by the 
anthropologist, it is relegated to the realm of the ‗cultural‘. The potential legitimacy 
of this manner of acquiring information is excluded by science and thus, excluded 
from the dominant episteme. Of the three kinds of knowledge valued by the 
Canadian people (from whom this recollection is drawn), the first two – traditional, 
and empirical knowledge – may be considered as possessing potential knowledge 
‗value‘, but the third – revealed knowledge – does not.608 The silent referent which 
rejects a Christian context for ‗revelation‘, as against a scientific explanation, blocks 
any interrogation of this type of claim as rational. Revelation is also claimed in the 
modern tradition as the false assertion of Christianity, over, above, and against other 
religious traditions.609 
Transdisciplinarity recognises simultaneous modes of reasoning: the rational and the 
relational.610 The aporia, in Derrida‘s conception, ceases to become a limit by the 
                                                 
606 Cited in Marlene Brant Castellano, 'Updating Aboriginal Traditions of Knowledge,' in Indigenous 
Knowledges in Global Contexts: Multiple Readings of Our World, ed. George Jerry Sefa Dei, Budd L. 
Hall, and Dorothy Goldin Rosenberg (Canada, 2000), 24. 
607 In the history of the study of myth by scholars of religion, myth has been generally seen as a 
„cultural product‟ as opposed to a knowledge storage system. Although it does sometimes conform to 
the former category, the understanding of how myth and storytelling may operate as educational 
devices is woefully underrepresented.  For an exception, see ibid. 
608 Categories derived from ibid., 23-24. 
609 Idea attributed to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011. 
610 See Nicolescu, Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity. 
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recovery of an ‗open‘, as opposed to ‗closed‘, idea of knowledge – correlated with 
the Foucauldian ideal.611 Things of ‗mysterious origin‘ are traditionally thought of as 
things we cannot ‗know‘, as their ordering is impossible utilising classical scientific 
notions such as proof and experiment, in which proof is verifiable.612 However, as 
Roelof Oldemon writes, defending a new and radically inclusive science, in matters 
of the psyche or of human communities neither innocent experiments, nor strict 
repetitions, can exist.613 A transformation in the general codes governing the 
production of discourse (an epistemological ‗break‘) would allow the conception of 
reality to become sufficiently ‗elastic‘ to make viable the interpretations and 
epistemological models that employ alternative causal chains.614 This necessarily 
involves overthrowing what Magoroh Maruyama has called the ‗monopolarisation 
of Euro-American thinking‘ to become ‗transpective‘, which is Maruyama‘s term for 
going beyond empathy (a projection between two persons sharing a single 
epistemology) in the attempt to experience a foreign belief or knowledge perspective; 
the result being the ability to hold multiple epistemological perspectives at any one 
time – a ‗polyocular‘ vision.615 This extreme openness may sound ambitious, but 
Maruyama is one of the very few scholars who can suggest theory which approaches 
what may be required in order to overcome this impasse. Questions which might 
have considerable impact on how education is structured at all levels arise from the 
contemplation of such ideas; especially if it is recognised that the primary 
incompatibilities that necessitate co-operation between different worldviews are 
either moral or soteriological at base.  A similar set of questions might arise from 
                                                 
611 In Nicolescu‟s conception, the action of the logic of the included middle on the different levels of 
Reality (which, being a physicist, he articulates in accordance with a quantum version of reality) 
induces an open structure that implies the possibility of a self-enclosed, yet complete theory. 
“Knowledge is forever open.” Volckmann and Nicolescu, 'Transdisciplinarity : Basarab Nicolescu Talks 
with Russ Volckmann,' 76. 
612 Roelof A. A. Oldeman, 'To Know or Not to Know, One Way or Another,' in Worldviews, Science and 
Us: Redemarcating Knowledge and Its Social and Ethical Implications, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 
Brussels, 10 June 2003, ed. Diederik Aerts, Bart D'Hooghe, and Nicole Note (Singapore; USA, 2005), 
86. 
613 Ibid., 86. 
614 Oldeman, p. 83 As Riegler, citing Glaserfeld, notes: “Those who merely speak of the construction 
of knowledge, but do not explicitly give up the notion that our conceptual constructions can or should 
in some way represent an independent, objective reality, are still caught up in the traditional theory of 
knowledge.” Alexander Riegler, 'Inclusive Worldviews: Interdisciplinary Research from a Radical 
Constructivist Perspective,' in Worldviews, Science and Us: Redemarcating Knowledge and Its Social 
and Ethical Implications, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, 10 June 2003, ed. Diederik Aerts, Bart 
D'Hooghe, and Nicole Note (Singapore; USA, 2005), 31. 
615 Magoroh Maruyama, 'Towards Human Futuristics,' in Cultures of the Future, ed. Magoroh 
Maruyama and Arthur M. Harkins (Paris, France, 1978), 51-52, 55. 
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negotiating the incommensurabilities between different ideas of how knowledge and 
medicine are related. 
Transdisciplinarity also incorporates the Kantian ideal of a ‗mature Reason‘616 and 
allows for the possibility of an ‗Enlightened‘ universiality, which recovers and 
upholds the human as a relational subject possessing legitimate individual difference, 
as opposed to an object defined according to particularised classificatory logic. 
Moral equivalence between subjects rendered in conventional humanistic terms may 
be impossible, but a co-operative and reflexive relational ethic, grounded in re-
education, could generate a more integrated political theory that does not evade 
difficult political issues. It is in this arena where the reconciliation between 
legitimate speech and issue of silencing is most urgently required. Though 
humanism and universalism seem almost indistinguishable, as Robbins notes, the 
possibility to go beyond a ‗blanket endorsement‘ of old-school universalism is 
actually found in the cohesive ‗accident‘, in which marginalised positions have 
become invested in solving similar social issues.617 The collective ‗others‘, who are 
racialised, gendered, religious, cultural, and so forth, are arguing in the language of 
diversity for what amounts to a universal humanitarian ethic of inclusion, provided 
that this is not depoliticising.618  
As Celia Haig-Brown writes in favour of reciprocity between knowledges: 
―Something decent, respectful, and human disappears in the space between as one 
                                                 
616 It must be noted that Kant‟s notion of „truth‟ was implicitly Judeo-Christian in its moral orientation 
Consider Goldberg: “The shift from religious to secular morality is reflected in the fact than Kant 
began by assuming that ordinary moral judgments in the Judeo-Christian tradition must legitimately 
be claimed to be true.” Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 17. 
617 Robbins, 'Race, Gender, Class, Postcolonialism : Toward a New Humanistic Paradigm?,' 559-562. 
618 Cultural belonging, aside from providing a reassuring illusion of fixed identity, is also a claim that is 
professed to confer „rights‟ within liberal democracies. The example of successful homosexual law 
reforms provides a case in point: though not generally thought of as members of a „cultural minority‟, 
collectivised political action conferred rights, but also transformed sexual practice into a culture or 
way of life that demands protection in exactly the same sense claimed by ethnic or religious 
minorities. Gray, Enlightenment's Wake : Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, 21. 
Affrontery is the only appropriate response to this when it is properly examined, which circles back to 
Gray‟s thoughts on tolerance. If there is ever to be an „appropriate‟ application of Reason, perhaps it 
ought to be directed at the strongly incompatible moral views between Christianity, Judaism, Islam, 
and „secular‟ modernity, especially given their common heritage. Unfortunately, due to the 
incommensurability of certain faith claims and the type of „Western‟ education that is presently 
offered throughout much of the world, this application may continue to prove both elusive and 
resisted.  
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knowledge insists on dominating the other.‖619 Justice, returning to Derrida, requires 
an engagement with the other which hinges upon responsibility, but also, either the 
removal of the ‗otherness‘ which modernity appears to require as the ‗other party‘ 
within the dialectic, or alternatively, a new type of universalism. The hybrid identity 
promoted by Bhabha does not attend to these issues as it is asserted against the 
humanist self and the right to claim ‗pure‘ otherness; in Robbin‘s terms, promoting a 
‗wrong‘ universalism.620 The ‗otherness‘ cannot be ‗removed‘ per se, but rather, the 
adjustment must occur in relation to the requirement for modernity (as normative) to 
be set against the category of otherness. As Robbins argues, there are no ‗global 
conditions‘ or ‗universal solutions‘;621 globalisation is, itself, a ‗Western demand‘ and 
imposition via modernity and the inherited distribution of ‗empire‘.622 Other 
assertions include that of Spivak: ―It has appeared to some of my readers recently 
[1991] that I seem to be moving towards some notion of universal humanity, and 
this has surprised them – I am expected to emphasize difference.‖623 Spivak argues 
that ―the principles of a universal humanism – the place where indeed all human 
beings are similar – is... lodged in their being different‖624 To cite Latour: ―Perhaps it 
is easier today to give up belief in our own strangeness. We are not exotic, but 
ordinary. As a result, the others are not exotic either. They are like us, they have 
never stopped being our brethren.  Let us not add to the crime that of believing we 
are radically different…‖625 In Nicolescu‘s terms, it is the transdisciplinary project 
which might enable this mediation between unity and difference:  
―When we speak about transreligion and transculture—these are the two key 
words in transdisciplinarity, in this field of the principle of relativity—we 
don‘t speak about unity in the sense of dogmatic unity. Each religion has to 
have dogmas in order to speak in a clear way. In culture, you have to have a 
set of rules to identify American culture, European culture, the various types 
of cultures. When we speak about transculture, we don‘t mean one culture all 
over the world. We say there is unity of cultures, but in a transcendental 
way... It is like a strange attractor in the sense you have an asymptotic point 
                                                 
619 Celia Haig-Brown, 'Working a Third Space : Indigenous Knowledge in the Post-Colonial University,' 
Canadian Journal of Native Education, vol. 31: 1 (2008), 261. 
620 Robbins, 'Race, Gender, Class, Postcolonialism : Toward a New Humanistic Paradigm?,' 565. 
621 Ibid., 565. 
622 Idea attributed to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011. 
623 Cited in Robbins, 'Race, Gender, Class, Postcolonialism : Toward a New Humanistic Paradigm?,' 
565-566. 
624 Cited in ibid., 566. 
625 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 126-127. 
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that is there, but you cannot put your hands on it. If it‘s very carefully done, 
we avoid the wrong turns of transdisciplinarity.‖626 
 
In conclusion, what is being proposed is a model for re-engagement with the 
excluded epistemological positions within modernity, by way of a shift towards the 
transdisciplinary mode of thought and praxis as an opportunity for reconfiguring 
what counts for knowledge. This thesis argues that the present strategies, as 
particularly organised within education, must be strategically revised in order to 
become hospitable to what are currently permanent exclusions as designated via the 
illusion of the epistemological purification sequence. The inanimate nature of 
knowledge, especially its post-theo-scientific manifestations, demands to be situated 
and remobilized by human agents who are capable of the radical revision of the 
singularity of the episteme, ontology, and intellectual tradition upon which the 
secular institutions are founded. The question of (im)possibility with respect to 
hospitality is therefore critical. If the interrogation of modernity as a religious and 
cultural position can be regarded as successful, then perhaps the subject-object myth 
of critical distance, as inherited from the transcendental orientation of Christianity, 
will, like the accompanying myth of epistemological purity, eventually be exorcised; 
although it is necessary to also surrender the myth of secularization and the 
privileged positionality of ‗being modern‘ in order to achieve this. A suitable last 
word, as eloquently stated by Max Weber:  
―The fate of an epoch that has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must… 
recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be the products 
of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move 
us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals 
which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us.‖ 627 
 
 
                                                 
626 Volckmann and Nicolescu, 'Transdisciplinarity : Basarab Nicolescu Talks with Russ Volckmann,' 
85. 
627 Max Weber, „„Objectivity‟ in Social Science and Social Policy‟, 1904, as cited in David Harvey, The 
Condition of Postmodernity : An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, 
USA, 1990), 1. 
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